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1 
ABSTRACT 
EARIS, Stanley Derek. 
Thesis submitted for the degree of B.C.L. entitled:-
"A consideration of the concepts of Justice formulated by some 
twentieth century theologians and their application to some problems 
of English law in the 1970's." 
This study in jurisprudence aims to discover what value and relevance 
some recent theological thought on the nature and application of 
Justice has on some of the practical problems of English law in the 
1970's. To this end four theologians and two broad areas of legal 
concern have been examined and analysed. 
The theologians studied are Barth, Maritain, Tillich and Moltmann. 
They have been chosen to span the whole of the century to date and 
to represent different theological traditions and approaches. Their 
life and general theological approach, their concept of Justice and 
their application of such a concept to issues germane to this study 
are examined. 
Of the two legal areas examined the first is the 'equality' legisla-
tion which covers recent attempts to legislate for racial and sexual 
equality. The other is the recent legislation, or attempts at 
legislation, dealing with the 'right of life'. This covers such 
legal areas as abortion, euthanasia, the definition of life and the 
use of advanced medical technology. The legislative philosophy, the 
effectiveness of the legislation and its subsequent application by 
the Courts are all examined. 
The final Chapters attempt to assess whether the theologians examined 
have sufficient unanimity to provide a coherent concept of Justice 
and a specifically Christian contribution to the matters under dis-
cussion. The conclusion being in the affirmative it is then examined 
to what extent Christian precepts enumerated by them have been influ-
ential or could be used as a critical tool for the possible amendment 
or extension of the legislation. 
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SOME TI\IENTIETH CENTIJRY THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS 
OF JUSTICE. 
7 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
8 
The 1970's have seen a great concern for legislation seeking to 
influence the social and moral fabric of society. This study 
in jurisprudence seeks to evaluate some of this legislation and 
its attendant legal problems by concentrating on one strand in 
the philosophy of law - namely recent theological thought on 
the nature and application of Justice. Historically our 
Christian heritage has had a great influence on the formation 
and evaluation of English. law. It remains to assess its 
influence and potential in the present decade. For the purposes 
of this study four modern theologians and two broad areas of 
legal concern have been examined and analysed. 
Part I of this study examines the contributions of the four 
theologians selected. These are Barth, Maritain, Tillich and 
Mbltmann. Between the~an the whole of the century to date 
and they represent different theological traditions and approaches. 
In each case their own life and general theological approach are 
first examined. This is followed by an examination of their 
concept of Justice and concluded with their application of such 
a concept to issues germane to this study. 
Part II of this study concentrates on the two broad legal areas 
selected for analysis. The first of these is the recent 'equality' 
legislation. This covers attempts to legislate for racial and 
sexual equality. The second is the recent legislation, or attempts 
at legislation dealing with the 'right to life'. This covers such 
legal areas as abortion, euthanasia, the definition of life and 
the use of advanced medical technology. These Chapters concern 
themselves with the background to such legislation both in terms 
of history and legislative philosophy. They consider the legal 
provisions enacted or proposed, the effectiveness of any legisla-
tion and its subsequent application by the Courts. The positive 
laws considered are those in the United Kingdom only. American 
or Continental European laws or societies are not considered in 
depth, although they may on occasions be referred to. 
Part III of this study attempts to assess lvhether the theologians 
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examined have sufficient common ground to enable a coherent 
concept of Justice to be determined, and a specifically Christian 
contribution to be made to the matters under discussion. It 
further goes on to consider to what extent the Christian precepts 
enumerated by them have in fact been influential in current 
legislation or attempts at legislation, and to what extent they 
can be used as a critical tool for the possible amendment or 
extension of the legislation. 
A central problem of linguistics exists in relation to this study. 
This is the terminology employed for that universal ethical 
doctrine called in German 'Naturrecht', in French 'Droit Naturel', 
in Latin 'Ius Naturale' or 'Lex Naturalis', and in English commonly 
'Natural Law' • 
The English terminology of 'Natural Law', although established by 
long usage, is linguistically imprecise and potentially misleading. 
By referring to the concept by means of the word 'law' it inevit-
ably suggests, often quite erroneously, that the doctrine is part 
of the law of the land. Rather the concept normally referred to 
as 'Natural Law' is concerned with those universal principles that 
arise out of being human - i.e. from our human nature. Once 
formulated such principles have historically been regarded as 
beyond and superior to the positive law (i.e. the concrete laws 
of a particular country). They have therefore been regarded as 
reaching the realms of inalienable 'right'. 
Hence to refer to the concept as 'Natural Right', the alternative, 
though far less widespread English terminology, seems linguistic-
ally and logically infinitely preferable. In this study, therefore, 
the concept will be referred to by the alternative terminology of 
'Natural Right'. It should be noted that this is in all cases 
synonymous with the ethical concept of 'Natural Law', lvhich term 
may still occur in this study when quoting the published terminology 
of a particular author. 
It remains to point out that this study professes to evaluate and 
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reflect the situation which existed until January 1st 1979. 
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CHAPTER 2 MARITAIN 
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MARITAIN'S LIFE 
Jacques Maritain was born in France in 1882. He was brought 
up a Protestant and early in his education developed a fascin-
ation both for the natural sciences and for philosophical questions 
about life and death. He was attracted to the Sorbonne in Paris 
by teachers who claimed to be able to relate the two. It was 
while at the Sorbonne that Maritain met his future wife - Raissa 
Oumansoff, a Russian-Jewish student. Both became disillusioned 
with the Sorbonne's scientism and began to attend lectures by the 
intuitionist philosopher Bergson. We will see that these lectures 
had a profound effect on Maritain's later philosophy and theology. 
They were also of dramatic personal influence at the time, for 
from Bergson Maritain came to realise his need for 'the Absolute'. 
In 1906, two years after studying with Bergson, Maritain was 
converted to Roman Catholicism. 
~furitain's studies continued at Heidelberg from 1906-08 where he 
studied Biology. This was followed by an intensive study of 
Thomism in Paris, thus laying the classical foundation for 
Maritain's own philosophy. In 1913 he began teaching at the 
Institut Catholique, serving as Professor of modern philosophy 
(1914-1939). In 1932 he began a long association with the American 
continent when he taught annually at the Institute of ~1edieval 
Studies in Toronto. During part of the war he was visiting 
Professor at Princeton (1941-2) and Columbia (1941-2). He 
returned as Professor of philosophy at Princeton (1948-60) after 
serving as French ambassador to the Vatican (1945-48). 
The second world war and its aftermath led Maritain increasingly 
to concern himself with the modern formulation of the doctrine of 
natural right ('droit nature!'). His book 'The Rights of~~', 
published in 1944 has been seen by many as influential on the 
later United Nations 'Declaration of Human Rights' (1948). 
'The Rights of Man' can be seen as a fitting development of his 
previous political and philosophical studies. Examples of these 
are 'Freedom in the Modern World' (1935), 'True Humanism' (1938), 
13 
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'Scholtsticism and Politics' (1940) and 'Redeeming the Time' (1943). 
Further developments of his politically motivated philosophy can be 
seen in 'Christianity and Democracy' (1945) and 'Man and the State' 
(1954). 
In 1958 at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, the Jacques 
Maritain Centre was established to further studies along the lines 
of his philosophy, but Maritain himself continued to publish to 
an advanced age - the latest of his major works being his 'Moral 
Philosophy' (1964) and his 'On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus' 
(1967). He died in 1973 at the age of 91. 
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A. MARJTAIN'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Maritain's philosophy is firmly rooted in the classical tradition 
and heavily influenced by Aristotelianism and Thomism in its treat-
ment of Christian doctrine. However Maritain's philosophy also 
goes far beyond the Scholastic tradition and draws on the breadth 
of his own education. So we find an important part played by 
science, anthropology, sociology and psychology as well as modern 
philosophy. ~mritain believed that philosophy must always take 
into account data from other branches of human knowledge. Hence, 
science, poetry and mysticism are all among the many different 
ways of knowing reality. 
Maritain's debt to Thomism and Aristotle can chiefly be seen in 
1 
his acceptance of Aristotle's doctrine of natural right as refined 
and Christianised by St. Thomas~ St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, 
believed in three hierarchical levels of law. The highest source was 
the unchangeable eternal divine law binding directly on all men and 
all other creatures. At the second level came the unchangeable 
natural right, being divine law as man is given the heart and soul 
to understand it. At the third level is the temporal positive lruv 
which is changeable but which should respect the limits laid down 
by the divine law and the natural right. According to the Thomist 
position man discovers the natural right by ascertaining God's will 
through reason. God's will could be determined by intellect and by 
reflecting on human nature. Influential here can be seen Aristotle's 
belief that all things have an innate tendency to fulfil their own 
destiny - the Divine spark in all mankind. 
We see that for Maritain also natural right not only expresses what 
is natural in the world, but also what is known naturally by men. 
To exist is to act according to certain fundamental tendencies. We 
will, however, see in the next section a refining of the Thomist 
position - particularly the dynamic element introduced through the 
influence of the philosopher Bergson~ Bergson sought to examine 
the phenomenon of change in his philosophy. As such he challenged 
mechanistic theories of evolution for failing to recognise the true 
15 
nature of reality and the existence of a vital impulse or urge 
(llan vital). This intuitive level motivated consciousness and 
the constant phenomenon of change. Hence life is dynamic, has 
force and will, and struggles for richness and complexity through 
and beyond matter. ~futter is the congealed residue of creation 
that has already taken place and, according to the laws of nature 
is in a gradual state of erosion. Morality and religion can be 
regarded in similar terms - having both a static principle com-
bining nature's heritage and the accumulation of past forms and 
also a dynamic principle through which morality and religion remain 
4 
always in crisis - always alive to contingency and growth. 
~ritain's own understanding of natural right and Justice, influ-
enced by Aristotle, St. Thomas, Bergson and others led to a vital 
interest in the human person and the political community. For 
Maritain, although fundamentally the human person transcended the 
political cornrnunity,nevertheless political institutions based on 
justice were essential. Men holding different beliefs must co-
operate in their formation and maintenance. Maritain's philosophy, 
although profound is never abstract. It is developed to apply to 
the practicalities of human life. In the sphere of law it is one 
of the most comprehensive examples of naturalist legal philosophy 
in the twentieth century. 
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B. MARITAIN 'S CONCEPT OF JUSTICE 
1. The Nature of the Concept 
For Maritain, justice is unquestionably an ontological concept. 
It is a direct emanation from God and part of His very being. 
So:-
"True justice, the justice of the sages and the Saints descends 
from Divine reason and permeates all reality as a living impulse, 
leading everything to its end." 5 
Here we see clearly the influence of Aristotle's belief that all 
things have an innate tendency to fulfil their own destiny. 
Maritain has put this in a Divine context. It is a conscious 
expression of God within His creation and not an act of arbitrary 
will:-
"Justice springs from His very Essence as He sees it in his Eternal 
vision and not from an act of arbitrary will." 6 
Conversely, false notions of justice are those that do not issue 
from the Divine will - that which is not ontological. True justice 
implies true human personality - the recognition that man has the 
rights and responsibilities befitting a creature of God. False 
justice imperils the basis of such rights and responsibilities:-
"The worth of the person, his liberty, his rights, arise from the 
order of naturally sacred things, which bear upon them the imprint 
of the Father of Being, and which have in Him the goal of their 
movement." 7 
It is from this belief in the sacredness of human personality that 
we are able to perceive, to a greater or lesser extent, Divine 
principles of justice in human affairs. 
In this Maritain is faithful to the Thomist position. He follows 
St. Thomas in believing that Justice is conformity with the Lex 
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aeterna. This is perceived in human terms as, on the one hand, 
the justice of God in terms of revealed Lex divina, and, on the 
other hand, in terms of Natural Right. Lex divina is expressed 
in the precepts of the Old and New Testaments. Maritain recog-
nises that there are many precepts which are not relevant to the 
social life but only to the spiritual life. There are, however, 
some that are specifically directed to social relations - for 
example 'treat your neighbour as yourself.' However, Maritain, 
although maintaining the basic scheme, examines principally 
the philosophical and legal notion of natural right in order to 
give the concept of Justice substance. The basis and exposition 
of the rights of man in the modern age are his basic concern. 
These come from God:-
"Every right possessed by man is possessed only by virtue of the 
right possessed by God, which is pure Justice, to see the order 
of His wisdom in beings respected, obeyed and loved by every 
intelligence." 8 
The basic philosophical problem is, however, how this form of 
Justice through natural right can be perceived. It is to 
~furitain's exposition of this that we now turn. 
2. The perception of Justice through Natural Right 
For Maritain the true idea of natural right must spring from the 
depths of our own being or essence. It "is regarded in an onto-
logical perspective and as conveying through the essential 
structures and exigencies of created nature the wisdom of the 
Author of Being." 9 It is that lUlWTitten law that man comes to 
know through his lUlderstanding, intelligence, and Divine creation. 
As such it has a respectable Christian and philosophical pedigree. 
In the Christian heritage we can trace the concept to Grotius 
and before him to Suarez and Francisco de Vittoria. Thence back 
to St. Thomas, St. Augustine and St.Paul. In pre-Christian 
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philosophy to Cicero, the Stoics and Aristotle. 10 
The notion of natural right does, however, take a number of 
philosophical points for granted. It takes for granted that 
there is a human nature which is the same in all men, and also 
that the human will seeks to attune itself to the necessary ends 
of the human being. So ~furitain can proclaim:-
"There is, by virtue of human nature, an order or a disposition 
which human reason can discover and according to which the human 
will must act in order to attune itself to the necessary ends of 
the human being. The unwritten right, or natural right, is nothing 
more than that." 11 
To expound and elaborate his view of natural right Maritain 
discusses it with regard to nvo elements. The first is the 
ontological. By this:- "I mean the normality of functioning 
which is grounded in the essence of that being man." 12This is 
inherently geared to achieving fullness of being in his behaviour. 
It is an ideal order relating to human reactions. Maritain is, 
however, careful to counter a possible misunderstanding:-
"I do not mean that the proper rule for every possible human 
situation is contained in our human essence .••• Human situa-
tions belong to the existential order. Neither they nor their 
appropriate regulations are contained in the essence of man. 
I would say that they pose questions to that essence." 
Hence to Maritain the natural right is both ontological and ideal. 
Ideal because it is grounded in human essence and ontological 
because human essence is an ontological reality. 
The second element Maritain elaborates is the gnoseological -
the natural right as known. Natural right is not written. This 
is bound to lead to relativism - men can know it with greater or 
lesser difficulty and in different degrees. It is subject to 
errors both in perception and in elaboration. The only self-
evident principles are those of the broadest nature - for 
example 'do good and avoid evil.' ~furitain follows St. Thomas 
19 
in seeing natural right not as rational knowledge but knowledge 
through inclination. Hence it is not clear knowledge:-
"It is obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality 
or affinity, in which the intellect, in order to form its judgement 
consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibratory strings 
of abiding tendencies awaken in us." 13 
n~f1).\ r\~\,o.~ 4t."o\"\~ 
Nevertheless Maritain can seeLwithin the framework of history and 
civilisation for he believes that human knowledge of natural right 
is progressively shaped and moulded by inclinations of human nature 
starting from the most ancient social communities. 
Here we see the great influence of Bergson's philosophy on Maritain. 
It was Bergson who taught Maritain about the progressive nature of 
insight and knowledge. For Bergson such progression was not 
necessarily a gradual unfolding but may well be in sudden leaps 
of intuition, sudden acts of creation - each of a violently impera-
tive character. Hence for Bergson:-
"The modern idea of Justice has progressed in this way by a series 
of individual creations which have succeeded through multifarious 
efforts animated by one and the same impulse." 14 
Interestingly for Bergson this is not a linear development of the 
new but a drawing out of pre-existing hypostasis:-
"Instead of realizing that some new thing has come and taken 
possession of the old and absorbed it into a whole that was up 
to then unforseeable, we prefer looking upon the process as if 
the new thing had always been there, not actually but virtually 
pre-existing •... the conceptions of justice that followed one 
another in ancient societies were no more than partial, incomplete 
visions of an integral justice which is nothing more or less than 
justice as we know it today." 15 
~~ritain, looking to anthropology, similarly comments that it 
shows both a universal awareness of natural law and an immense 
relativity. Defective contents become whittled away with the 
passage of time. ~fun realises also from this process that natural 
20 
right enumerates both rights for himself and obligations or duties 
to others. The elaboration of these for modern society was one 
of Maritain's chief concerns. 
By means of the ontological and gnoseological elements Maritain 
seeks to guard against a simplistic view of natural right which 
would endanger its credibility. Natural right on the one hand 
claims the utmost supremacy - an ontological rooting in man's 
essence, itself implanted by God. On the other hand it is not 
transparent. Its extraction without blemish is a matter of 
skill and delicacy. It is also subject to an evolutionary 
doctrine. The emphasis within both elements points out that 
the 'lex aeterna' is the ground of natural right. Belief in 
natural right is firmer therefore in those who believe in God. 
However, Maritain points out that belief in human nature and 
in the freedom of the human being is sufficient to convince us 
that there are un\vritten rules and tendencies and to assure us 
that natural right is something as real in the moral realm as 
so-called 'laws' of growth and sensience are in the physical 
realm. 
Throughout Maritain's exposition of natural right we see that 
reason has an important role to play. Maritain follows the 
classical formulation of natural right by Aquinas in stressing 
that man's reason is God-given and is the means whereby he can 
ascertain God's will and carry out the difficult task of discern-
ing the natural right. Neither Maritain's ontological nor his 
gnoseological elements could be perceived unless reason takes 
this central role. It is precisely this importance given to 
human reason in the natural right tradition that incurred the 
wrath of Protestants like Barth. To them the foundation of 
human reason was one of sand for it was corrupted by sin and did 
not focus sharply enough on God. Maritain and the Catholic tradition 
•re ~' however, far more optimistic on the capabilities of human 
nature and reason. 
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3. Natural Right and Human Rights 
For Maritain a belief in natural right necessarily implies a 
belief in human rights:-
"Every right possessed by man is possible only by virtue of the 
right possessed by God, which is pure Justice, to see the order 
of His wisdom in beings respected, obeyed and loved by every 
intelligence." 16 
Here we see in a nutshell the close and essential relationship 
between Maritain's concepts of Justice, natural right and human 
rights. He stresses that this philosophical foundation is of 
importance if the human rights themselves are to be on a strong 
foundation. Different philosophies may ~-tE:~e the same htnnan 
rights but only the correct philosophy can guarantee their 
continuance:-
"A kind of intellectual and moral revolution is required of us, 
in order to re-establish on the basis of a true philosophy our 
faith in the dignity of man and in his rights, and in order to 
rediscover the authentic sources of this faith." 17 
However, from the point of view of pragmatism and of such docu-
ments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it 
is fortunate that certain 'rights of man' can be agreed on a 
broad basis, although there is no unity of faith or philosophy 
in the minds of men. 
In order to demonstrate the unique character of those human rights 
derived from the natural right, Maritain takes some care in distin-
gui~ng natural right from the law of nations and from positive law. 
He believes one of the errors of the rationalist philosophy of 
human rights has been to regard the positive law as a mere tran-
script traced off natural right which would prescribe in the name 
of nature all that which positive law prescribes in the name of 
society. This overlooks the immense field of htnnan things which 
depend on variable conditions of social life and free initiative 
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of human reason. Natural right precepts must therefore be in 
broad and general terms which are in themselves, or are in the 
nature of things, invariable. Perhaps the most fundamental 
precept is 'do good and avoid evil' for all the rights and 
duties of natural law must be connected in a necessary manner 
with this first principle. Jus gentium or international law 
Maritain sees as being an intermediary between natural right 
and positive law - it is the common law of civilisation. 
Positive law, on the other hand relates directly to the variable 
conditions of social life. 
Human rights therefore, emanating directly from the natural right, 
are inalienable. Maritain, however, carefully defines what he 
means by inalienable. He does not mean that they are by nature 
incapable of limitation, or that they are infinite rights of God. 
Some, like the right to existence, are absolutely inalienable. 
However:-
"Others, like the right of association or of free speech, are of 
such a kind that the common good would be imperilled if the body 
politic could not restrict in some measure the possession that 
men naturally have of them. We may say that they are inalienable 
only in substance." 18 
Even absolutely inalienable rights are liable to limitation not 
as to their possession but as to their exercise. Thus a homicidal 
criminal may justly forgo the assertion of his right to live. At 
a less dramatic level it may be fitting for us to forgo the exer-
cise of certain rights while acknowledging that we still possess 
them. Maritain quotes as an example that this might be the right 
course in a period of economic transformation in respect of private 
property or in a period of the development of an international 
community in respect of national sovereignty. Both of these 
examples have been proved to be very far-sighted. 
When Maritain comes to the elaboration of human rights in particular, 
he reaches further important conclusions. These arise from his 
theory of the relativity of our knowledge of natural right:-
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"In natural law there is immutability in regard to things, or 
the law itself ontologically considered, but progress and 
relativity as regards our human awareness of it." 19 
Hence the mere elaboration of rights from the natural right 
is not sufficient without great care. It is all too easy to 
be selective with regard to human rights. We must never forget 
counterbalancing rights to the ones we are enumerating. 
Hence there tends to be a conflict between old and new rights -
for example the right to a just wage may be in conflict. with 
the right to free agreement and private ownership. ~mritain 
sees the rights of workers and labour as containing an important 
group of newly realised rights - for example the right to join a 
union, to unemployment pay, to a just wage and to social security. 
That these may counterbalance previous, and still existing rights 
of employers naturally leads to tension and antagonism. However 
Maritain believes that these seem irreconcilable only because 
there is also a clash between two opposed ideologies and political 
systems. If each of the human rights were unconditional and 
exclusive of limitation then any conflict would be irreconcilable. 
As far as their exercise is concerned there are, however, conditions 
and limitations. There are, of course, great difficulties in the 
counterbalancing and harmonisation of rights but Maritain believed 
that a process of 'dynamic unification' is possible. The extent 
to which this is possible depends on underlying political ideologies. 
0 
He comments that both the capitalist and collectivist idellogies 
are defective and that 'dynamic unification' of rights will only 
come under a personalist system - i.e. one that stresses the 
common achievement of intrinsically human, moral and spiritual 
good and man's freedom of autonomy. In some passages ~britain 
comes close to saying that liberalism is the political ideology 
most congenial to natural right. 
24 
4. Equality and its relationship to Justice 
~~ritain, following the tradition of Aristotle, found it essential 
to relate theories of equality to justice. Indeed he devotes 
considerable space to the systematic philosophical exposition of 
equality - particularly in his book 'Redeeming the Time.' He 
begins by pointing out the difficulties of the concept of human 
equality:-
"It is surrounded by geometrical imagery that relates to those 
entities without ontological substance so characteristic of 
mathematical abstraction. Consequently, its application to 
human reality demands that the mind work constantly against 
the grain of this very imagery.'' 20 
Problems of equality, ~ritain maintains, concern at once man's 
psycho-physical nature and his social conditions and hence 
involve us in a multi-disciplinary study. He examines the concept 
with respect to three basic positions: 
The first ~.~ritain refers to as the 'Pure nominalist or empiricist 
notion of Equality' or the 'Anti-Christian Philosophy of Enslavement.' 
In this theory the unity or equality in nature between man is less 
basic than the inequalities. The ontological dignity of that nature 
or essence which all men have in common is overruled by the empirical 
observation of individual inequalities. Reality is theru made to 
rest on these - i.e. the fact of inequality leads to a deduction of 
inferiority. Pseudo-scientific reasoning is often used to back 
this up. This is the philosophy used to justify racialism and 
slavery. Thus the Nazi Nuremberg declaration could proclaim that 
there is a greater difference between superior and inferior humans 
than between apes and inferior humans. This is plainly an anti-
Christian philosophy of enslavement:-
"Whether one looks at it from the point of view of the natural 
order and the natural truths confirmed by Christianity, or from 
the point of view of the supernatural life and the supernatural 
truths which it brought into being, clearly such a philosophy of 
enslavement wounds Christianity to the heart." 21 
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The second position Maritain entitles 'Pseudo-Christian Egalitarian-
ism.' This is essentially an idealist deification of equality. 
Equality, implying sameness is the underlying principle to which 
all is made to conform. This alone is conceived as reality. 
Maritain sees this as logical and not ontological. The idealist 
sets up against natural inequalities a speculative denial. He 
minimises them as much as he is able, or thinks that they are 
above all the result of the artificial stratification of social 
life. Maritain points out that social inequalities spring from 
the diversity of the internal structures of society itself and 
from the diversity of the conditions of life. The idealist claims 
that these should not exist for man in himself cannot be unequal 
to himself. His essential dignity is outraged each time one 
individual is unequal to another, meaning each time one individual 
is different from another. 
For Maritain the idealists' error lies:-
"not in thinking there is an essential equality in nature between 
man. It lies in the conviction that all human substance reflows 
within the abstract species alone, and that the reality and value 
of these individual inequalities which are inscribed in the world 
of what is peculiar and historic are as nothing. But these individ-
ual inequalities despite the burden of sorrow or injustice which the 
sons of men or the viciousness of institutions may superimpose on 
them, are in themselves as necessary for development and flowering 
of human life as the diversity of parts are for the perfection of 
a flower or a poem." 22 
The idealist's concept of equality implies no vital depth, no variety 
in degree. The dignity of the person has been transferred to the 
mass. Any notion of distributive justice is impossible. Emotion-
ally much of this concept of equality is motivated by a hatred of 
superiority, collective envy and resentment and the thirst to punish. 
In so doing all natural inequalities are rejected. All natural 
privileges, all privileges of the mind, natural gifts or acquired 
virtues must be levelled out. The movement as a whole leads to 
depersonalisation. Maritain claims that it is just as incompatible 
with Christian thought as the implications of the philosophy of 
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enslavement. Although it is less hateful than this it is in many 
ways more treacherous - for the great doctrinaires of this form 
of equality are motivated by the passion for justice. They often 
use the same words but not the same voice as Christianity. They 
are motivated by a false and non-Christian love. It is a dangerous 
and pseudo-Christian philosophy. 
The third position Maritain outlines is the truly 'Christian 
Equality.' This is essentially ontological and concrete and 
is rooted in the mystery of the human species. As such "it is 
the natural love of the human being for his own kind which reveals 
and makes real the unity of species among men." 2\uch a realist 
conception of equality in nature is an inheritance of the Judea-
Christian tradition and is a natural prerequisite for Christian 
thought and life. It can be seen in the basic tenet of Christian-
ity that all men are created in the image of God and all are called 
to the same supernatural dignity as adopted sons of God. They are 
called to coheirship with Christ and all are redeemed by his blood. 
While asserting the unity of mankind this does not mean that there 
should be no distinctions or hierarchies within human society:-
"It is because the Christian conception of life is based upon so 
concrete broad and fruitful a certainty of the equality and 
community in nature between man that it, at the same time, insists 
so forcefully on the orderings and hierarchies which spring and 
should spring from the very heart of this essential community, and 
on the particular inequalities which they necessarily involve." 24 
No life or movement or communication is possible without differenti-
ation and no differentiation is possible without inequalities:-
"the inequalities which lend variety to human life and intensify the 
richness of life's encounters, in no way injure the dignities which 
befit the unity of mankind and the rights which are grounded on this 
unity. On the contrary these inequalities make such a unity all the 
more manifest." 2 5 
No man is capable of exhausting in himself the riches of the various 
perfections of which human kind is capable. Hence only diversity 
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can lead to wholeness. 
Maritain asks the question "What is the Christian relationship 
between necessary equality and necessary inequality?" In answer-
ing it he sees equality as primordial and inequality as secondary. 
Equality is primary in as much as it relates to the fundamental 
rights and common dignity of human beings and (as equality of 
proportion) to Justice. While inequalities have a purpose in 
diversity there is also a danger that they will conceal primary 
equality. So:-
"it is an offence against creation, to treat as an inferior man 
a man belonging to some inferior part of the social structure, to 
make him conceive his inferior social condition as an inferiority 
of essence." 26 
So to do is to attempt to negate those fundamental rights which 
flow from primary equality - for example the right to exist, to 
keep one's body whole, to found a family, the right to association 
and private ownership. These are fundamental and anterior to 
civil society. 
If the primary equality relates to justice by the proclamation of 
certain natural human rights, the secondary inequalities are bound 
·up with Distributive Justice. The individual should receive accord-
ing to his talents and necessities:-
"Such notions as that of equality of opportunity or equality of 
condition which egalitarianism would make chimerical, become true 
and proper if they are understood in the sense not of an equality 
pure and simple, but of a proportional equality" 
and 
"in the domain of relations between the social whole and its parts, 
such a proportional equality is Justice itself." 2 7 
The equality of proportion pervades distributive justice which deals 
with each ·according to his merits:-
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"And thus, pervading and reconciling all inequalities, justice to 
a certain extent restores equality ••.. it pertains to justice to 
lead unequals to equality." 
For this there must exist such social justice as would really offer 
to each an equal opportunity (equal in the proportional sense). 
Aristotle's influence can plainly be seen in Maritain's thoughts 
on dis.tributive justice and behind Maritain's theory of Christian 
equality summarised in the following passage:-
"Such a leaven of equality as has been disseminated by pseudo-
Christian egalitarianism has filled the world with unhealthy 
fermentations; but there is another leaven of equality which is 
a level of justice and is a proper stimulant of human history 
and which tends to raise the human mass toward a way of life 
more truly human, wherein inequalities are not suppressed, but 
compensated, and subordinated to that high equality of the common 
use of the good things which nourish and exalt our rational nature. 
In sum, the error has been to seek equality in a regression toward 
the basis set up by "nature", and in a levelling down to this base. 
It should be sought in a progressive movement toward the end which 
is composed of the good things of rational life becoming in so far 
as possible and in various degrees accessible to all, and this, 
thanks to the very inequalities themselves, by justice and frater-
nal friendship turned away from seeking domination and towards 
helpfulness and cooperation. This equality I have been discussing 
should be called Christian equality." 28 
Maritain's careful analysis of different philosophical forms of 
equality, with its conclusions as to the nature of Christian equality 
is of great value to the aim of this study which seeks critically 
to examinethe recent legislation related to racial and sexual equal-
ity. Although the scope of such legislation would scarcely have 
been contemplated when ~furitain was writing the bulk of his work, 
he has in his philosophical examination of the nature of equality, 
supplied us with an excellent critical tool for the examination of 
the philosophy behind recent 'equality' legislation. 
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C. GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SYSTEMS 
1. The Enumeration of Human Rights 
In his book "The Rights of Man', significantly published just 
before the end of the second world war, Maritain enumerates 
rights in three broad categories - viz, rights of the human person, 
rights of the civic person, and rights of the working person. 
In relation to the rights of the human person Maritain believes 
that the transcendent nature of the person is of prime importance. 
Man has natural aspirations to the spiritual life and as such must 
transcend the state in importance. Moral laws and the right of 
conscience cannot be tampered with by the state, but a just state 
may educate in moral virtues. Human beings have, generally, the 
right to make their own decisions with regard to their personal 
destiny. In brief all the fundamental righ~of the human person 
"are rooted in the vocation of the person (a spiritual and free 
agent) to the order of absolute value and to a destiny superior 
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to time." Maritain enumerates the rights of the human person as 
follows:-
The right to existence. 
The right to personal liberty or the right to conduct one's own 
life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them 
before God and the laws of the community. 
The right to the pursuit of the perfection of rational and moral 
human life. 
The right to the pursuit of eternal life along the path which 
conscience has recognised as the path indicated by God. 
The right of the Church and other religious families to the free 
exercise of their spiritual activity. 
The right of pursuing a religious vocation; the freedom of religious 
orders and groups. 
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The right to marry according to one's choice and to raise a family, 
which will in its turn be assured of the liberties due to it. 
The right of the family society to respect for its constitution, 
which is based on natural law, not on the law of the state, and 
which fundamentally involves the morality of the human being. 
The rightto keep one's body whole. 
The right to property. 
The right of every human being to be treated as a person, not as 
a thing. 30 
In so far as all of these rights are dependent on the first enumer-
ated ('the right to existence') we will see that they are of vital 
significance to the area of this study that seeks to relate Christian 
principles to legislation about this right. 
Interestingly Maritain defines a human person as one who has a 
vocation to be a spiritual and free agent. Hence although a person 
cannot be so physically (as in the case of a foetus), or is not 
permitted to be free (as in the case of a prisoner), he still has 
rights. Rights such as the one to property and the right of every 
human being to be treated as a person, not as a thing have signifi-
cance in relation to the current 'equality' legislation. 
The rights of the civic person are political rights. These·spring 
from the first principles of constitutions and as such should derive 
from the natural right. Hence there is a fundamental right to a 
constitution and government of the people's choice. Other rights 
e 
are based on three~qualities- viz, political equality, equality 
before the law and equal admission of all citizens to public 
employment according to their capacity. This includes free access 
of all to the various professions, without racial or sexual discrim-
ination. Maritain enumerates the rights of the civic person as 
follows:-
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The right of every c1t1zen to participate actively in political 
life and in particular the right of equal suffrage for all. 
The right of the people to establish the constitution of the state 
and to determine for themselves their form of government. 
The right of association, limited only by the juridically recog-
nised necessities of the common good, and in particular the right 
to form political parties or political schools. 
The right of free investigation and discussion ( freedom of 
expression). 
The equal right of every citizen to his security and his liberties 
within the state as well as political equality. 
The equal right of everyone to the guarantees of an independent 
judiciary power. 
The right to equal possibility of admission to public employment 
and free access to the various professions. 31 
Such rights - in particular the right to equal possibility of 
admission to public employment and free access to the various 
professions - will be seen to be an important part of the legis-
lation dealing with racial and sexual equality. In the latter 
respect, whether Maritain extended the rights to single women only, 
or to both single and married women is open to question. 
~furitain is especially interested in the more recent realisation 
of the rights of the working person. These are derived from "a 
consciousness of the dignity of work and of the worker, of the 
dignity of the htnnan person in the lvorker as such." This leads 
to rights such as those for a just wage; for man's work is not 
a piece of merchandise subject to the mere law of supply and demand. 
He has, fundamentally, a right to work - although Maritain recognises 
that only when society is recast can this right become an actuality. 
~furitain enumerates the rights of the working person as follows:-
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The right freely to choose work. 
The right freely to form vocational groups or trade-unions. 
The right of the worker to be considered as an adult. 
The right of economic groups (Trade-unions and working communities) 
and other social groups to freedom and autonomy. 
The right to a just wage. 
The right to work. 
The right to joint ownership and joint management of the enter-
prise and to the 'workers title' wherever an associative system 
can be substituted for the wage system. 
The right to relief, unemployment, insurance, sick benefits and 
social security. 
The right to have a part, free of charge, depending on the possi-
bilities of the community, in the elementary goods, both material 
and spiritual of civilisation. 32 
The enumeration of such basic rights is common to all working persons 
and as such will be seen to be of relevance to the 'equality' legis-
lation examined. However they extend beyond this to fundamental 
principles of industrial and labour law. 
2. Women and Equality 
Maritain's thoughts on equality reach practical conclusions when 
he considers the status and position of women. There is, however, 
a clearly defined shift in his thought as his career progressed. 
His starting point can be found in his pre-war 'True Humanism' 
in 1938. Here he points out that Christianity has been a great 
liberator of women:-
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"It is a platitude, which is nevertheless very exact, to say that 
Christianity has endowed women, otherwise and particularly in the 
East regarded as an object of property, with a sense of dignity 
and personal liberty." 33 
This he sees as passing little by little into the temporal order 
and juridical_ structures. 
However in 'True Humanism' Maritain believes that the crisis 
surrounding marriage has resulted from a false ideology of equality 
amongst other things:-
"In the same way, in the present day cr1s1s affecting marriage and 
the family, a crisis principally due to economic causes, but also 
to a certain moral ide~logy, one may say that a pseudo-individualism, 
destructive of domestic society, whereby women claim an equality 
with man which is in some sort material and quantitative in its 
terms, and which otherwise is only too comprehensive as a reaction 
against that non-Christian but bourgeois conception of the family, 
is like a caricature and a mockery of Christian personalism." 34 
This false idea of equality could be seen in Marxist and socialist 
theorists' views on the role of the working woman:-
"It is notable that socialist theorists in general accept these 
dissolving and inhuman results of the capitalist system (in particular, 
for example, the factory work of women) as in general they accept 
the economic heritage of bourgeois economy and push it farther." 35 
He comments that Marxist theorists believe that generally an equality 
of economic conditions between men and women will give their life 
of affection the dignity and freedom of an earthly paradise. Rather 
Maritain believed that the aim of Christianity was that woman should 
rise to her full personhood as the Gospel intended:-
"In such a conception, which is one of a qualitative and proportionate 
equality, the married woman has not, except in exceptional cases, the 
same economic functions as a man; she cares for 'the humble kingdom 
of her house' and it is in the order of private life and in the 
domain of all humanity, the vigilance and firmness implied by these 
personal relations, that she will exercise her primacy." 36 
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It is plain that in such pre-war work Maritain fears that the 
relationships between man and his wife may be seen in terms of 
what he has defined as 'Pseudo-Christian Egalitarianism' where 
equality implies sameness. He rather sees their Christian roles 
as involving different yet complementary equality. Hence if a 
married woman is nourished by her husband, she will not thereby 
lose her liberty as a person. This should have full juridical 
recognition, implying a complete equality of rights in everything 
concerned with the institution of matrimony. 
Two comments should be made on Maritain's pre-war comments on 
women and equality. The first is the obvious historical condition-
ing of pre-war society. The second is that his remarks are all 
based on the assumption that the woman is married. He does not 
comment specifically on the role of the single woman but it is 
clear that his conclusions on single womeri and work would have 
to be different. In his post-war thought in 'Man and the State' 
and 'The Rights of ~~n' ~~ritain alters his assumptions about 
women and work. As part of his scheme of basic rights he includes 
the free access of all to the various professions without sexual 
discrimination. In his rights of the working person he nowJ1ere 
distinguishes bebveen men and women. However, neither in his later 
work does Maritain repudiate his distinction of different types of 
equality or his assertion that the relationship between men and 
women in marriage is governed by his notion of 'correct' and 
'incorrect' forms of equality. Maritain, no less than Barth, 
seems to draw a distinction between domestic relationships between 
men and women which have their own unique basis in what he would 
call 'Christian equality' and non-domestic work relationships, civic 
and human relationships which are governed by identical 'rights'. 
Nowhere, however, does he make this explicit. 
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3. Racialism and Equality 
We have seen that many of Maritain's rights of man have ~li­
cations which ensure equality between the races if they are imple-
mented. Such basic rights will be seen as significant pointers 
towards modern legislation. However, in one passage Maritain 
directly relates racialism with his category of the 'Pure 
nominalist or empiricist notion of equality' otherwise known 
as the 'Anti-Christian philosophy of enslavement.' By pseudo-
scientific reasoning this denies the basic human essence and 
thereby negatives all the basic human rights enumerated by Maritain. 
Such a denial reduces mankind to a biological inferno:-
"Racism is existentially related to this pseudo-theism, since 
in its reaction against individualism and in its thirst for 
communion in human animality, which, once separated from the 
spirit, is no longer anything but a biological inferno." 37 
The racialist tries to break down that natural unity of mankind 
proclaimed by Christianity - namely that based on the image of 
God. He tries to replace it with arbitrary notions of racial 
supremacy or inferiority. As such he is to a high degree irrational. 
In conclusion we see clearly in Maritain's work the different levels 
and functions of Justice, all of which are worked out within a 
fundamentally Thomist scheme. Only after the fundamental concept 
of Justice is worked out starting from God and the 'lex aeterna' 
can specific rights be enumerated as principles for legislation. 
We have seen that there may be a tension between the working out of 
the concept of Justice (for example in relation to equality) and 
in the enumeration of rights, which in themselves of necessity 
presume a universal application, and an arithmetical notion of 
equality. Perhaps a solution may be found in the observation that 
rights derived from the fundamental concept of Justice may exist, 
but it may not always be according to that fundamental concept to 
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exercise them. There may be rights which the moral conscience 
vie,tas counterbalancing. However, the enumeration of rights as 
such is of great help as a preliminary to legislation enabling 
the exercise of those rights, should the one who wishes to exercise 
them so desire. In a later Chapter we will see their significance 
in relation to current laws. 
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CHAPTER 3 BARTH 
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BARTH'S LIFE 
Karl Barth was born in 1886 at Basle in Switzerland, the son of 
a minister of the Swiss Reformed Church. While Karl 'vas still 
\ 
a small child his father became first lecturer and then Professor 
of New Testament and Early Church History at the University of 
Berne. Barth himself went to that University to study theology 
at the age of 18. Here he became vitally interested in both 
Kant and Schleiermacher. He wished to continue his studies with 
the great neo-Kantian theologian Wilhelm Hermann of Marburg but 
under the influence of his father went instead to Berlin. Here 
he was fascinated by the lectures of the liberal theologian 
Harnack. In 1908 he realised his ambition to study with Hermann. 
At 23 he was ordained into the Lutheran Church. Then followed 
twelve years in the pastoral ministry - first at Geneva (1909-11) 
and then in Safenwil (1911-21). In 1913 Barth married. 
The 1914-18 war was formative in his flight from liberal theology 
and the working out of his own theology based on the word of God. 
This can first be seen in written form in 1919 in his 'Der 
Romerbrief' (Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans). The 
first edition was followed by a second, corrected, enlarged and 
reconsidered,-~n 1921. The book created a profound impression. 
The term 'Bar~an' signified the position of his followers in the 
subsequerrttheological ferment. The book was also instrumental 
in Barth's rapid promotion. He became Honorary Professor of 
Reformed Theology in Gottingen (1921-5), Professor of Dogmatics 
and New Testament Exegesis in ~funster (Westphalia) 1925-30 and 
Professor of Systematic Theology in Bonn (1930-35). In 1922 
Barth, Thurneysen and Gogarten inaugurated a journal to propound 
their theology entitled 'Zwischen den Zeiten' (Between the Times). 
In 1927 came the first volume of Barth's 'Die Christliche Dogmatik' 
(Christian Dogmatics) - his first attempt to work out his theology 
as a whole. This was abandoned and a new attempt begun in 1932. 
Church Dogmatics was to be his magnum opus - in its final state 
it consists of 12 volumes and spans 1932 - 1959. 
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Whilst in the full flood of working out his theology Barth found 
himself in a dramatic situation in Germany with the rise of Hitler. 
His opposition to Hitler's National Socialism was not merely a 
political stance but also involved a theological conflict which 
sharply divided German theologians - including the alienation 
of Barth from his former friend Gogart~n. Theologians were 
divided into those who supported or who were willing to acquiesce 
in the actions of the State, and those whose theology made it 
impossible to acquiesce. Barth's O\in description of his position 
makes his stance perfectly clear:-
"In the sl.IDllller of 1933, the German Church, to which I belonged 
as a member and teacher, found itself in the greatest danger 
concerning its doctrine and order. It threatened to become 
involved in a new heresy strangely blended of Christianity and 
Germanism, and to come under the domination of so-called German 
Christians - a danger prompted by the successes of National 
Socialism and the suggestive powers of its ideals. And it so 
happened further that the representatives of other theological 
schools and tendencies in Germany - Liberal, Pietist, Confessional, 
Biblicist - who had previously in opposition to me put so much 
weight on ethics, sanctification, 01ristian life, practical 
decision and the like, now in part openly affirmed the heresy 
and in part took up a strangely neutral and tolerant attitude 
towards it. And it happened further that, when so many fell 
in line and no one seriously protested, I myself could not very 
well keep silent but had to undertake to proclaim to the imperilled 
Church what it must do to be saved." 1 
Because of his stance Barth was discharged from his pos1t1on at 
Bonn and had to operate from Basle in his native Switzerland in 
his task of the preservation of the "true Church and the just state." 
Thus began Barth's long association with the University of Basle. 
The Nazi phenomenon above all focussed his attention on Justice. 
After the war Barth, travelling extensively, continued a vital 
interest in politics. Many of his lectures and correspondence can 
be seen in a valuable collection 'Against the Stream'. Here Barth 
attempts to come to terms with the post-war world and provide a 
mature reflection on the role of the Church in the State. Barth's 
later publications include a new emphasis on God's relationship 
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with man in 'The Humanity of God' (1956) as well as the completion 
of his 'Church Dogmatics.' In 1962 Barth gave his final lecture 
as "Professor Ordinarius" at the University of Basle, followed by 
an active and happy retirement until his death in 1968. So 
ended a fulfilled and vitally important life for our century -
his humanity, his love of culture - especially his beloved Mozart, 
but above all his vital contribution to theology and its implica-
tions for the state in terms of politics and law have all become 
legendary. 
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A. Barth's General Theological Position 
Barth began as a disciple of liberal Protestant theology. At 
2 
the turn of the century this was dominated by Harnack building 
on the foundations of Kant and Schleiermacher. ~fuch of this 
theology was based on the human experience of God. It was 
this aspect that Barth first began to suspect in the early days 
of his pastorate. In particular he desired that his sermons 
should not be merely his own words but in a real sense an expression 
of the Word of God. The first world war convinced him of the 
inadequacy of liberal theology in its basis in human experience. 
He was continually challenged by the Bible and believed that in 
viewing it as man's view of God the liberal theologians had grossly 
perverted its doctrines. Rather Barth increasingly viewed it as 
God's view of man and hence as the Word of God. This led to a 
new emphasis on the fundamental discontinuity between God and 
man - the righteousness of God and the righteousness of man. 
The liberal view of Schleiermacher 3that man's religious conscious-
ness was the basis, the theme and the criterion of theology was 
turned on its head. Barth rejected the cosiness of Harnack or the 
rationalism of Troeltsch 4and substituted a new and vital sense of 
the otherness of God and the command of God. He began an intensive 
study of the Bible and especially the Pauline writings. His great 
commentary on Romans was beginning to take shape. 
In 'Der Romerbrief', while acknowledging the validity of the modern 
historical-critical method Barth is ever trying to see through and 
beyond the historical (des Historische) into the Spirit of the 
Bible - the Word of God. Throughout the commentary Barth demon-
strates his thesis that God is first and foremost the subject of 
theology and only secondarily its object. Man cannot know God 
himself but only through God's revelation of Himself in the person 
and work of His Son Jesus Christ. The message of Paul for Barth 
was that God is God and he has wrought salvation. This was the 
tolling bell Barth sounded:-
44 
"As I look back upon my course, I seem to myself as one who, 
ascending the dark staircases of a church tower and trying to 
steady himself, reached for the bannister, but got hold of the 
bell rope instead. To his horror, he had then to listen to what 
the great bell had sounded over him and not over him alone." 5 
In his second edition of 'Der Romerbrief' he pointed out in the 
preface that if he had a system:-
"it was limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 
infinite qualitative distinction between time and eternity - God 
is in heaven, and thou art on earth. The relation between such 
a God and such a man and the relation between such a man and 
such a God, is for me the themfof the Bible and the essence of 
philosophy." A 
Barthi'·s other great work 'Die Christliche Dogmatik' was first 
attempted in 1927. This proved a failure for in it he tried to 
reconcile his doctrine of the Word of God with the concepts and 
ideas of existential philosophy. In the new attempt in 1932 he 
firmly declared:-
"I have cut out •••• everything that in the first issue (1927) 
might give the slightest appearance of giving to theology a basis, 
support, or even a mere justification in the way of existentialist 
philosophy." 
Instead his epistemological basis became that discerned in his 
book on Anselm 'Fides quaerens intellectum' (1931); namely that 
of 'faith knowledge' i.e. the knowledge that springs from faith 
in God's revelation in Jesus Christ. The writing of 'Church 
Dogmatics' covers a vast span of Barth's life (1927-59). It has 
been held to be the most comprehensive dogmatics since St. Thomas' 
'Summa Theologica'. Throughout we see Barth's emphasis on the Word 
of God as revealed in Jesus Christ, lvritten in Holy Scripture and 
proclaimed by the Church. Hartwe1161ists some consistent features 
which show Barth's methodology. Throughout the Dogmatics are 
exegetical discourses vitally linked to l1is theological arguments. 
His theology is strongly Christological - each proposition has as 
its point of departure Jesus Christ. The work has an ecumenical 
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breadth. It is concerned with the exposition and interpretation 
of a story - that of God's gracious dealings with mankind in Christ 
from eternity. This Barth does in myriad forms - each different 
angle has a correspondingly different theological proposition. This 
many sided approach to the truth does not make for easy reading or 
exposition. Finally Hartwell points to Barth's exhaustive structure 
- covering the whole of Christian doctrine from his own unique 
perspective. This is not in the sense of a system - for such 
would be determined by the man in the theologian. Rather the 
theologian must attempt to follow the Word of God which determines 
the method and the theology. Barth is not so arrogant as to claim 
anything like perfection in this but he cannot ground his work on 
anything less that such a high ideal. 
The Nazi phenomenon was the direct stimulus for Barth to work out 
his theology of Justice and the relation of the Church to the State. 
It reinforced Barth in his determination to expound the Word of God 
in theology and confirmed his distrust of theological liberalism. 
His work 'Church and State' was written just before the second world 
war. (1938). Barth's famous 'NO' to Natural Right and the develop-
ment of his concept of Justice according to the Word of God will be 
considered fully in the next section. 
Barth's dogmatism on the otherness of God mellowed considerably in 
his post war writings. Here Barth laid far more emphasis on the 
humanity of God - ~- · that is his relationship with man. The culmin-
ation of this can be seen in his book 'The Humanity of God' (1956). 
Barth here makes it clear that his earlier emphasis on the otherness 
of God had been forced on him by the situation of his early ministry. 
Through Jesus Christ we must also stress God's humanity - this was 
not the negation but rather the fulfillment of the wholly other God 
of whom he speaks in Romans. 
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B. Barth's Concept of Justice 
a) The Relationship to Dogmatics 
Barth specifically warns against any attempt to separate ethics 
from dogmatics. This is true from the standpoint of both dogmatics 
and ethics. Hence:-
"As dogmatics enquires concerning the action of God and his good-
ness, it must necessarily make thorough enquiries concerning 
active man and the goodness of his action. It has the problem 
of ethics in view from the very first and it cannot legitimately 
lose sight of it." 
"Conversely, the ethical question •••• cannot rightly be asked 
and answered except with the framework, or at any rate the material 
context, of dogmatics. True man and his good action can be viewed 7 
only from the standpoint of the true and active God and his goodness." 
So we see from the outset that justice and its practical response 
in ethics is inseparable from dogmatics and hence in Bartian terms, 
from the Word of God and his commands. 
These commands are not, however, found through a prescribed text -
either from moral rules in the Bible, or from natural right, or 
from Church tradition. Such rules would need casuistry. In it 
the moralist usurps God's function. He makes the untenable assumption 
that the command of God is a universal rule and sees his function 
as filling out and applying that rule. Rather the commands of God 
are always definite in their con text: - -~ 
"It rests on a misconception of the command of God as it emerges in 
Holy Scripture if casuistry thinks it can and must abstract from the 
Bible a collection of general moral rules which it is then the task 
of ethics to expound and apply in particular .••• The commands of God 
in the Bible are not general moral doctrines and instructions but 
absolutely specific directions which concern each time the behaviour, 
deeds and omissions of one or more or many definite men in this 
historical context." 8 
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We can therefore learn from history in specific encounters, for 
God is true to Himself but the Word of God in each particular 
situation is in the event itself:-
"If we have heard the Word of God, it must be clear to us that 
the reality in which the ethical event takes place as revealed 
in the Word of God is none other than its own, so that we do not 
have to seek and find it but simply to see it as it is given to 
us in and by the event itself." 9 
Even so we must take care not to claim too much:-
"More than guidance will not be expected from even the most parti-
cular ethics, just as more than guidance to a knowledge of Christian 
truth .••• will not be expected from even the most precise and 
detailed dogmatics." 10 
Hence Barth in his ethics is offering us guidance - but guidance 
on what he hopes is a faithful perception of the command of God. 
Such guidance enables us in this study to search out that which 
is useful to formulate or evaluate legislation. Before we do 
this we must return to Barth's dogmatics to search for his first 
principles of law and to discern with more precision how he 
conceives of the concept of Justice from which his ethics are 
directly or indirectly derived. In particular we must ask why 
Barth rejected so fiercely the neo-Thomist position of the import-
ance of natural right as a foundation for justice and from thence 
to its application in ethics. 
b) The rejection of a Natural Right basis 
Barth saw a natural right basis for justice and the working out of 
ethics as clearly contrary to his Word of God theology. For him 
justice and ethics must derive from the way God communicates to us 
that justice which is part of his very nature. To Barth moral 
natural right was a prime example of a false natural theology which 
placed a dangerous reliance on human reason in place of the revealed 
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Word of God. Underlying this is the assumption that human reason 
has been hopelessly corrupted by sin so that God is not discoverable 
by the reason of fallen man:-
"There is no law and commandment of God inherent in the creature-
liness of man as such, or written and revealed in the stars as a 
law of the cosmos, so that the transgression of it makes man a 
sinner. It is characteristic of the sin of man - and one of its 
results - that man should think he can know such a law of nature 
and direct and measure himself and others in accordance with it." 11 
Hence natural right is spiritually blind - Barth illustrates this 
in 'Against the Stream' in political terms:-
"To base its policy on natural law would mean that the Christian 
community was adopting the ways of the civil community, which does 
not take its bearing from the Christian centre and is still living 
or again living in a state of ignorance." 12 
The civil community lacks anything beyond natural right. Barth 
defines this natural right as:-
"The embodiment of what man is alleged to regard as universally 
right and wrong, as necessarily permissible and forbidden 'by 
nature' - that is on any conceivable premiss. It has been connected 
with a natural revelation of God, that is, with a revelation known 
to man by natural means.'' 13 
Hence for Barth to ground justice in natural right is to ground 
it on foundations of sand for there is no consensus of what it 
consists of:-
"All arguments based on natural law are Janus-headed. They do not 
lead to the light of clear decisions, but to the misty twilight in 
which all cats become grey." 14 
Moreover where it has a theological basis the theology starts from 
the wrong point - from man's experience. 
Barth's rejection of natural right was stimulated by his extreme 
reaction to the idealistic liberal Protestant theology of Adolf 
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Harnack. In the winter term 1899-1900 Harnack delivered a famous 
lecture series at Berlin university 'Das Wesen des ChristenttnnS' 
(The Essence of Christianity). Believing implicitly in the 
historical progress of revelation Harnack commented in his seventh 
lecture:-
"Jesus open<; to us the prospect of a union among men, which i_s 
held together, not by any legal ordinance, but by the rule of 
love, and where a man conquers his enemy by gentleness. It is 
a high and glorious ideal, and we have received it from the very 
foundation of our religion. It ought to float before our eyes 
as the goal and guiding star of our historical development. 
Whether mankind will ever attain to it, who can say? but we can 
and ought to approximate to it, and in these days - otherwise 
than two or three hundred years ago -we feel a moral.obligation 
in this direction. Those of us who possess more delicate and 
therefore more prophetic perceptions no longer regard the kingdom 
of love and peace as a mere Utopia." 15 
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However, as Heinz Zahrnt points out, in 1914 it was Harnack who 
drafted the appeal of the German Kaiser to his people, together 
with other intellectuals. Barth commented:-
"Among these intellectuals I discovered to my horror almost all of 
my theological teachers whom I had greatly venerated. In despair 
over what this indicated about the signs of the time, I suddenly 
realised that I could no longer follow either their ethics or their 
dogmatics, or their understanding of the Bible and of history." 17 
Barth likewise rejected the position of the Roman Catholic Church, 
whose formulation and application of natural right was based on 
Thomism. The authority of the Church, and especially of the Pope 18 . -
was seen as vital arbiter. Barth's reformist tradition did not take 
kindly to such authority which might attempt to channel the Word of 
God, but was in effect still tainted with sin and man's fallen nature. 
Barth recoiled from the traditional language of Thomism in order to 
bypass the human imperfections of natural revelation. 
Barth was confirmed in his stance when both varieties of natural 
right failed to stand up to Hitler. Indeed many of the pro-Hitler 
members of the German Church movement based their support of National 
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Socialism upon a variety of natural right - the Lutheran doctrine 
of the 'order of creation.' A major reason for the famous split 
between Barth and Brunner was because Brunner could assert that 
"What we call laws of nature are God's orders of creation" and 
"The idea of the 'order of creation' interests us particularly 
19 
as the principle of social ethics." Barth believed that in essence 
there was little difference between the 'order of creation' doctrine 
advocated by Brunner and that advocated by the theological supporters 
of Hitler like Altheus, Gogarthen and Elert. Hitler's supporters 
could see the new Germanism as the revelation of God's will in 
creation:-
"God's hidden will is manifest in the great historical events of 
our time. There are God's masks behind which our conscience may, 
if it will, recognise His eternal, creative power." 20 
In a less dramatic setting in the post war period there is some 
evidence that Barth's approach to natural right was not so condemna-
tory. Indeed a recent analyst2fias argued that throughout Barth's 
stance on natural right he:-
"wishes to reject the usual formulations of moral natural law 
doctrine, but he does not reject the conceptual foundations upon 
which it is typically made to rest; his position therefore may 
actually contain, as Brunner and others have implied, some Kantian 
shavings . '' 
Midgley points out that the essential difference between Barth and 
his critics is twofold. First in the manner and degree to which 
essential human nature is known. Second in the degree and signifi-
cance of the alienation between the existing human being and his 
essence. Barth's post-war stress on the humanity of God has led him 
to claim:-
"It would not do even to partially cast susp1c1on upon, undervalue 
or speak ill of man's humanity, the gift of God, which characterises 
him as a being." 
Midg~e.y · corrunents that:-
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"By adopting the vocabulary of metaphysical realism in his doctrine 
of man, Barth has backed himself into a corner from which he cannot 
consistently deny that there is a natural moral law arising from 
man's essential nature." 
Hence Barth can accept natural right ontology but not its tradition-
al epistemology. It is possible to argue, however, that he has 
elaborated a new form of 'revealed natural right' which is essen-
tially Christological, although avoiding traditional natural right 
terminology. 
Evidence can be found for this in Barth's writings. In a striking 
passage in Church Dogmatics Barth directly equates his Christolo-
gical approach with the true natural right:-
"Again we read in 1 Peter 1/20 that the 'Lamb without blemish and 
without spot' was not only 'foreordained before the foundation of 
the world, but was manifest in these last times for you.' As the 
context shows this means that in human history and beyond all history 
human or otherwise, there is no other higher law than that of divine 
mercy, now revealed, established and applied in the oblation of the 
Lamb of God. There is no positive law to be restricted or repealed 
by another of the same kind. There is no place from which it can 
be relativised. It is the true "natural law" which necessarily 
limits and relativises all positive law. For the Lamb of God fore-
ordained before the foundation of the world is the person and work 
in which this law had been revealed.'' 2 2 
Barth can also cautiously accept Bonhoeffer's mandates of creation 
for they turn out to be:-
"the conunand of God revealed in Jesus Christ .••• it is from the 
Holy Scriptures that we learn of the existence of these mandates 
which give concrete form to the conunand." 
Nevertheless two points should be born in mind when considering such 
a revealed natural right in Christ. The first is Barth's own warning 
that "the conunands of God in the Bible are not general moral doctrines 
and instructions." This would of necessity leave much room for the 
Holy Spirit in the revealed natural right. The second is the extent 
to which a revealed natural right can be called natural right at all 
in the conventional meaning of the term. 
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c) The Basis in the Word of God 
For Barth Justice can only be securely grounded in the language 
and concept of the Word of God and his revelation in Christ. Hence 
Justice must be seen as emanating from the very personality of God 
as revealed in Christ. Justice must be an absolute - an ontological 
standard. 
Barth demonstrates this in his book 'Church and State' (1939). 
Here he asks two pertinent questions -
"Is there a connection between justification of the sinner through 
faith alone and the problem of justice and the human law?" 
This is turn leads to the question 
"Is there an inward and vital connection by means of which human 
justice, as well as divine justification, becomes the concern of 
the Christian faith?" 
In answering Barth emphasised his abhorrence of the Lutheran 'bvo 
world' doctrine which stressed that the Christian's duty was to God 
and to his immediate neighbours and that the State was another 
world which, short of the most clear apostacy demanded unqualified 
obedience. This arose out of the assumption - seen for example in 
Zwingli - that there is a clear distinction between 'Divine' and 
'human' justice. Barth points out that if divine and human justice 
are separated the disastrous consequences are that justice would 
have no relevance to the Kingdom of God and that it would be perfectly 
satisfactory to construct a secular gospel of human law. That was 
the plain result of those who advocated the 'two worlds' doctrine 
in Nazi Germany. It was that which enabled them to tolerate 
Auschwitz. The effort to discern the Word of God in the form of 
Divine Justice must be made. 
In the realm of Church and State it is obvious from 'Against the 
Stream' that Barth can recognise a vast distinction between the 
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Christian community and the civil community but the positive point 
to grasp is that because of their common origin and centre there 
is a divine ordinance in the civil community:-
"Since the State fonns the outer circle, within which the Church, 
with the mystery of its faith and gospel, is the inner circle, 
since it shares a common centre with the Church, it is inevitable 
that, although its presuppositions and its tasks are its own and 
different, it is nevertheless capable of reflecti~ indirectly 
the truth and reality which constitute the Christ.ian community." 23 
Justice should determine the standard of behaviour and justice 
should be the criterion of the laws. Christians are the vital 
link for putting this justice into practice:-
"Christians must not only endure this earthly State, but they must 
will it, and they cannot will it as a 'Pilate' State, but as a Just 
State; when it is seen that there is no outward escape from the 
political sphere; when it is seen that Christians, while they 
remain within the Church and are wholly committed to the future 
city and equally committed to responsibility for the earthly city •..• 
in short when each of them is responsible for the character of the 
State as a just State." 24 
The State needs more than anything "the wholesomely disturbing 
presence", the activity that revolves directly around the common 
centre, the participation of the Christian community in the execution 
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of political responsibility. 
The Christian community then bears a great responsibility in the 
discernment of justice to the actions and activities of the State. 
We have seen that although this justice is absolute as part of God's 
personality it cannot be discerned in the abstract. The divine 
justice operates by speaking to each precise situation. This inevit-
ably introduces a dynamic element into Barth's concept. We have 
already noted his necessary caution in this type of operation:-
"Mbre than guidance will not be expected from even the most particular 
ethics, just as more than guidance to a knowledge of Christian truth 
will not be expected from even the most precise and detailed 
dogmatics." 
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Nevertheless Barth is able to offer us guidelines for legal systems -
these are guidelines for the determination of God's particular will 
in a particular situation. They are not intended to be laws in the 
positive legal sense but pointers to God's word and his justice. 
As such they challenge the law but they do not seek to usurp its 
function. 
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C. GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SYSTEMS 
1. Life 
a) Respect for Life: 
Barth emphasises that all human life is an unmerited loan from 
God. Hence man should treat this loan with respect:-
"Those who handle life as a divine loan will above all treat it 
with respect. Respect is man's astonishment, humility and awe at 
a fact in which he meets something superior -majesty, dignity, 
holiness, a mystery which compels him to withdraw and keep his 
distance, to handle it modestly, circumspectly and carefully." 26 
In turn such respect means living life in Christian obedience:-
"Respect for life, if it is obedience to God's command, will have 
regard for the free will of the One who has given life as a loan. 
It will not consist in an absolute will to live, but in a will to 
live which by God's decree and command, and by meditation 'futura~ 
vitae', may perhaps in many ways be weakened and finally destroyed." 
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So both life and death is under God's sway. Man is not to usurp 
the Divine authority - a historic expression of this can be seen 
in the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill'. He is however expected 
to look after life and encourage health:-
"Man must will to live and not die, to be healthy and not to be sick, 
and to exercise and not neglect his strength to be as man and the 
remaining psycho-physical forms which he has for this purpose, and 
thus to maintain himself." 28 
He should use the powers God has given him responsibly and develop 
his own character according to his gifts from God. 
b) The Protection of Life: 
The whole of Barth's exposition on the protection of life is, in 
56 
effect, a commentary on the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' in 
the context of specific ethical situations. This does not however 
always mean that human life is an end in itself:-
"Since human life is of relative goodness and limited value, its 
protection may also consist 'ultima ratione' in its surrender and 
sacrifice." 29 
Barth examines many of the ethical implications of life and death 
issues - including suicide and murder. In this study we are, however, 
to concentrate on his reflections on abortion and euthanasia - both 
problems of considerable current legislative significance. 
i. Abortion: 
Barth defines an abortion as the deliberate interruption of a 
pregnancy in circumstances in which the birth and existence of the 
child was not desired and perhaps even feared. He has no doubt 
that this is both medically and theologically the killing of a human 
life:-
"For the unborn child is from the very first a child. It is still 
developing and has no independent life. But it is a man and not a 
thing, nor a mere part of the mother's body." 30 
"Moreover this child is a man for whose life the Son of God has died, 
for whose unavoidable part in the guilt of all humanity and future 
individual guilt He has already paid the price. The true light of 
the world shines already in the darkness of the mother's womb. And 
yet they want to kill him deliberately because certain reasons which 
have nothing to do with the child himself favour the view that he 
had better not be born." 31 
While accepting that abortion is the killing of a human life Barth 
does not, however, unlike the Roman Catholic view, issue an unequi-
vocal No. He concedes that there are possible exceptions in which 
there is the possibility that God may wish the life to be terminated:-
"Human life and therefore the life of the llllborn child is not an 
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absolute, so that, while it can be protected by the commandment, 
it can be so only within the limits of the will of Him who issues 
it." 32 
Genuine exceptions are, however, rare. Barth suggests only one -
where the life of an unborn child directly threatens the life or 
health of the mother. He does not accept the Roman Catholic view 
that the life of the child must always be given an absolute prefer-
ence:-
"On the basis of the command, however, we can learn that when a 
choice has to be made between the.life or health of the mother and 
that of the child, the destruction of the child in the mother's 
womb might be permitted and commended, and with the qualification 
already mentioned a human decision might thus be taken to this 
effect." 33 
Barth attempts to define more precisely the circumstances in which 
an abortion might be permitted. He refuses to try and frame the 
circumstances as a law but makes the following observations:-
A life against a life must be at stake. There must be scrupulous 
calculation - this calculation must take place before God (i.e. 
via prayers) and it must be in the faith that God will forgive 
the element of human sin. A crucial point is how far the health 
of the mother can be balanced against the life of the child. Barth 
seems somewhat equivocal on this point - on the one hand he can 
declare that 'a life against a life must be at stake' - on the other 
hand he is prepared to concede that very exceptionally a socio-
medical reason may be sufficient:-
"It does not follow, however, that a doctor is generally and radically 
guilty of transgressing the command of God, though he may expose 
himself to legal penalty, if he thinks he should urge a socio-medical 
'indication' i.e. in terms of a threat presented to the physical or 
mental life of the mother, or of economic or environmental conditions. 
For occasionally the command of God may impose a judgement and action 
which go beyond what is sanctioned by the law." 34 
Here not only is the health of the mother a possible justification 
but interestingly also economic or environmental conditions - both 
vital issues in our consideration of the present English law on 
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abortion. 
Barth's socio-medical justifications for abortion are an uneasy 
extension of his previous argument. He gives no indications of 
the means for assessing such factors, nor does he point out the 
subjective nature of the judgement and the possible abuses it gives 
rise to. However, perhaps some of the difficulties are lessened 
if it is noted that Barth is not here advocating a precept for law, 
but rather providing a possible justification for going beyond the 
law and risking incurring a legal penalty. In some socio-medical 
circumstances he can see this as morally right in the sight of 
God. He is not, however, advocating changing the law to admit 
of socio-medical exceptions. 
ii. Euthanasia: 
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Barth gives an unequivocal 'No' to euthanasia defined as the killing 
of the incurably infirm, insane, deformed, immobilised and crippled. 
This he sees as a wicked usurpation of God's sovereign right over 
life and death. Even if such people are a burden to society, society 
has no right to pronounce their life as valueless for "The value 
of this kind of life is God's secret." Indeed a society that cannot 
welcome such members is itself weak and infirm:- "No community, 
whether family, village or state is really strong if it will not 
carry its weak and even its very weakest members." 
Euthanasia is, however, also advocated by people generally in a 
more specialised sense - namely the treatment of terminal cases by 
deliberately hastening death in cases of advanced and painful illness. 
This arises from well-meaning humanitarianism. It is a problem for 
medical ethics - a problem made more complex by the modern number of 
artificial means for the prolongation of life. To Barth "Dying no 
less than living, can be a blessing only to the man to whom it comes, 
and by whom it is received, from God." Positive human hastening of 
death may be contrary to God's wish:-
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"How can they be sure that as now lived it is not the supreme form 
of divine blessing?" "How may we know we are really helping a 
human being by assisting him to die?" 
However Barth points out that there is a difference between posi-
tively shortening life and fanatically maintaining it. We should 
not make "the required assisting of human life a forbidden tort-
uring of it. A case is, at least conceivable in which a doctor 
might have to recoil from this prolongation of life no less than 
from its arbitrary shortening." As in the case of abortion the 
right decision can only be reached after careful deliberation and 
prayer before God. 
2. Equality 
a) Concern for the Weak: 
Barth stresses that the Church is a witness of the fact that the 
Son of Man came to seek and save the lost and hence Christians in 
their legislative influence must concentrate on the lower and lowest 
levels of human society and on the most disadvantaged. So the poor, 
the economically weak and threatened, the socially rejected will 
be an object of primary concern:-
"The Church must stand for social justice in the political sphere 
it will always choose the movement from which it can expect the 
greatest measure of social justice." 36 
The Church will wish that the whole of society might live as adult 
human beings with basic rights and freedom to a family, education, 
art, science, religion and culture. This freedom should be on the 
basis of equality and exercised responsibly:-
"The Church must and will stand for the equality of the freedom and 
responsibility of all adult citizens, in spite of its sober insights 
into the variety of human needs, abilities and tasks. It will stand 
for their equality before the law that unites and binds them all." 37 
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b) Racial Equality: 
Within his broad concern for the weak and the disadvantaged Barth 
devotes space to a consideration of racial equality. The back-
ground for the Nazi persecution of the Jews was never far away 
from his thoughts, nor was that Germanism that claimed itself 
as a super-race ordained by God and pure within itself. Barth 
points out that barriers of different cultures and languages can 
only be overcome through conscious effort:-
"He must be at pains to understand them, and above all to make 
himself understandable to them. He will make oral and verbal 
concessions for this purpose." 38 
This is not merely a duty but results in an enrichment of cultures:-
"The corrnnand of God wills that a man should really move out from 
his beginning and therefore seek a wider field." 
and 
"In every land there are many native features, traditions and 
customs which would benefit greatly from superior foreign influ-
ences." 
That this has gone on through history makes any claim of a super-
race absurd:-
"Today, of course, there is no people - not even in Asia and Africa, 
let alone in Europe or America - which can boast that its present 
members derive from the same f~ilies or clans and therefore 
constitute a unity of blood and race." 
The bas~ theological precept behind this is that there is a corrnnon 
humanity created by God. A man is not firstly and intrinsically in 
his own people and then perhaps in humanity as well. His first duty 
is to the corrnnon humanity, forgetting all pretensions of exclusivism 
or superiority for his own language, territory or person. It follows 
that this should be reflected in the legal structure of a country -
to prevent discrimination against one minority or another. The 
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extent to which this is reflected in present day English law will be 
considered later in this study. 
c) Sexual Equality: 
Barth would appear fundamentally to support sexual equality in a 
passage taken from 'Against the Stream':-
"If, in accordance with a specifically Christian insight, it lies 
in the very nature of the State that this equality must not be 
restricted by any differences of religious belief or unbelief, 
it is all the more important for the Church to urge that the 
restriction of the political freedom and responsibility not only 
of certain classes and races but, supremely, of that of women, is 
an arbitrary convention which does not deserve to be preserved 
any longer. If Christians are to be consistent there can only be 
onepossible decision in this matter." 39 
In his 'Church Dogmatics' Barth examines at considerable length the 
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relationship between the sexes and the nature of their equality. 
The equality is a complex one for man and woman are inseparable as 
well as distinct. Both are human creatures of God and as such the 
image of God. Any phenomenology or typology according to funct~on 
or psychological characteristics is dangerous and inadequate for it 
grossly insults those who do not conform to the rule. However this 
does not mean that the sexes do not have special vocations - there 
is a distinction between masculine and non-masculine and feminine 
and unfeminine for they exist not to deny their sex but to complement 
the other. So real violations occur:-
"Where the one sex or the other forgets, or for any reason refuses 
to acknowledge that it has its rights and dignity only in relation 
to the opposite sex and thereforein distinction from it." 
So Barth can support St. Paul's comments in lCorA· 11 and 14 as based 
on this principle that women must always be women. It is impossibly 
dangerous to attempt to aspire beyond the sexes to a purely human 
being. This would be a being both semi-sexual and bi-sexual:-
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"Outside their corrunon relationship to God there is no point in the 
encounter and fellowship of man and woman at which even as man and 
woman they can also transcend their sexuality. And precisely in 
the relationship to God they cannot do this in such a way that they 
come to be male and female or that their sexuality becomes non-
essential." 
Hence: 
"It is always 1n relation to their opposite that man and woman are 
what they are in themselves.'' 
This does not mean that one is superior to the other - 'In Christ 
there is no male or female' (Gal 13/28). The manner in which they 
are equal is, however, complex because of their complementary 
nature. They are not A and a second A like two halves of an hour 
glass. They are rather A and B and cannot therefore be equated. 
However in inner dignity and right and.therefore in human dignity 
and right A has not the slightest advantage over B, or the slightest 
disadvantage. Man and woman are fully equal before God and are 
equal in regard to the necessity of their mutual relationship and 
orientation. Barth then boldly faces the problem of order. He 
comments that every work is dangerous and liable to be misunderstood 
when we try to characterise this order - yet nevertheless it does 
exist. For A precedes B and B follows A. This does not mean inner 
inequality but rather reveals their inequality but then confirms the 
equality. It confers no privilege or injustice - no duty or right:-
"Thus man has no privilege or advantage simply because in respect 
of order he is man and therefore A and therefore precedes and is 
superior to woman." 
Conversely 
''Woman does not come short of man in any way nor renounce her right, 
dignity, honour, nor make any surrender, when theoretically and 
practically she recognises that in order she is a woman and therefore 
B and therefore behind and subordinate to the man." 
Hence Barth sees man as having a leadership role by being first in 
order:-
"Properly speaking, the business of woman, her task and function, 
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is to actualise the fellowship in which man can only precede her, 
stimulating, leading and inspiring. How could she do this alone?" 
This is a divine subordination. Equality of order would lead both 
her and the man in a deplorable situation hanging in the void. If 
the man is made weak then the woman is weak also through the weakness 
of the man. The woman will not thereby be compliant but will endorse 
the strength of the strong man and guide the strength of his sense 
of responsibility and service thereby negating tyranny. This is 
no resignation but rather asserting her independence and true 
equality. She educates the man into becoming a strong man. He 
fulfils in her the height of womanhood. 
In much of this language it is plain that Barth is concerned with 
personal relationships - especially marital ones. In the sphere 
of legal and political freedom, rights and responsibilities it is 
plain from 'Against the Stream' that there should be no arbitrary 
discrimination:-
"The restriction of the political freedom and responsibility .•.• 
supremely, of that of woman, is an arbitrary convention which does 
not deserve to be preserved any longer. If Christians are to be 
consistent there can only be one possible decision in this matter." 
Such political freedom and responsibility covers the whole range of 
political, proprietary and professional rights. These should be 
identical for men and women. Presumably, however, Barth would 
suggest to married women that they should weigh whether to exercise 
some of these rights against the complementary form of equality 
present in the marriage relationship as outlined by him. That, 
however, is a personal decision, to be resolved within the marriage 
relationship and one in which the positive law can have nothing to 
say. Barth's insights into the nature of equality between men and 
women will later be directly related to recent English legislation. 
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CHAPTER 4 TILLICH 
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PAUL TILLICH AND HIS TI-IEOLOGY OF JUSTICE 
1. TILLICH'S LIFE 
Paul Tillich was born on 20th August 1886, the son of a Lutheran 
clergyman. When he was 14 his father went to Berlin but Tillich 
never forgot his country origins. His academic talent soon became 
recognised, his University career culminating in the degrees of 
Doctor of Philosophy of Breslau and Licentiate of Theology of 
Halle. In 1912 he was ordained to the ministry of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in Brandenburg. During the First World War Tillich 
joined the army as a chaplain. At this time he was becoming increas-
ingly interested in art, culture and politics. These were important 
in the development of his philosophy of religion and can be set 
against the background of the tragedy of the war. 
He began as a university teacher in 1919 at Berlin and was later 
Professor at Marburg, Dresden and Frankfurt. His lectures from 
1919-24 were on the theology of culture. During this period he 
was also converted to socialism - although this was very much his 
own brand of religious socialism. Heywood Thomas suggests that 
in this period Tillich stood on the boundary between idealism and 
Marxism in philosophy and Lutheranism and Socialism in the world of 
affairs; He spent one year teaching theology at Marburg (1924-5) 
where he met with twentieth century existentialism, but the rest of 
the 1920's were spent teaching philosophy at Dresden, Leipzig and 
"""'cr."' Fr~fur~. During this period he was verytinfluenc~d by Barth's 
'dialectical' theology. He was, however, too much Influenced by 
nineteenth century liberalism to agree with many of Barth's con-
clusions. Nevertheless he agreed fully with Barth's opposition 
to National Socialism and because of this opposition he lost his 
chair in the University of Frankfurt. He was helped by Ni~uhr 
to emigrate to the U.S.A. where he became Professor of Philosophical 
Theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York. 
Tillich spent the rest of his life in the United States and all his 
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most creative work was written there. Nevertheless his theological 
roots lay in Germany. From 1933-55 he taught in New York. In 1955 
he moved to Harvard and from there to Chicago. His last major 
work - his 'Systematic Theology' - was completed in 1963. He 
died in 1965. Throughout the period following the Second World 
War he hoped and worked for a United Europe and a closer inter-
national unity. His interest in politics and culture never left 
him and provided the practical challenge to his theological and 
philosophical enquiries. 
69 
2. TILLICH'S GENERAL THEOLOGICAL POSITION 
Tillich's theological work is complex and densely packed. This 
short summary of his position must inevitably be superficial, but 
is a necessary background to understanding Tillich's theory of 
justice. We must remember that Tillich is both philosopher and 
theologian. He is vitally interested in any attempt to deal 
honestly with the actual condition of human existence. He is 
concerned with ultimate questions and ultimate meanings. However 
it is only theology that "tries to correlate the questions implied 
2 
in the situation with the answers implied in the Christian message." 
This is pursued in a rational way. The world embodies structures 
that find their correspondence in the mind of man. Human reason 
can pose ultimate questions and answers have historically been 
given through revelation, itself coming to man through reason. 
The Bible is a primary source of theologically interpreted facts. 
Another source is the whole history of reform and culture. Yet 
man's intellect and his analysis of his situation cannot bring him 
to God (ultimate Being). For there is no truth without doubt. 
~bn is justified by grace through faith and so ~ accepted in 
spite of his doubt. 
Tillich's quest for ultimate meaning has the result that, while 
taking existential thought seriously, he constantly presses beyond 
this to ontology - to the position where the infinite reveals itself 
in the finite. This mingled lvith the Romantic strain in Tillich 
leads to a search for a lost identity, a quest for the ultimate 
union of the separated. We will see that his examination of Justice 
is undertaken in terms of ontology. Commentators have recognised 
that behind much of Tillich's work is the philosophical German 
classical tradition - especially Schelling. Man's sin is rooted 
in the estrangement of his existence from his essence~ 
What can conquer this existential estrangement? The salvation 
event of Christ. Christ is seen as the 'New Being'. He provides 
a new transparency to the ground of being so that this separation 
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can be overcome. His salvation is that which liberates and 
transforms us. It is a gift of Grace. So Tillich can see "that 
the material norm of systematic theology today is the New Being 
4 
in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern." 
The complexity of much of Tillich's thought comes from the 'vide 
variety of much of his source material and his constant dialogue 
with scientists, artists, psychiatrists and scholars. He was 
interested in modes of perception of ontology - particularly in 
symbols, which were not mere signs but which participated in the 
reality or power of that to which they pointed. The quest for the 
characteristics of the Kingdom of God led him not only to examine 
concepts symbolic of the ground of being itself, but also to 
examine their practical implications in human society. He could 
write:-
"The meaning of history can only be discovered in meaningful hist-
orical activity. The key to history is historical action, not a 
point of view above history •••. The meaning of history manifests 
itself in the self understanding of a historical group." 5 
ff'\o"e""«"'"t. 
Tillich could applaud the ~r8gFe9s of philosophy away from the anti-
metaphysical bias of logical positivism and some linguistic philo-
sophy preferring the place of mystery in traditional metaphysics. 
6 
In some respects Tillich can be compared to Coleridge. Both were 
concerned with metaphysics and ontology. Both were romantics and 
influenced by Schelling and Boehme. Both approached the truth 
from a wide variety of insights. Both were vitally concerned with 
their own society and human development and insight. Both contain 
many flashes of genius, both are highly original yet lack cohesion, 
because of their multi-dimensional nature. 
Tillich's theology of Justice is a vital consequence of his theo-
logical method and quest. It has received surprisingly little 
attention in the standard~ commentaries. Yet it is one of the 
most detailed and intricate examinations of the concept undertaken 
by a modem theologian. It is to the consideration of Tillich's 
theory of Justice that 've nmv tum. 
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3. TILLICH Is THEORY OF JUSTICE 
a) The nature of Justice as an Ontological Concept 
We have seen that Tillich's basic quest is ontological. He wishes 
to explore the characteristics of ultimate Being. He is convinced 
that Justice belongs to this realm. So he writes:-
"Justice is not a social category far removed from ontological 
enquiries, but it is a category without which no ontology is 
possible." 7 
To treat Justice as ontology is another way of saying that it is 
a characteristic of God, for God is Being itself:-
"As being itself He is ultimate reality, He is really real, the 
ground and abyss of everything that is real. As the God, with 
whom I have a person to person encounter." 8 
Being must have a form and Justice is "the form in which the power 
9 
of Being actualises itself." This is a symbolic expression of God. 
Hence:-
"The divine law is beyond the alternative of natural and positive 
law. It is the structure of reality and of everthing in it, 
including the structure of the human mind. In so far as it is 
this it is natural law, the law of continuous creation, the justice 
of Being in everything. At the same time it . is the positive law 
posited by God in his freedom which is not dependent on any given 
structure outside Him." 10 
Because of this in so far as God's law is natural right we can 
understand it in nature and in mankind and formulate it deductively, 
and in so far as it is positive law we have to accept it empirically 
and observe it. 
As support for his statement that Justice is the form of Being, 
Tillich cites both the classical and the Old Testament witness. 
Plato's ideal was "to become as much as possible similar to God" 
whereas for Aristotle '~'s highest aim is participation in the 
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external divine self-intuition." 
This leads to an unconditional rather than a conditional moral 11 
imperative, and this unconditional character is its religious quality. 
In the Old Testament model the claim of God was not impersonalistic 
but implied the principle of Justice. The Covenant demanded Justice 
and the keeping of the commandments and it threatened the violation 
of justice with rejection and destruction. The prophetic principle 
is that God will destroy his nation in the name of justice. We will 
see the extension of this in the New Testament, with the corning of 
the 'New Being' when we examine the relation of justice to love. 
If justice is the form of Being in what sense is it a moral irnpera-
time? Tillich writes:-
"A moral act is not an act in obedience to an external law, human or 
divine. It is the inner law of our true Being, of our essential or 
created nature, which demands that we actualise what follows from 
it." 12 
The moral imperative therefore puts our essential against our actual 
Being. Since man is partly estranged from his essential Being he 
therefore needs laws, yet we must not turn these laws themselves into 
morality. The end in Christian terms is Grace which overcomes guilt 
and estrangement through the Salvation process. 
However Tillich asks the question whether all ethics are not relative 
and culturally conditioned. If so no ontology is possible. He states 
that a positive and constructive criticism of the relativistic theories 
is embodied in the doctrine of the natunal moral right - that men by 
nature have an awareness of the universally valid moral norms. Many 
Protestants (notably Barth) have rej.ected natural right because they 
-
claim that man is totally estranged by sin from his essence. He has 
no knowledge of his true nature in him unless it be given by divine 
revelation. Tillich cannot agree:-
"For those who deny it must admit that a divinely revealed moral law 
cannot contradict the divinely created human nature. It can only be 
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a restatement of the law that is embodied in man's essential nature •.• 
Man's essential nature cannot be lost as long as man is man ••. Even 
a weak or misle~d conscience is still a conscience, namely, the silent 
voice of man's own essential nature, judging his actual being." 13 
Tillich also rejects the claim that natural right is impossible 
because of cultural conditioning. He claims that in all ethical 
systems some basic norms appear - their elaboration is the task of 
natural right:-
"Such a theory underlines not only all ethical systems, but also 
all systems of 'law' in the sense of jurisprudence." 14 
There are, however, important distinctions beu~een Roman Catholic 
and Protestant views of natural right. According to the Roman 
Church their principles are discovered through reason. No revela-
tory event is necessary. Because of hwnan uncertainty the Church 
must decide. The Protestant distrust of reason has resulted in far 
less emphasis being placed on natural right. Biblicism has tended 
to accept ethical demands directly from the Bible. The Church has 
been viewed as more of a human institution. However where Protest-
antism is able to accept a doctrine of natural right it can accept 
some element of relativity in ethics and can develop a more dynamic 
doctrine. It must relate to person-to-person encounter as the 
experUiential root of morality. For Tillich this leads to the 
..., 
deepest roots of justice:-
"All the implications of the idea of justice, especially the various 
forms of equality and liberty, are applications of the imperative to 
acknowledge every potential person as a person. Here too is the point 
at which every legal system of justice depends on some interpretation, 
consciously or unconsciously of the moral idea of justice." 15 
Personal claims for justice arise from a similar motivation:-
"Justice is first of all a claim raised silently or vocally by a being 
on ~1e basis of its power of being. It is an intrinsic claim, express-
ing the form in which a thing or person is actualised." 16 
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b) The relationship, through ontology, of Love and Power to Justice 
Thus far Tillich has only presented justice as ontology in a single 
dllnension. In order faithfully to represent its complexity he must 
relate it to the ontology of love and power. This he does specific-
ally in his short though profound book 'Love, Power and Justice." 
Throughout his writings he pays special attention to the relationship 
of Justice to Love. This is not only essential through his emphasis 
on person-to person relationships but also through the very nature 
'( of Christ as the 'New Being'1Tillich's emphasis on love presents 
the Christological dimension to justice. 
What does Tillich mean when he refers to love as an ontological 
characteristic? He acknowledges the wide variety of meanings love 
has been given. How far is it merely an emotion? Traditionally 
theologians have separated two broad types of love - eros and agape. 
Many have seen thes~ in terms of hierarchy. Eros as the lower form 
of human striving for sensual satisfaction. Agape as the higher form 
of spiritual love - that commanded by Christ. Tillich is unhappy 
with such a sharp distinction. To him both are necessary - eros and 
philia are the motivating powers towards beauty and creativity but 
remain incomplete without the divine dimension, without 'love cutting 
into love'. Love is not mere emotion or sentimentality but is onto-
logical - i.e. part of the very nature of Being. To illustrate its 
role Tillich uses the classical concfftion that "Love is the drive 
towards the unity of the separated." It does not distort or destroy 
in its union~8 The love of Christ has enabled reunion with God 
throughout the salvation event. 
What then is the relationship between justice and love? It keeps love 
faithful to itself:-
"A love of any type, and love as a whole if it does not include justice, 
is chaotic self-surrender, destroying him who loves as well as him who 
accepts such love." 19 
The exercise of justice is the working of his love resisting and 
breaking what is against love. Therefore there can be no conflict 
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in God between love and justice." 20 
This means that "Justice is that side of love which affirms the 21 
independent right of object and subject within the love relation." 
It both preserves the freedom and unique character of the beloved 
and preserves the self from chaotic self-surrender. Both love and 
justice are meaningless 2~ithout each other. Although love is the 
ultimate moral principle it could not be love if it did not contain 
justice. This has been made plain in the salvation event:-
"The final expression of the unity of love and justice in God is 
the symbol of justification. It points to the unconditional validity 
of the structures of justice but at the same time to the divine act 
in which love conquers the immanent consequences of the violation 
of justice. The ontological unity of love and justice is manifest, 
in final revelation as the justification of the sinner. The divine 
love in relation to the unjust creature is grace." 23 
So also justice without love is injustice. This unit~ and inter-
~dependence of love and justice is a necessary conclusion of 
ontological analysis. It alone justifies judgement, condemnation 
and punishment:-
"Condei1U1ation is not the negation of love but the negation of the 
negation of love." 
and 
"Judgement is an act of love which surrenders that which resists 
love to self-destruction." 24 
i.e. allowing the self-destructive consequences of existential 
estrangement to go their way. 
When Tillich examines the ontological nature of power he again dis-
covers that it is at the heart of Being. Being is the power of Being. 
Non-Being is that quality of Being by which everything that partici-
pates in Being is negated. Yet:-
Power is the possibility of self-affirmation in spite of internal and 
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external negation. It is the possibility of overcoming non-Being."25 
This is the goal of history:-
'~istory, in terms of the self-integration of life, drives towards 
a centredness of all history - bearing groups and their individual 
members in an unambiguous harmony of power and justice." 26 
Justice in democracy means progress only in its quantitative and 
not necessarily in its qualitative character. Justice is the form 
in which the power of Being actualizes itself and hence must be 
adequate to the dynamic~ of power:7 It gives form to the encounters 
of Being within Being. Power by its nature needs to be actualised 
in force and compulsion. How can this be reconciled with love and 
justice? Tillich recognises that nothing can be forced into some-
thing which contradicts its essential nature without being destroyed. 
But power in justice and love is Being actualizing itself over 
against the threat of non-Being - so the more reuniting love there 
is, the more conquered non-Being there is, the more power of Being 
there is. Hence love is the foundation and negation of power. 
Hence in Tillich's ontology love, power and justice are a unity. 
Love is the aim of justice and power, yet without justice and power 
love cannot be love. Justice by its nature leads to a concrete 
expression of itself. We will now examine what principles of justice 
Tillich can deduce from its nature - together with the ambiguities 
which arise from them. 
c) Philosophical Principles in the Application of Justice 
We have seen that love is the aim of justice and that the justice of 
Being is the form which is adequate to this movement. Yet more 
detailed principles must be derived from this basic principle in 
order to mediate between it and the concrete situation where justice 
is demanded. In the course of his writings Tillich elaborates several 
principles and points out the ambiguities within them. We now come to 
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the heart of the practical lawyer's dilemma in trying to apply 
justice-to concrete situations. However, Tillich does not deal 
with the application of Justice to specific moral issues but rather 
deals with its application in terms of general principles. 
The first princiJ>le is that of adequacy - the adequacy of the form 
to the content •2 The fom; may be inadequate in various ways. They 
might have outlived their usefulness and failed to keep pace with 
society - laws governing the family structure of another period 
may destroy families and disrupt the class unity of this period. 
The form might be the expression only of a particular individual or 
social power of being. The form might be abstract and inadequate 
to any unique situation. There is a fundamental divergence between 
the abstract character of the law and the uniqueness of every concrete 
situation. 
This is a problem that the common law, with its emphasis on precedent 
and its ability to distinguish when a new situation has arisen, has 
coped with quite successfully. The common law can be seen as media-
ting between general principles and concrete facts. This, perhaps, 
explains something of the reluctance of many trained in the common 
law to take note of general and abstract jurisprudence, for this is 
seen as neglecting the needs of Judges for practicable guidelines or 
principles. Tillich himself, with his intricate philosophy, may well 
so be cens~red. 
Finally there is the problem of the inclusiveness and exclusiveness 
of both form and content. How far can justice accommodate minority 
groups, dissenters or newcomers? Tillich comments:-
"In all these cases justice does not demand unambiguous acceptance of 
those who would possibly disturb or destroy group cohesion, but it 
certainly does not permit their unambiguous rejection." 29 
The second principle is that of equality. Put on an external level, 
most would agree that there is ultimate equality between all men in 
the view of God and His justice is equally offered t~ all of them. 
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Tillich develops this more concretely in his 'Systematic Theology':-
"Every person is equal to every other, in so far as he is a person. 
In this respect there is no difference between an actually developed 
personality and a mentally diseased one who is merely a potential 
personality." 30 
Yet he readily acknowledges that every concrete application of this 
principle is ambiguous. For differences in society may entail 
different claims for distributive justice. A rigid equality may 
deny the right embodied in a particular power of Being and give it 
to individuals or groups whose power of being does not warrant it. 
The principle of equality has on occasions to be restricted to equals, 
although this could be used to justify, say, apartheid. Tillich 
attempts to get over this by basing the principle of equality on that 
of personality, the content of which is the demand to treat every 
person as a person. Justice is always violated if men are treated 
as if they were things. 
This brings us to the next principle of justice - that of freedom. 
Freedom can be seen on two levels. It can be spiritual freedom 
"the inner superiority of the person over enslaving conditions in the 
external world." 31 
Hence the Stoic can participate in the justice of the universe and its 
rational structure and the Christian can expect the justice of the 
Kingdom of God. In contrast to this Liberalism tries to remove the 
conditions of oppression:-
"Liberty is considered to be an essential principle of justice because 
the freedom of political and cultural self-destruction is seen as an 
essential element of personal existence." 32 
The final principle of justice that Tillich examines is that of 
fraternity:-
"If justice is the form of the reunion of the separated, it must 
include both the separation without which there is no love and the 
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reunion in which love is actualised. This is the reason why frequently · 
the principle of fraternity or solidarity or comradeship or, more 
adequately, community has been added to the principles of equality 
and liberty." 33 
Tillich is, however, unhappy about the principle of fraternity. 
Community can be seen as an emotional principle adding nothing essen-
tial to the rational concept of justice, but on the contrary endanger-
ing its strictness. We see from Tillich's 'Systematic Theology' that 
leadership within a community brings its own ambiguities. 
"Leadership is the social analogy to centredness" 34 
yet 
"The leader represents not only the power and justice of the group but 
also himself, his power of being and the justice implied in it." 35 
In leadership we also have the ambiguity of rationalisation and ideol-
ogy and the ambiguity of an authority over persons which is always open 
to rejection in the name of justice. 
d) Levels of Justice 
Significantly in his book 'Love, Power and Justice' Tillich follows 
his discussion of principles of justice with an analysis of levels of 
justice. Ambiguities were an unavoidable accompaniment to his prin-
ciples of justice. He cannot avoid asking himself the question what 
effect this has on his scheme of ontology. He tries to answer this 
by enumerating different qualities of justice. 
He begins with the basis of justice - i.e. intrinsic justice. This 
we have already examined:-
"Justice is first of all a claim raised silently or vocally by a being 
on the basis of its power of being. It is an intrinsic claim, express-
ing the form in which a thing or a person is actualised." 36 
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This can be either a just or an unjust claim. It may suppress the 
dynamic element in the actualisation of being or it may deny the 
static structure within which the dynamic element can be effective. 
The second level of justice Tillich refers to as tributive or prop-
ortional:-
"It appears as distributive, attributive, retributive justice, g1vmg 
to everything proportionally to what it deserves, positively or 
negatively." 37 
Tillich defines his terms:-
"Attributive justice attributes to beings what they are and can claim 
to be. Distributive justice gives to any being the proportion of 
goods which is due to him; retributive justice does the same but in 
negative terms, in terms of deprivation of goods or active punishment." 
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In the realm of law and law-enforcement Tillich sees the tributive 
form of justice as the norm. Yet there are exceptions and they point 
to a third and higher form of justice which is in accord with intrinsic 
justice. 
This third form Tillich refers to as transforming or creative justice. 
Because intrinsic justice is dynamic, tributive justice is never 
adequate to it because it calculates in fixed proportions. This would 
include the breach of a positive law in the name of a superior law 
which is not yet formulated and valid. A judgement may be unjust 
although legally right. Tillich defines the criterion of creative 
justice as the fulfilment within the unity of universal fulfilment. 
The religious symbol for this is the Kingdom of God. The classical 
expression of this is given in the Bible, where the main emphasis 
is not on proportional justice but on those who subject themselves to 
the divine orders according to which everything in nature and history 
is created and moves - i.e. loving obedience to the source of the law. 
God's justice is expressed in the grace which forgives in order to 
unite. It may appear as plain injustice. Justification by faith 
through grace justifies him who is unjust. For creative justice is 
39 
the form of reuniting love. 
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I have summarised at some length Tillich's levels of justice because 
they mark a fundamental difficulty in the ontological approach. 
Justice is by its nature a concrete form of being, yet as soon as we 
attempt to put it into concrete form we are faced with ambiguities 
and a betrayal of its original purity. This is inevitable given 
human nature and society and leads Tillich to declare 
"A state of unambiguous justice is a figment of the utopian imagin-
ation.'' 40 
This difficulty can clearly be seen in Tillich's early book "Die 
41 
socialistische Entscheidung". Here Tillich justifies socialism as 
a prophetic movement leading towards a new order of things - towards 
justice. However:-
"In the power struggle Justice decides the issue in the final analysis 
- not an absolute, abstract justice, but a concrete justice that is 
perceived at a given time by a society and its particular groups as 
justice for them. In this sense all Power is based on justice." 42 
In addition Tillich comments:-
"Justice is not an absolute ideal standing over existence; it is the 
fulfilment of primal being ••• Therefore justice presses beyond every 
social situation for every reality reflects the ambiguity of origin. 
It is the function of the prophetic movements of a particular period 
to explore this ambiguity and to fight for a more adequate justice. 
But this struggle can only be led by a group that can represent and 
realise the new justice. This is precisely the situation of the 
proletariat." 43 
It shoul~of course, be noted that Tillich was here writing in the 
1930's in a particular social situation. However, it is because 
Tillich believes "Justice presses beyond every social situation" 
that ambiguity is inevitable. 
This ambiguity is also evident wherever Tillich attemps to work out 
justice in personal and group encounters. In personal encounters:-
"The cultural process gives the contents; they are provided by human 
experience, embodied in laws, traditions, authorities as well as by 
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the individual conscience. This provides a solid foundation for 
justice in personal encmmters." 44 
Hence law is externalised conscience and conscience is internalised 
law. The rules of justice are created by the interplay between law 
and conscience within the context of the acknowledgement of the other 
person as a person. Yet can this situation be transcended? Tillich 
sees the only possibility left as the classical theory of natural 
right, but that itself leads us back to the ambiguities of its basic 
principles like equality and freedom. He concludes:-
"The natural law theory cannot answer the questions of the contents 
of justice. And it is possible to show that this question cannot be 
answered at all in terms of justice alone. The question of the content 
of justice drives to the principle of love and power." 45 
This is all very well, yet when we are driven thus far back we are 
again driven to abstracts. Tillich mentions functions of creative 
justice (i.e. that which relates love to justice) in personal encoun-
ters as listening, giving and forgiving yet surely these are just as 
ambiguous in v.r:orking out the content of justice. 
An example of the practical difficulty of achieving justice in the 
sphere of personal and group encounters can be seen in Tillich's 
own example of the emancipation of women and the movement towards 
their equality before the law. Tillich, while supporting much of 
the progress made and opposing any attempt to restore a male pat-
riarchalism, comments on the dangers of providing a male-orientated 
equality model:- 46 
4. 
"The powers of origin possessed by womtn by virtue of her resonance 
with eros and motherhood cannot easily be incorporated into the 
extremely one-sided, male-orientated rationalistic system." 47 
Further analysis of this problem can be seen in the writings of the 
other theologians examined, in particular Maritain~8 Part III of this 
study further discusses the problems of equality models when examining 
legislation designed to outlaw certain broad areas of sexual discrim-
ination. 49' 
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In group relations such as those between nations we are led to 
similar ambiguities. We have already mentioned the ambiguities of 
leadership and form to content. In dealing with the problem of the 
desire for a united mankind Tillich mentions three possibilities. 
First the return to independent power centres, perhaps not national 
but continental. The second a kind of federal union of the present 
main powers and their subjection to a central authority in which all 
groups participate. The third that one of the great powers should 
develop into a world centre, ruling the other nations through liberal 
methods and in democratic forms. The first leads to a conflict 
between centralisation and nationalism. The second contradicts the 
analysis of power as we have given it and presupposes the presence 
of a spiritual unity which does not exist. Tillich believes the 
third is the most probable but acknowledges the dangers of disin-
tegration and revolution - the development of new vocational con-
sciousness. Again we are faced with ambiguities and Tillich has to 
recognise tl1at ultimate justice is only attainable in the ultimate 
relation - i.e. in God and the Kingdom of Heaven. SO 
So we have come full circle. Tillich's ontological analysis is im-
pressive and illuminating as ontology. As such it is the goal and 
teleology of mankind. Yet the very nature of justice as a concrete 
form brings with it the eternal dilemma of the lawyer and student of 
jurisprudence. How can such an ontology be put into practice in an 
imperfect world? Human justice must to a certain extent be ambiguous. 
We have but the problem of the immanence and transcendence of God writ 
large. Yet the difficulty of putting ontology into practice does not 
negative the necessity of the attempt. Tillich's value is in his 
attempt to clarify the ontology of justice by exploring its relation-
ship with love and power and thereby examining the strengths and weak-
nesses of the traditional ontology of natural right. His multi-
dimensional approach brings new insights to this. In the last resort 
he claims to have done neither more nor less than an ontological 
study. There is the awesome responsibility of attempting to put such 
an ontology into practice. The significance of the principles enum-
erated to the problems of present day English law examined in this 
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study will be further examined in Part III. 
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CHAPTER 5 ~LTMANN 
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M:>L Th1ANN I s LIFE 
., 
Jurgen Moltrnarm was born in Hamburg on April 8t:h, 1926. He started 
-:::,. 
studying theology as a· prisoner of war in England and, after he had 
returned home in 1948, continued his studies in Gottingen under 
H.-J. Iwand, E. Wolf, and C. Weber. In 1952 he took the degree of 
Doctor of Theology with a thesis in the field of historical theology, 
entitled 'Amyraut and the School of Saumur'. Also in 1952 he married 
Dr. Elizabeth Wendel. 
Having entered the Lutheran Church as a curate in Berlin and West-
phalia from 1953 to 1958, Moltrnarm became parson of a parish and the 
student chaplain in Bremen. In 1957 he qualified for inauguration as 
academic lecturer, submitting to the University of Gottingen a dissert-
ation on 'Chr. Pezel and the Conversion of Bremen (from Lutheranism) 
to Calvinism'. He taught as a professor at the Theological College 
in Wuppertal from 1958 to 1963. In 1963 he was appointed to the 
chair of Systematic Theology and Social Ethics in the University of 
Bonn. 
Since 1967 Mbltrnann has been Professor of Systematic Theology in the 
University of Tubingen. For the academic year 1967-68 he was guest-
professor at Duke University, North Carolina, U.S.A. In 1971 he was 
awarded the literary prize 'premia d'Isola d'Elba' for the Italian 
edition of his 'Theology of Hope'. 1973 saw the publication of his 
other major work 'The Crucified God.' 
Moltmarm has travelled widely on lecture tours. He is co-editor·of 
several periodicals as well as a member of the Synod of EKD ('Evangel-
ical Church in Germany' the federation of Protestant churches), Faith 
and Order, the council of the Ecumenical College of Bessey, and the 
Paulus society. 
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A. Moltmann's General Theological Position 
The development of Mol tmann' s theology can be compared to the growth 
of a symphony, each new movement throws the old into relief and 
further illuminates and develops it. His thinking in the 1960's 
was centred rmmd the theology of hope. In the 1970's his theology 
dramatically changed to that of the cross. He does, however, deny 
any reversal of ideas. On his own admission the two phases are two 
sides of the same coin. To understand this we will briefly examine 
both phases. 
Moltmann's theology of hope and newness as seen in his books 'Theology 
of Hope' and 'Religion, Revolution and the Future' start from his 
fascination with the future and with eschatology. Eschatology is, 
for him, the starting point for theology, not the end of it. Hence 
"From first to last and not merely in the epilogue Christianity is 
eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and there-
fore also revolutionising and transforming the present." 1 
The classic sign in salvation history of this is seen in the resurr-
ection of Christ. The resurrection is seen as the culmination of a 
God of promise who is witnessed to in both Old and New Testaments. 
It should not, however, be thought of in terms of classic promise 
and fulfilment, for the time scale is, as it were, fluid, with the 
future breaking into the present and the present into the future. 
This is true for the whole of the Gospel event but the resurrection 
is the key point:-
"The resurrection has set in motion an eschatologically determined 
process of history, whose goal is the annihilation of death in the 
victory of the life of the resurrection, and which ends in that right-
eousness in which God receives in all things due and the creature 
thereby finds sal vat ion." 2 
On a human level this means that the future attains predominance. over 
the past and hope over anxiety. There is clearly an important differ-
ence between this eschatologically determined process of history and 
that which is historically new merely by virtue of event - although 
91 
the one is partially e~odi~d in the other. Hence:-
"The anticipation of that which is ultimately new lies within the 
historically new." 3 
From this hope for the new creation develops Moltrnann's vision of 
the new man and the new corrummity which we will see so intimately 
connected to his concept of Justice. 
In this emphasis on newness and realisable eschatology Moltrnann 
claims to be re-emphasising the insight of St. Paul:-
"If anyone is in Christ he is a new creation." 4 
This is in marked contrast to religious tradition:-
"In religious tradition men tum into recipients of an old message. 
In the modem world they become pioneers of progress, trail-blazers 
of the future, and discoverers of new possibilities. The Church 
seems to live on memories, the world on hope." 5 
A development of Pauline theology should, however, mean that everything 
past is either future begun or future aborted. This should be the true 
context of Christian faith, instead of the present situation where 
"A Christian faith in God without hope for the future of the world has 
called forth a secular hope for the future of the world without faith 
in God." 6 
True faith motivated by hope means that the Church is vitally concerned 
with the ordering of social and political life for it is striving 
towards an ideal. 
It is not, therefore, surpr1s1ng that in his 'Theology of Hope' 
Mbltmann rejects a purely ontological foundation for the understanding 
of history in Christian social ethics. He stresses that God's action 
is not seen in that which is repeatable or remains the same. Thus he 
discounts Greek philosophy as standing in the epiphany of the eternal 
present - contrasting it rather with the Israelite/Christian man who 
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stands in the 'apocalypse of that which is coming.' This does not 
deny the present but illuminates it. However the future is ever in 
danger of being obscured by the forces of evil. Here we see the 
jumping off point for the next development of Moltmann' s theology 
- the theology of the Cross. 
Hence in his 'The Crucified God' Mol tmarm explains the shift in 
emphasis:-
"The dominant theme then was that of anticipations of the future of 
God in the form of promises and hopes; here it is the understanding 
of the incarnation of that future by way of the sufferings of Christ, 
in the world's sufferings." 7 · 
In this new emphasis there is the feeling that Moltmarm is seeking to 
balance his earlier idealism and counsels of perfection with the blood, 
sweat and tears of existence - with that human nature that crucified 
the Son of God. His theological reasons for his theme bear this 
general feeling out. He sees the crucified Christ in the light and 
context of his resurrection and therefore of freedom and hope. Yet 
to emphasise the crucifixion means we must deepen our concept of God. 
We must ask fundamental questions about man and his liberation and 
relationship to the reality of the demonic crisis in his society. 
Out of such a critical analysis Moltmarm wishes to move beyond a 
criticism of the Church to a criticism of society. The study of the 
cross marks a radical orientation of theology and the Church of Christ. 
So the cross illuminates the nature of God and man and enables a more 
sober reappraisal of hope:-
"Unless it apprehends the pain of the negative, Christian hope carmot 
be realistic and liberating." 8 
More specifically in 'The Crucified God' the cross has three effects 
on the state of man. Firstly it is of importance when we think about 
our identity. The cross shows that identity and involvement carmot 
be separated:-
"Christian identity can be understood only as an act of identification 
with the crucified Christ." 
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What does this identification mean? 
"By his sufferings and death, Jesus identified himself with those who 
were enslaved, and took their pains upon himself. And if he was not 
alone in his suffering, nor were they abandoned in the pains of their 
slavery .•. Jesus was their identity with God in a world which had 
taken all hope from them and destroyed their human identity." 9 
Hence the identity and involvement required from the Church of the 
crucified is to be the Church of the oppressed and insulted, the 
poor and wretched. It must liberate the poor from poverty and the 
rich from riches. It must take sides in political and social 
conflicts. 
Secondly the cross relates to eschatology. The command to take up 
your cross and follow Christ (Mk.8/35) is eschatological and not 
moral:-
"It is a call into the future of God which is now beginning in Jesus." 
10 
The cross can only be understood in the context of his resurrection. 
It is the resurrection that can demonstrate realised eschatology:-
"Jesus' resurrection makes possible the impossible, namely reconcil-
iation in the midst of strife, the law of grace in the midst of judge-
ment, and the creative love in the midst of legalism." 11 
Moltmann later elaborates on this point:-
"Jesus broke through legalistic apocalyptic because he proclaimed 
'justitia justificans' rather than 'justitia distributiva' as the 
righteousness of the Kingdom of God, and anticipated it in the law 
of grace among the unrighteous and those outside the law." 12 
This is an eschatological position because the future was anticipated 
in Christ's death on the cross. The risen Christ and the crucified 
Christ are one and the same. This wisdom_ of God is folly in human 
eyes. (1 Corl/25-31; 2Cor 4/10,12). 
Thirdly we can see in Mol tmann' s examination of the theology of the 
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cross a heightened awareness of the political ramifications of the 
trial and crucifixion of Jesus and from there to the politics of 
mankind. Politics cannot be separated from religion for it is the 
means whereby collective involvement can be made effective and rele-
vant to the present human condition:-
"Faith gains substance in its political incarnations and overcomes 
its un-Christian abstractions which keep~ it far from the present 
situation of the crucified God." 13 
A theology of the cross keeps the Church faithful to its mission so 
that it does not identify wholly with society as constituted, neither 
does it reject the world but is critical of society in the insight 
and knowledge of the cross. 
For a more detailed examination of the human condition and Moltmann's 
concept of Justice we must tum to his book '.Man'. Again the cross is 
a constant theme making the intersection of true God and true men. 
The exact opposite of the Greek ideal of the good and beautiful for 
man is seen in Jesus:-
"He did not preach and live out a new ideal of the good and just man 
but brought the Gospel to the poor." 14 
Here, presumably, Moltmann is using the word 'just' in the sense of 
the Greek ideal and is contrasting it with God's justice of the cross. 
Man's lack of humanness is revealed in the cross, as is the remedy:-
"The basis of Christian hope lies in the faith of the crucified Son 
of Man. It is therefore 'hidden under the cross' (Luther) and become 
present only during temptation and in struggle. Following the cruci-
fied Jesus creates the distance of Christians from this 'passing 
world' ••• the strength for the incarnation of love." 15 
Moltmann's latest major work is 'The Church in the Power of the 
Spirit' (published 1977). Doctrinally the book breaks little new 
ground unlike his 'Theology of Hope' and 'The Crucified God.' In 
the words of a perceptive review by Kenneth Mason:-
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"Those earlier books were fascinating explorations in the doctrine 
of God, Christ and the Holy Trinity. This book in spite of its title, 
does nothing similar for the doctrine of the Spirit. It is not really 
the third book of a major trilogy. That has still to come, and we 
must very much hope that it will." 16 
The book is, however, important for our purposes in so far as it 
contains a further application of the principles worked out in his 
earlier books to the life of Christians under the guidance of the 
Holy Spirit. As such it brings Moltmann one step closer to an applied 
theology. Its conclusions will be examined in Section C of this 
Chapter. 
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B. Moltmann's Concept of Justice 
Moltmann's concept of Justice has naturally developed as his 
theological emphasis has changed. Indeed, it is suggested that his 
thoughts on Justice may be a major factor in the balancing of his 
earlier theology of hope with his later theology of the cross. His 
theology of hope plainly required an expression in terms of Justice. 
This belonged to the eschatological domain which is seeking to react 
on the present:-
"Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, 
but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it." 17 
However Moltmann realised that in this process human striving is 
essential - this in turn leads to the dangers of human inadequacy 
and sin. We can see how his thoughts are turning to the cross. 
In expressing human inadequacy Moltmann's Lutheran background is in 
evidence. Thus he comments in true Lutheran fashion on the law, 
meaning by that the moral and religious law revealed by God:-
"Man being human depends on what he does. But what he does is sub-
ject to the law. The law demands of him a justice he can no longer 
produce once he has become unjust. So he becomes the slave of a law 
which holds up to him a humanity it refuses to grant and demands of 
him freedom without setting him free." 18 
The way out of this dilemma is to start not from man but from God -
thus 
"When justification happens to a sirmer, unjust living is made just." 
19 
In the words of Luther arguing against Aristotle 
'~e do not become just by doing justice, but because we have been 
justified, we do what is just." 20 
In this emphasis on starting from God and on justification by faith 
the towering influence of Barth's concept of justice can be seen. 
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Moltmann is surely echoing Barth when he proclaims:-
'~ithout God's justice and faithfulness nothing can exist." 21 
This is equivalent to saying that Justice is an ontological charact-
eristic of God. 
Mol tmann' s theology of hope and eschatology do, however, provide a 
new and vital element to justice and rule out any simple ontology. 
Justice as righteousness is made possible by Christ's resurrection 
in which hope is always kindled anew. Thus this confidence and hope 
which requires human justice 
"Seeks for that which is really objectively possible in this world, 
in order to grasp it and realise it in the direction of the promised 
future of the righteousness, the life and the Kingdom of God ••. Thus 
it will continually strive to understand world reality in terms of 
history on the basis of the future that is in prospect. It will not 
therefore search, like the Greeks, for the nature of history and for 
the enduring in the midst of change, but on the contrary for the 
history of nature and for the possibilities of changing the enduring." 
22 
Hence, to summarise, we already have in Moltmann's early theology a 
realistic concept of justice in terms of righteousness. This is seen 
as both ontology and eschatology challenging the present. Ideally 
Justice is one with righteousness but in fact our attempts at Justice 
are clouded by our unwillingness to contemplate the demands of right-
eousness on human strivings. We can see this conclusion in Mbltmann's 
early work as being influential in the formulation of his later 
theology of the cross. 
Mbltmann's concept of Justice is greatly refined in his book '~fum' in 
1974. Here he relates it directly to human society through a detailed 
examination of natural right and human law. Mol trnann recognises that 
man being a social animal must form himself in a society. Societies 
must have laws, a legal system and concepts of Justice operative in 
formulating and administering these laws. However "Our ideas of 
justice depend on the images of man current at any particular time", 
and "the legal system shows us the actual image of man of an age and 
of a society as it is put into practice." 23 
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This leads to the basic question of a coherent and moral theory of 
justice, namely 
Is there a higher court of appeal before which the law in force 
must be justified, or can anything count as law which has been 
established by agreement?" 24 
Natural right provides a clear answer to this question. However, 
Mbltmann, like Barth, does not see the traditional formulations of 
25 
natural right as a solution. He begins his criticism of natural 
right with a quotation from Radbruch:-
"Man in the eyes of the law is no longer Rqbinson Crusoe or Adam, 
the isolated individual, but man in society." 26 
Hence although the idea of natural and human rights is fascinating 
the difficulties in carrying through this ideal lie in its lack of 
connection with the real historical situation of man. Universal 
principles can be used both to support and oppose situations and 
ideologies. What is natural and what is unnatural may well be 
culturally conditioned - this can be seen, for example, in sexual 
ethics. However, although Mbltmann believes that natural right is 
itself historically conditioned he is reluctant to jettison the 
concept entirely:-
In spite of these historically conditioned and changing contents, the 
idea itself and the search for a natural law are actual facts and, 
once they have entered into history, are unforgettable ••• Behind the 
assertions that 'the true nature of man' or an absolute moral law is 
known stand claims to authority which seen historically are always 
immense. And yet, on the other hand without a public agreement about 
what life that is worthy of man is, no legal system is possible." 27 
Mbltmann develops this statement to expound his own use of natural 
right and his own foundation for justice. To continue with the above 
quotation:-
"If this agreement arises in the historical process of human social-
isation, it is meaningful to understand the idea of the moral law and 
the question of natural law in the context of man's future hope for 
mankind and for humanity. The contents may be historically conditioned 
and changeable, but the intention which is contained in it is 
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tn1conditioned and invariable." 
The influence of the 'Theology of Hope' can clearly be seen. Laws 
and reforms of_laws should always anticipate the future of meaningful 
communal life - justice must have eschatology as well as ontology:-
"It is not the invocation of a supposedly objective moral law, but 
the unavoidable task of altering the world, of healing it, of better-
ing it, of making it more worthy of men and more worth living in, 
that can be regarded as the norm of justice." 28 
He quotes Maihofer with approval:-
'~atural Law is for us the concept of the continuously required 
evolutions and revolution of human relationships in everyday life 
fmward to the form of a truly human society among men." 29 
Moltmann claims that such a redefinition of natural law is not only 
more faithful to our human experience, it is also more faithful to 
God. For God is a God who acts through history. He is not like 
Zeus "the tight reason which pervades all things' but is God of the 
Exodus and the Covenant. He is the God of freedorr: and deliverance 
from sin and death. 
The actual working out of justice is therefore both dynamic and real-
istic. The realism can be seen in 'The Crucified God' - for God 
spoke to men not by 'right reason' but by the 'folly of the cross' 
(lCor.l/18). So we can elaborate in terms of justice on the three 
points noted earlier from 'The Crucified God'. The first was that of 
identity and involvement. The crucified Lord emphasised the radical 
nature of the content of Justice. There must be justice for the 
oppressed, insulted, poor and rejected. The second point was that the 
cross and resurrection were themselves eschatological events. So 
justice is in the nature of 'justitia justificans' rather than 'just-
itia distributiva'. The third point stressed the importance of 
Christian politics. Politics is the way to implement in practical 
terms a Christian concept of justice. For Moltmann, it is, however, 
also more than this for it is also the means whereby collective 
involvement can be made effective and relevant to the present human 
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condition. It is not merely a mechanical agency but rather shares 
in the discernment process. 
Hence we can see in Moltmann' s concept of justice a balance between 
the two sides of the coin - his theology of hope and his theology of 
the cross. This reflects the complex nature of God's being - for 
justice is part of God's personality. So on the one hand justice is 
dynamic working for change according to the discernment of God's 
risen power and purposes. Yet on the other hand man's sinfulness 
and the crucified Lord must be realistically faced. The task of 
justice is to discern the intention of God which is unconditioned 
and invariable but in so doing it has to translate it into a concrete 
historical setting which is by its nature culturally conditioned and 
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changeable. Moltmann's essay 'A Christian Declaration on Human Rights' 
makes the point that since the beginning of time God has had a claim 
upon human beings. They must respond by establishing and upholding 
those rights and duties which belong essentially to what it means to 
be truly human -
'~ithout their being fully acknowledged and exercised, human beings 
cannot fulfil their original destiny of having been created in the 
image of God." 31 
Justice is both ontology and eschatology challenging the present, but 
in our attempts to ground it in present situations and laws we need 
both the vision to discern the intention of God and also the realis-
ation that God's plan is ever liable to be clouded by human sinfulness. 
101 
C. Practical Applications by Moltmann 
It is not surpr1s1ng that such a recent theological concept of 
Justice has not, as yet, achieved its full flowering in detailed 
practical applications. Moltmann has not yet achieved any detailed 
ethics to compare, for example, with volume III part 4 of Barth's 
'Church Dogmatics.·' The beginning of this process can, however, be 
seen in a recent collection of Moltmann's essays 'The Experiment 
Hope', (1975), in his essay 'A Christian Declaration on Human Rights' 
(1976), and in MJltmann's latest book 'The Church in the Power of 
the Spirit' (1977). 
In 'The Church in the Power of the Spirit' Moltmann discusses ethical 
applications in three broad categories - viz Christianity in the 
Processes of Economic Life; Symbiosis; Christianity in the Processes 
of Political Life; Human Rights; Christianity in the Processes of 
Cultural Life; Open Identit;s.z These broad categories cover many 
contemporary problems and provide us with a general framework. More 
specific contributions on individual issues from 'The Experiment Hope' 
and 'A Christian Declaration on Human Rights' will be added where 
appropriate. 
In his essay 'A Christian Declaration on Human Rights' Moltmann makes 
the point that because we are persons before God and as such capable 
of acting on God's behalf and responsible to him, a person's rights 
and duties as a human being are inal~ble and indivisible. This is 
true whether they be economic, social, political or personal rights 
and duties. Without human duties, rights and freedom cannot exist. 
1) Economic Applications: 
In discussing the economic applications of his theology, Moltmann 
stresses the need to start from the Christian doctrine of creation. 
He points out that according to the Biblical and Christian tradition 
it is only the fact that man is made in the image of God that justifies 
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and upholds his commission to rule over the earth. However he claims 
that since Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes this idea has been re-
versed in the popular conception. So it becomes man's expanding 
rule over nature which makes him the image of God and leads him to 
be like God. This perversion results in the conviction that man 
must do everything he can with the world he dominates - using and 
exploiting it. This results in processes of growth that escape our 
control. Rather the Christian position should be:-
" because man is made in the image of God, his rule over the 
earth has its bounds and responsibilities ••• away from the will 
to supremacy to solidarity with others and with nature." 
Hence 
"The most important element for the development of a society that 
deserves the name 'human' is social justice, not economic growth •.• 
The hunger for justice and the longing for fellowship with one 
another can be much stronger." 33 
This leads to a basic and universal economic right:-
"If the right to the earth is given to htmlan beings, it follows that 
each and every htmlan being has the basic economic right to a just 
share in life, nourishment, work, shelter and personal possessions. 
The concentration of the basic necessities of life and the means of 
production in the hands of a few should be seen as a distortion and 
perversion of the image of God in human beings." 34 
The "right~·' of the earth must also be recognised to safeguard future 
htmlan life:-
"Economic justice in the prov1s1on and distribution of food, natural 
resources, and the industrial means of production will have to be 
directed towards the survival and the common life of htmlan beings 
and nature ••• Today economic and ecological justice mutually condition 
each other and thus can only be realised together." 35 
2) Political Applications: 
Mbltmann defines politics as those public affairs which a community 
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has to order. A primary concern within this sphere is hlDllan rights:-
"In their present fonn htnnan rights had their genesis in the Medi-
terranean world - Greece, Israel, Rome, Christendom - and they took 
form in the course of the Christianisation of Europe. Human rights 
are by definition rights which man as man has towards the state -
man meaning every htnnan being without regard to his birth, race, 
religion, health or nationality. They are rights that are integral 
to man's being man. They are therefore also termed pre-political 
or supra-political rights. They are not at the State's disposal 
and the State is bound to respect them. They must consequently be 
introduced into national constitutions as fundamental and civil 
rights." 36 
Here we see Mbltmann far closer to the traditional fonnulations of 
natural justice than in 'The Experiment Hope' where he discussed 
them in the more general terms of liberation from oppression. He 
does, however, still assign this as a prerequisite to obtaining such 
fundamental rights. Hence if they are to claim their htnnan rights 
people must be freed from poverty, hunger, contempt and persecution:-
"The Biblical traditions have proclaimed liberation from all inequal-
ities of class and caste, as well as from the privileges of race, 
sex and health and have looked forward to the time when the 'glory 
of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together." 
Hence "the traditions of hope in the Son of Man ••••• demand that we 
first of all establish htnnan rights among and for those who are 
oppressed and robbed of these rights. HlDllan justice becomes concrete 
when it is specifically viewed as 'the rights of my neighbour'." 37 
Here Moltmann shows that the emphasis in his Christian theory of 
human rights is on the rights of neighbours rather than of selves. 
In addition Moltmann's consideration of htnnan rights in 'The Church 
in the Power of the Spirit' and his essay 'A Christian Declaration 
on HlDllan Rights' have become far more profound than that in 'The 
Experiment Hope' by stressing that human duties must be formulated 
as well as htnnan rights - i.e. the fundamental obligations which man 
as a hlDllan being has towards other men when he claims his human rights. 
He does not, however, go on to enlDllerate the precise nature of many 
of these duties. As far as individual human rights are concerned he 
quotes with approval the formulation in the United Nations Declaration 
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of Human Rights 1948 but comments that these are only concerned with 
individual human rights. Arising from his economic applications he 
stresses that further development of human rights will involve the 
~iS formulation of the rights of humanity as a whole. We can se~h re-
flected in his essay 'A Christian Declaration on Human Rights' where 
he comments that human rights point to a universal community in which 
alone they can be realised. 
Moltmarm does not see human tights as a final possession or an ideal 
but rather as legal and political aids on the road to man's becoming 
man in the context of the unification of mankind. They are a process 
- unfinished and historically speaking unfinishable. Thus new human 
rights can arise as society develops. Here we see a clear teleolog-
ical emphasis not catered for by traditional formulations of natural 
justice. All of this is seen as within the context of the Kingdom 
of God:-
"Human rights and the rights of humanity are to be viewed as answer-
ing to and anticipating the Kingdom of the Son of Man in the power 
struggles of history." 38 
However human sin is ever likely to pervert this process:-
"Today, fear and aggression dominate a divided and hostile humanity 
which is on the way totally to destroy itself and the earth. Human 
rights can only be realised when and in so far as the justification 
of unjust human beings and the renewal of their humarmess take place." 
39 
It is through the incarnation of Christ that God restores to human 
beings their true humanity. 
3) Cultural Applications: 
Mbltmann defines culture as the 'self-representation of persons, 
groups and peoples in relation to one another and as a whole before 
the ground of their existence.' Under this heading he examines con-
flicts caused by race, sex and those who are handicapped. 
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1. Conflicts of Race:-
In 'The Church in the Power of the Spirit' Moltmann uses the same 
definition for racism as that which he used in 'The Experiment Hope' 
viz:-
"By racism we mean ethnocentric pride in one's own racial group and 
preference for the distinctive characteristics of that group; belief 
that those characteristics are fundamentally biological in nature and 
and are thus transmitted to succeeding generations; strong negative 
feelings towards other groups who do not share these characteristics 
coupled with the thrust to discriminate against and exclude the 
outgroup from full participation in the life of the community." 40 
The mobility of modern society means that more than ever before 
people of different races have to live together in societies. The 
solution to racialism ultimately can only be within the heart of the 
people. It involves a correct understanding of what it means to be 
human:-
"It can be overcome when people win through to a liberated, non-
aggressive identity as people - when they cease to identify 'being 
human' with the membership of a particular race, and then they arrive 
at a redistribution of social, economic, political and cultural power 
from the powerful to the powerless." 41 
Moltmann therefore can see the need for legislation to combat racialism 
and even for special privileges to be accorded to the minority. 
However to be truly effective such measures should proceed from the 
inner conviction of the true nature of what it is to be human. Such 
measures must also be comprehensive - social, economic, political 
and cultural. 
2. Conflicts of Sex:-
Moltmann defines the major problem of sexual discrimination as that of 
masculine supremacy on the basis of imagined privileges and the sub-
ordination of woman to man. He comments that the Christian tradition 
has often been used to support this - pointing back to the fall. ~fum 
has been seen as the 'head' of the woman in creation and redemption. 
$oc.\-\\!i 
SQei 9l9~eally he has claimed dominance in public life. His world 
has been separated from that of the.woman in such a way that masculine 
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privileges are preserved. This has led to the codification of rights 
which hinder the woman's free development and hence the man's as well. 
Behind much of this process has been a psychological typography 
assigning different characteristics to men and women (for example 
man stands for activity, intellect and responsibility, woman for 
passivity, feeling and obedience). These Moltmann denounces as 
bogus:-
Social privileges are built up on mutual sexual differences and claims 
to rule are derived from biological distinctions which are not inherent 
in those things themselves." 4 2 
Moltmann uses an identical solution to sexual discrimination as that 
he proposed for racialism - viz the concept of the full human being. 
Until this is brought about neither partner is fulfilling their 
potential. Hence "as long as being human is primarily identified 
with being a man the man does not arrive at human identity." Rather 
there is a "need for a human sense of identity which then no longer 
needs to justify itself on the basis of special sexual characteristics." 
This requires positive laws to redress the balance in favour of the 
woman:-
On the other hand the woman must at the same time be put on an equal 
footing before the law and her free human development must be made 
economically possible. There must be a new distribution of power." 43 
3. Conflicts of Health and the Handicapped:-
The third major application of Moltmann's concept of full personhood 
from man's creation by God can be seen in his discussion of the 
healthy and the handicapped. If being human is identified with being 
healthy, then the sight of a handicapped person brings insecurity. 
We do not see the person but only the handicap, because we do not want 
to see ourselves simply as a person but only as a healthy person. 
Moltmann then introduces an important philosophical discussion which 
is of relevance to the whole of his discussion on human rights. 
Ironically it can also be used as a critique against some of his 
earliers conclusions. Starting from Gal.3/28 he examines the notion 
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of equality in Christ. He corrunents that the old idea is that like (., .. ,., ... !. ~ 
&'t;Five~ wi~ like - i.e. we love people like ourselves and in the 
same condition as ourselves. This is not, however, the Christian 
stance:-
"If the Christian faith breaks with the compulsion towards self-
collaboration, the Christian fellowship will also have to break 
with the 'natural' principle of 'like cleaves to like'. For 
Christianity the basic principle of liberated humanity can only 
be the principle of the recognition of the other in his otherness, 
the recognition of the person who is different as a person. It is 
only this recognition which makes it possible for people who are 
different to live together - one in fellowship - sharing and 
fulfilling man's corrunon being in hope for the Kingdom." 44 
Recognising the other in their differences as a person is to anti-
cipate the Kingdom of God and its righteousness. While such reason-
ing justifies many of Moltmann' s conclusions on human rights it can 
be argued that, especially in discussing the relation between men 
and women he has been reluctant to recognise otherness because of its 
historical use in bolstering privilege. 
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In 'The Experiment Hope' Moltmann goes further into ethical appli-
cations of the healthy and handicapped and examines more deeply the 
nature of life and death. His analysis does, however, consist largely 
of asking questions. He puts the ethical problems of abortion within 
the context of two questions - "When does life begin?' and 'When is 
the origin of the humanity of life?' In order to answer the first 
question the further question must be asked 'For what purpose is the 
beginning point to be ascertained?' The gynaecological, scientific 
and legal answers may differ. The 'nascent life' is accorded a diff-
erent value depending on whether one is considering the present 
condition of the f~tus or the potential future of the person. It 
follows that the question of the origin of the humanness of life 
cannot be answered by a dating of the beginning of life in its proto-
forms. Hence Moltmann makes a distinction between protection against 
the destruction of vitality and destruction of humanity. The origin 
of humanity comes when it is accepted and affirmed, recognised and 
loved. It follows:-
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"that an abortion is to be viewed not as the first or the exclusive 
culpable denial of humanity. Rather the rejection of a person's 
becoming and beyond that, the rejection of each person, is already 
such a denial of humanity." 46 
However Moltmann points out that the acceptance of another presupposes 
inner identity and strength on the side of the accepting one and 
'without such requirements for acceptance of a nascent life, and thus 
a pregnancy, self-dissolution and self-destruction is set in to a 
point where one can no longer speak of acceptance and love." 4 7 
Exclusively personal argumentation is, however, inadequate, since 
the human non-recognition and refusal of nascent life can be revoked 
but an abortion is irreversible. 
When discussing the end of the body and the death of man Moltmann 
turns from the human acceptance of life to the human surrendering of 
it. He points out the lack of consciousness in our society of both 
death and mourning. 
"Medical work turns its efforts against the premature un'natural' 
death and towards the prolongation of life. This is as it should be 
for the professional practice of medicine. A similar repression of 
dying and all conscious human attitudes towards this should not, 
however, be an unconscious result of this. When in the presence of 
the dying the medical art has come to an end, the human being in the 
physician is still "on call." 48 
Unless this is the case dying is de-humanised. Whereas physical death 
can be determined by the dying away of vital organs - eg. the irrever-
sible death of the brain - the death of the person has human dimensions. 
It is concerned with the human act of surrendering life - or the 
acceptance of death. For a Christian this involves giving oneself 
finally out of one's own hands and to trust the one who takes the 
life which he gave. Christ's love, his death and resurrection showed 
us the mystery of life and death and the power of accepting and 
surrendering life. Hence:-
"the mere prolongation of life does not yet contain this human meaning, 
just as the mere conception and birth of human life do not bring forth 
human life as human." 49 
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Hence in discussing the humanity of living and dying ~~Itmann stresses 
throughout the need for a comprehensive conception of the human person 
in his bodily, spiritual, social and transcendental dimensions. 
Health can only be in the context of a meaningful humanity. He ends 
by stressing the need for co-operation of the various therapies 1n 
the medical, social and human sphere with a view to salvation -
the salvation we know through faith and hope. 
4) Priorities and Balance in Human Rights 
In an important section in 'A Christian Declaration on Human Rights' SO 
Mbltmann comments that all human rights are bound up with and related 
to one another. They cannot be curtailed, separated or differentiated 
and are all bound up with specific human duties. However in history 
there are always priorities and the balance must continually be 
redressed. This can be achieved by promoting the opposite rights 
to those a community is already strong on. For example where a 
priority has been given to rights and duties connected with personal 
freedom a counterbalancing stress should be promoted to strengthen 
collective rights and duties. Moltmann sees .the Christian Church 
as having a major duty to promote such a balance, thus witnessing to 
the inalienable and indivisible nature of different rights and duties. 
Part III of this study will seek to apply some of Moltmann's insights 
directly to the problems of English law examined in Part II. 
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PART II SOME PROBLEMS OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE 1970'S 
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CHAPTER 6 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
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TilE LAW ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Backgrmmd 
Racial discrimination is probably as old as civilisation itself. It 
marks a fear ag:lRst a culture which is alien, or felt to be alien. 
It has led to countless unnecessary wars and atrocities but possibly 
none greater than the senseless and de-hurnanising barbarities such 
as typified the Nazi reaction to the Jews and other minorities. 
Despite such a salutary lesson racial arrogance is still much in 
evidence in modern times. Increased mobility has led to vastly 
increased racial mingling. Feelings of insecurity have led to an 
upsurge in nationalism which can easily lead to exclusivism and hatred 
of those seen to be intruders. 
From a historical perspective this is nothing new in Britain. More 
than most countries it has absorbed many racial strains in its history. 
Any talk of racial purity is absurd. Present problems of integration 
are, however, caused by the fact that many of the recent immigrants 
are recognisable by their colour and come from a greatly different 
cultural background. Coloured immigrants also tend to be concentrated 
in a few areas and neighbourhoods. Simple integration by assimilation 
would often rightly be. felt by them to be an insult to their culture. 
Hence the importance of Roy Jenkins' definition of the right approach 
to integration:-
"I would define integration not as a flattening process of assimil-
ation, but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity 
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance." 1 
It was to further this aim of racial equality that legislative inter-
vention was employed as a concerted policy when it became obvious that 
widespread discrimination was being practised. The moral issue was 
not the only spur to legislation. We will see that equally important 
in the various White Papers were fears of violence, reprisals and 
counter reprisals such as those seen in the American deep South in 
the 1960's and 1970's. 
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Early attempts at legislation 
Despite attempts in the 1950's and early 1960's the first legislation 
in recent times was not achieved until Sir Frank Soskice's 'Race 
2 Relations Act 1965. This was confined to discrimination on racial 
grounds in providing services and facilities in specified public 
~~~ places. Contrary to tbe antQgrl5 wishes, Parliament proved reluctant 
to impose criminal proceedings and insisted on a process of concili-
ation. The Act has been described as largely toothless. The Race 
Relations Board was set up but their conciliation committees had no 
self-initiating powers and could issue no subpoena. The only remedy 
available was an injunction obtained through application to the 
Courts, unless there was also a common law offence. 
The 1965 Act did, however, initiate a far wider debate about the role 
of legislation in combating racial discrimination. For the first time 
the actual extent of discrimination was investigated by an independent 
research organisation. The result was the Political and Economic 
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Planning (PEP) report which was published in April 1967. The report 
indicated discrimination on a wide scale not only with regard to 
facilities and services but also in employment and housing. Groups 
who were most physically distinct in colour and racial features from 
the English experienced the greatest discrimination. The discrimin-
ation itself was self perpetuating for it tended to push or keep immi-
grants in the poorest housing and lowest status jobs. The report also 
revealed tl1e complex nature of discrimination. It was by no means 
always caused by bigotry but also by the fear of the prejudices of 
others. Of more direct influence to the 1968 Act, which extensively 
supplemented the provisions of the 1965 Act, was the Street Committee's 
report in 1967 which examined the legislative choices available to 
Parliament. This recommended an effective process of persuasion -
this meant increasing the powers of the Board, and, where persuasion 
failed, securing an adequate remedy for the victim. 
The 1968 Act in the event was not to be the decisive legislation, being 
repealed by the 1976 Race Relations Act. Nevertheless its successes 
and failures were of decisive importance both for the 1976 Race 
Relations Act and for the not dissimilar 1975 Sex Discrimination Act. 
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The 1968 Act extended the scope of the law to apply it to a wide 
range of situations in employment, housing, the provision of goods 
and services and facilities to the public, including clubs of a 
public nature, as well as to the publication of discriminatory 
advertisements or notices. The Race Relations Board was reconstit-
uted and increased in membership and ftmction. It had a duty to 
investigate all complaints of unlawful discrimination except for 
employment complaints which had to be dealt with by suitable indust-
rial machinery, and complaints about dismissal on racial grounds 
which were dealt with by Industrial Tribunals as unfair dismissal. 
The Board h~ a duty to seek conciliation. Where that failed they 
had the exclusive right to bring legal proceedings in specially 
designated County Courts, two lay assessors sitting with the Judge. 
In these Courts they could claim an injunction restraining any 
further unlawful conduct. 
The 1968 Act also created the Community Relations Commission to 
complement the work of the Race Relations Board. Its task was to 
promote "harmonious community relations", to coordinate national 
action to this end and to advise the Secretary of State on any 
relevant measures. It had limited funds to support locally based 
voluntary community projects. 
The Act had an important declaratory effect. Crude forms of discrim-
ination largely disappeared. Yet both the statutory bodies drew the 
attention of the Legislature to the fact that present legislation was 
not proving effective to deal with the widespread patterns of discrim-
ination - especially in employment and housing. There was also a lack 
of confidence on the part of minority groups in the effectiveness of 
the law. Likewise successive P.E.P. reports showed that the level of 
racial discrimination remained high. 4 
A useful evaluation of the workings of the Act can be gleaned through 
an examination of the annual reports of the Race Relations Board. The 
first report after the 1968 Act was that for 1969-70. It was largely 
optimistic:-
'~e consider the Act to be a sound one, with remarkably few ambig-
uities or weaknesses. We believe that the Act was a necessary piece 
117 
of legislation which is oppressive neither in substance nor in oper-
ation. That is not to say, however, that the mere enactment of a 
sound statute is sufficient of itself to achieve the result at which 
it is aimed." (para 1) 
They were also impressed with the role of industrial machinery under 
sections 3 and 4 of the Act:-
·~ve have been impressed with the fairness and thoroughness with which 
the investigations in many industries have been conducted, and so far 
the Board has not reversed an opinion of an industrial machinery." 
(para 14) 
They were not, however, so optimistic as to believe U1e Act would be 
totally effective - they stressed that positive action must be taken 
by those in positions of authority like the Government, management, 
Trade Unions, local authorities and insurance companies. They write:-
"The most important consequence of the passage of the Act is to 
stimulate these and other bodies to fulfil their social responsibil-
ities." (para 95) 
Whilst this latter theme is repeated in many subsequent reports, the 
note of optimism became progressively fainter. The 1970-71 Report 
commented with regard to the small percentage of complaints upheld 
in employment cases:-
"The plain fact of the matter is that the extent of discrimination in 
employment is not and cannot be known with any degree of precision." 
(para 56) 
A major difficulty was the enforcement of the law:-
"The belief that the mere enactment of laws is sufficient to cure the 
social ills at which they are aimed seems quite unjustifiable." 
(para 97) 
This complaint over inadequate enforcement was returned to with 
increased force in the 1971-72 Report. Here U1ey requested legis-
lation to enable investigations without the need to suspect that any 
individual unlawful act had been committed and also to force the 
respondent and witnesses to disclose relevant information to the 
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Board directly. The Board also recommended a strengthening of 
provisions to prevent further unlawful discrimination by offenders. 
The Report also viewed with concern the widening exceptions deemed 
possible by the Courts - in particular the case of London Borough 
of Ealing v R.R.B. [1972] 1 All E.R. 105. The 1972 Report of the 
Board (they changed over in this year to annual calendar year reports) 
is, not surprisingly dominated by the loophole revealed by judgements 
related to the right of entry to private clubs and the definition of 
what constituted private. These cases will be discussed in detail 
later on in this Chapter. After the case of Charter v R.R.B. [1973] 
1 All E.R. 512 they commented 
"In view of the serious social damage we recommend that the Act be 
amended to cover application for membership of all but those clubs 
that are genuinely private." 
The Reports for 1973 and 1974 mark increasing demands for the amend-
ment of the Act. The 1973 Report included detailed proposals in its 
Appendix (XII). The 1974 Report commented bitterly on the Dockers' 
Labour Club case (para 17) which marked a further widening of the Club 
loophole. A note of frustration and almost despair creeps into the 
Report:- "We have gone beyond appeals to moral and social obligation" 
(para 81), "Employers and Trade Unions lack motivation" (para 83) 
"Swifter progress towards equal opportunities is essential and there is 
no reason to suppose that the existing powers and methods of enforce-
ment will be any more successful in the future than they have been in 
the past." (para 84). The role of Government Departments was strongly· 
criticised by the Report of the Commons Select Committee on Race 
Relations and Immigration (publ. July 1975). It comments:-
"The plain truth is that the Home Office is not at present equipped to 
give a lead or to deal effectively with race relations matters." 
The Department of Education and Science is roundly condemned as being 
"singularly uninformed." 
It was in response to comments such as those found in the annual Reports 
5 
above that a White Paper 'Racial Discrimination' was published in 
September 1975. This aimed to pinpoint the weaknesses of the 1968 Act 
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and provide suggestions for new legislation. It commented that a 
major weakness was the narrowness of the definition of unlawful dis-
crimination on which it was based - viz the less favourable treatment 
of one person than of another on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic 
or national origins. This definition covered only direct discrimin-
ation and we will see had been to some extent eroded by Court decisions. 
It did not cover practices and procedures which had a discriminatory 
effect upon members of a racial minority and were not justifiable. 
This could result in de facto discrimination although all parties were 
treated equally - for example a stringent language requirement for a 
job where such a requirement was unnecessary. The definition led to 
undue emphasis both to motive and identification of individual victims. 
tvlany victims did not complain or realise that discrimination was taking 
place. 
The Race Relations Board itself was hampered by this narrow definition 
and by its obligation to investigate every individual complaint. It 
had inadequate powers to investigate and deal with suspected discrim-
inatory practices. It was unable to compel attendance of witnesses or 
demand the production of documents or other information. It had no 
power to require unlawful discrimination to end. The Court had only 
limited power to grant injunctions - the Board had to prove not only 
that the defendant had acted unlawfully and that he was likely, unless 
restrained to so act again, it also had to prove that he had previously 
engaged in conduct of the same or a similar kind. The Community 
Relations Commission suffered from ill defined terms of reference and 
uncertainty of aim. 
Added to these institutional difficulties inherent in the 1968 Act were 
loopholes and anomalies in the Act itself as interpreted by the Courts. 
~lany will be pointed out in the detailed discussion of the 1976 Act, 
but two of the most glaring will be commented on now. The words 
'national origin' in S.l(l) of the 1968 Act were narrowly defined by 
the Courts. The case of London Borough of Ealing v Race Relations Board 
[ 1972 ] 1 All E.R. 105 determined that 'national origins' was distinct 
from 'nationality'.. Nationality meant the status of an individual as 
the subject or citizen of a particular sovereign state and was outside ~~ 
scope of the act. In this case the Council as local housing authority 
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stipulated that the applicant must be a British subject within the 
meaning of the British Nationality Act 1948. A Polish national was 
rejected on these grounds from the housing list. The Court dist-
inguished between 'national origins' as indicating a person's conn-
ection by birth within a particular group of people from 'nationality' 
as meaning citizenship of a particular state - (per Viscount Dilhorne 
"Nationality in the sense of citizenship of a certain state must not 
be confused with nationality in the racial sense ••• I think the \\Dr·d 
'national' in 'national origins' means national in the sense of race 
and not citizenship"). Lord Kilbrandon was the lone dissenting voice 
on the grounds that the Board's claim that the two were identical 
"leads to a result less capricious and more consistent with reality." 
The judgement as a whole demonstrates the reluctance of their Lord-
ships to give an extensive interpretation of the Act. 
This same 'conservative'policy was followed in the judgements related 
to the position of membership clubs vis a vis the Act. The case of 
Charter v Race Relations Board [1973] 1 All E.R. 512 concerned the 
right of membership to the East Ham South Conservative Club. An 
Indian was rejected by the casting vote of the chairman on the grounds 
of his colour. The point at issue was whether the club was providing 
facilities to "a section of the public" within S. 2 (1) of the 1968 Act. 
The House of Lords held that the words "section of the public" were 
words of limitation. The word 'public' was used in contrast to 
'private'. S.2(1) did not apply to situations of a purely private 
character. A club, being an association of individuals fell outside 
S.2(1) provided there was a genuine process of selection (per Lord 
Reid "A clear dividing line does emerge if entry to a club is no more 
than a formality. This may be because the club rules do not provide 
for any true selection or because in practice these rules are disregard-
ed.") Lord t-brris of Borth-y-Gest dissenting made the point:-
"I see no reason why those who are members of a club are not properly 
described as being a section of the public. A private group may still 
be a section of the public •.• What parliament has as a matter of policy 
provided is that, subject to certain defined exceptions, that type of 
discrimination which is made unlawful is just as unlawful where groups 
of the public are concerned as it is where members of the public at 
large are concerned." 
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The restrictive interpretation of the ratio in Charter's case was 
again applied in the case of Dockers' Labour Club v Race Relations 
Board [1974] 3. All E.R. 592. The Dockers' club was affiliated to 
4,000 similar clubs in a union - all of which held the right of 
associate membership to each other, subject to a possible power of 
exclusion. The Dockers' club operated a colour bar and so refused 
entry to a coloured associate member from another club. It was held 
by the House of Lords that the Dockers' club did not move from the 
private to the public sphere in offering admission to associates and 
hence S.2(1) did not apply and the doctrine of Charter's case was 
reaffirmed. 
(per Lord Diplock "The Race Relations Act 1968 does not operate in 
some esoteric field of law. It provides for the enforcement by legal 
sanctions of a code of conduct to be followed in day-to-day trans-
actions between ordinary citizens." and "Those who were allowed in 
were not admitted in their roles as members of the public but by 
reason of their having been chosen because of their character as 
private individuals.") 
The obvious reluctance of their Lordships to extend the scope of the 
Act by judicial legislation exposed a wide loophole in the case of 
membership clubs. Such a clear flouting of the spirit of the Act made 
fresh Parliamentary legislation the only remedy. 
Another major spur to legislation was the desire to harmonise laws 
dealing with discrimination in both the sex and the race areas. The 
Sex Discrimination Act was framed largely out of the experience of the 
1968 Race Relations Act and sought to avoid running into similar 
difficulties. It enacted an increased range of remedies, institutional 
powers and basic definitions (see Chapter 7). The Race Relations A~t~. 
~"ll "t)\~"\"'\~\OV\ 
1976 is clearly analogous in its provisions and procedures to thell975 ~\AC~O.S " Act. This should promote advantages ).lr a corrunon case law and admini-
strative expertise - for example, like powers can be interpreted by 
analogy. 
As a background to all of this could be seen continuing racial dis-
advantages as shown by several PEP Reports. A major fear was the 
possibility of vastly increased racial violence. Hence the corrunent of 
the 1976 PEP Report:-
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"If present injustices are allowed to continue, political organis-
ation by the minorities, when it comes, is likely to be extremist 
and destructive." 6 
A comment echoed in the ~Yhite Paper 'Racial Discrimination' (1975):-
"To abandon a whole group of people in society without legal redress 
against unfair discrimination is to leave them with no option but to 
find their own redress." (para 23) 
In the White Paper the Government affirmed their determination and 
resolve to act boldly in order to achieve fair and equal treatment:-
/ 
"The Government's proposals are based on a clear recognition of the 
proposition that the overwhelming majority of the coloured population 
is here to stay, that a substantial and increasing porportion of that 
population belongs to this country, and that the time has come for a 
determined effort by Government, industry and the unions, and by 
ordinary men and women to ensure fair and equal treatment for all our 
people, regardless of their race, colour or national origins." (para 4) 
However, while legislation was acknowledged as "the essential pre-
condition for an effective policy" the Paper pointed out that 
"Legislation is not, and can never be, a sufficient condition for 
effective progress towards equality of opportunity." 
While welcoming the White Paper's vindication of many of the previous 
statements from the Race Relations Board, the Board itself in its final 
report (for January 1975-June 1976) was critical as to some of the 
practical recommendations as to new legislation. This criticism is set 
out in detail in Appendix VIII of the Report and centred around the 
proposal to abandon the conciliation system and instead allow indivi-
duals direct access to the Courts and also the proposal to join the 
functions of the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations 
Commission in the new Commission for Racial Equality. In the event 
both of these proposals became operative in the 1976 Race Relations 
Act and the detailed criticism of the Board will be examined in the 
subsequent analysis of that Act. Despite this criticism the Board 
in particular welcomed many of the new powers proposed for the new 
Commissi~,as well as the new legislation proposed to bring clubs 
within the scope of the Act. It is to the contribution of the 1976 
legislation that we now turn. 
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RACE RELATIONS ACT 1976 
This Act is now the comprehensive statute on race relations and the 
1965 and 1968 Race Relation Acts are now repealed. 
a) The definition of Discrimination 
The Act enumerates three different kinds of discrimination. The 
first is similar to the definition of the 1968 Act and covers direct 
discrimination. This involves less favourable treatment on the 
grounds of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins 
'"'"~ \., .1•\U'l•\-.~ (S.l(l)(a) and S.3(1)). An unlawfult~tive must be proved. This 
may be done by statements of the defendant or may be inferred from 
the surrounding evidence. A direct personattTz:i:'\i!Gcriminat~o ...... 
is not necessary - hence the situation where the discrimination 
arises because of fear of what the customers would think is covered. 
Segregation is per se less favourable treatment unless justified by 
one of the exceptions to the Act (eg. for special training, welfare 
or ancillary benefits under S.35). 
A new provision of the Act deals with indirect discrimination. This 
occurs when a condition or requirement is applied whid1 is such that 
the proportion of per.sons of a particular colour, race, nationality, 
ethnic or national origins able to comply with it is considerably 
smaller than the proportion of other persons able to do so, which l'Torks 
to the detriment of the complainant, and which is not shown by the 
alleged discriminator to be justifiable on non-racial grounds. (S.l(l) 
(b) and S.3(1)(2) and (4) ). Here no intention or discriminatory 
motive is necessary. Intention is only relevant.to the question of 
compensation and damages - no compensation being necessary where no 
intention can be proved. This provision is in line with the Sex 
7 
Discrimination Act (SDA). It allows plenty of scope over the judicial 
interpretation of the meaning of a requirement or condition and the 
definitions of "considerably" smaller proportion, what constituted 
justification and what is a racial group. For example in the case of 
Bohon - Mitchell v Common Professional Examination Board and Council 
of Legal Education [1978] I.R.L.R. 525, concerning the length of 
training required, it was held that the proportion of persons not 
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from the U.K. or Irish Republic who could comply with this require-
ment was considerably smaller than such citizens and the required 
justification under S.l(l)(b)(ii) of the Act had not been met by 
such a far reaching regulation. 
The third form of discrimination is that arising through victimisation. 
This occurs when those who bring proceedings under the Act or who oth-
erwise use powers conferred by the Act are unfairly treated because 
of this (S2). This again is a new provision. One of the concerns 
of the Race Relations Board hat been the extreme reluctance of victims 
of racial discrimination to come forward.8 Under the old Act there 
were a number of incidents of reprisals. The victimisation clause is 
designed to eliminate such fear. Commentators have, however, doubted 
its effectiveness.9 Victimisation has to be proved by the person 
alleging it and there are many covert ways of victimisation possible. 
Also unlike Trade Union victimisation cases there is here, and in the 
SDA a bad faith exception. If an allegation is false and has been 
made in bad faith the employer is free to victimise. It has been 
commented that "courage to stick up for and fight for what is your 
right is less likely to come from the uncertain legal safeguard in 
the Race Relations Act's victimisation clause than from your own 
crusading zeal." Section 2 is, however, still actionable although 
the employee is employed for the purpose of a private household and 
thereby otherwise exempted from the Act. (S4(3)). 
Several factors common to all three kinds of discrimination should 
be mentioned. As with the 1968 Act discrimination is covered in 
employment, education, housing and the provision of goods, facilities 
and services to the public although unlike that Act the provisions 
operate uniformly for all. The meaning of racial grounds has been 
extended with the reversal of the case of London Borough of Ealing 
v RRB (supra ). Both national origins and nationality are covered 
and S.78(1) defines nationality as including citizenship. Discrimin-
ation is still, however, narrowly defined on racial grounds. The 
absence of religion has been criticized as making the position of Jews, 
Sikhs, Moslems etc. uncertain and providing a possible loophole for 
the 'ct. In the case of Ahmad v Inner London Educational Authority 
[ 1978] lAll E.R. 574, a Huslim teacher was not entitled to absent 
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himself from school to attend religious worship if this was incon-
sistent with the performance of his contractual duties. So far 
most cases involving Jews have been found to be genuine discrimin-
10 
ation on religious grounds but if with them or other religious 
groups the discrimination was in fact on racial grounds masquerading 
as religious they would come within the scope of the Act. A major 
difficulty arises over the definition of "racial group." S3(1) says 
a racial group means a group of persons defined by reference to colour, 
race, etc. without saying who does the defining. One solution would 
be to define subjectively according to the view of the discriminator 
but in indirect discrimination the discriminator's intentions or 
motives are irrelevant to establish discrimination. Objective 
definitions have in case law been found almost impossibl~!" The 
position of gypsies highlights the problem similarly. In a 1967 
case (Mills v Cooper) [ 1967] 2All E.R. 100 it was held that the word 
'gypsy' in a statute meant a nomadic people rather than people of 
the Romany race, yet in a past report of the Race Relations Board 
it was conunented 
"The Board has been advised that gypsies should, in general, be 
regarded as being within the terms of the Race Relations Act." 12 
b) Unlawful discrimination 
i) Employment 
The Act protects employees and the self-employed in respect of terms 
of employment, promotion, transfer, training, conditions of employ-
ment, benefits,facilities or services and dismissal (S4). Also 
covered under S4 are job applicants and contract workers. The sub-
sequent actions of the Company are instructive in assessing whether 
discrimination has taken place - eg. cf Johnson v Timber Tailors 
(Midlands) [1978] I.R.L.R. 146. Recruitment covers such details as 
advertisements, arrangements for interviews, the terms offered and 
job refusals thus removing the ambiguity in the 1968 Act over recruit-
ing arrangements!"3 vicarious liability attaches to an employer for 
the actions of his agent whether the discrimination was done with his 
knowledge or approval or not. It is however a defence if he took 
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such steps as were reasonably practical to prevent discrimination. 
The case of RRB v Harris (Mail Order)1troduced the judicial comment 
"It is sufficient if the employee knew that any sort of discrimination 
will not be contemplated." Employment agencies and careers advice 
services are covered as are professional or occupational qualifying 
bodies, vocational training bodies and the manpower services commi-
ssion. Partnerships are covered only if the firm contains six or 
more partnens. Trade Unions and Employers Associations are covered 
in respect of admission to membership and treatment of members. 15 
Excluded from the employment conditions are private households. However 
we have seen that this exception does not apply to victimisation. Nor 
does it apply where contract services are involved. In addition 
dismissals on racial grounds from a private household may be unfair 
dismissal actionable under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
which has no private household exceptiont.6 Employers have also a 
limited right to discriminate in certain jobs for which being of a 
particular racial group is held to be a genuine occupational qualifi-
cation. Examples are actors, artists and photographic models, waiters 
in Chinese restaurants and community social workers. However this 
exemption does not allow discrimination in terms of employment or 
access to any other benefits, facilities or services. There is also 
an exemption for seamen recruited overseas. Immigration controls 
are exempted. Exemptions under the 'racial balance' clause to preserve 
a reasonable balance of persons of different racial groups, permitted 
under the 1968 Act1ho longer obtains, as does that Act's exemptions 
for seamen. We have seen that positive discrimination is permitted 
to give persons of a particular racial group access to facilities or 
services to meet the special needs of persons of that group in regard 
to their education, training or welfare, or any ancillary benefit. 
(S35). 
ii) Education 
The 1976 Act has separate provisions within it for discrimination in 
education and its enforcement. This is tinlike the 1968 Act in which 
education was merely an example of facilities and services. Under 
lZ7 
5.19(6) of the 1976 Act a distinction is made between the public 
and the private sector. In higher education the Universities are 
classed as the private sector and polytechnics and Colleges of Further 
Education as public. The range of discrimination actionable is the 
same in each - viz terms of admission, refusal of admission and 
discrimination in the provision of benefits and facilities to students 
or expelling and subjecting students to detriment. Thus in the case 
of Commission for Racial Equality v Ealing London Borough Council [1978] 
1 W.L.R. 112, brought under the 1968 Act, the Commission alleged that 
the Local Authority discriminated against Asian children by dispersing 
them to schools outside the area. The Council claimed they were in 
an impossible position unless the claim was particularised. However 
the Court of Appeal held that this was not necessary and ordered the 
Council to deliver a defence to the pleadings as they stood. 
However there are differences of procedure in enforcement dependent 
on public or private status. Complaints in relation to the public 
sector must go first to the Education Minister. His or her sanctions 
under the Education Acts entirely replace the Commission's non-discrim-
inatory notice procedure (see post) but the individual can still take 
the case to a County Court after a brief delay to secure individual 
reparation. 
Exceptions to the provisions on education include the provision of 
special education to cover the needs of racial groups as well as 
tra~~g ~ourses (5.35,36). Likewise existing immigration controls 
and rest~ctions on overseas students are exempted. 18 
iii) Goods, Facilities and Services 
According to S.ZO, subject to the exceptions, the general rule is that 
-~ • ..tc..c.\\\\f.\ _.... .... \llC. .. $ 
any person who is concerned with the prov~ion or~~ to the public 
or any section of it must not discriminate against any person who seeks 
to obtain or use them, whether they are provided free or for payment. 
This provision is very similar to that under S2 of the 1968 Act with 
the omission of the old exception allowing discrimination in the 
provision of sleeping berths on ships. The situation with regard to 
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clubs is clarified. A new provision makes it unlawful for any non-
profit making organisation with over 25 members to discriminate in 
the admission of people to membership or in the treatment of members 
or associate members on racial grounds. (S25). There is an exception 
for clubs whose main object is to give benefits to members of a 
particular race, ethnic or national origin, but not colour. Hence 
some clubs are covered by S20, some by the new provision and some 
are exempt. The old cases apply to S20 alone. The ethnic and 
national club exception is an addition and designed to facilitate 
19 
such clubs as the London Welsh Club or the Caledonian Club. In 
deciding what is the main object of such a club regard shall be had 
to i) its essential character ii) the extent to which it tries to 
see that its benefits are primarily enjoyed by the racial group in 
question and iii) all other relevant circumstances. Hence clubs whose 
primary object is to keep blacks out (or whites) will not qualify. 
Thus the Act in effect reverses the Charter and Dockers' Club rulings 
of the House of Lords. 
Other exceptions, outside the general ones of the Act, are few. How-, 
ever, surprisingly the Government has decided to remove fostering from 
the scope of the act. In Applin v RRB [ 1975] A. C. 259 under the 1968 
Act the House of Lords upheld the decision that fostering, other than 
by private arrangement was within the scope of S2 of that act. The 
. . . tltk.f'\-~¥\ Government's omiSSion has the effect of making lawful the treatmeftt 
in Applin's case and making the judgement of no effect with regard to 
the specific issue of fostering. However, in the case of Zarczynska 
v ~ [ 1978] The Times October. 21st". . The Applin case applied to 
entitle the bringing of a case of racial discrimination under the 
1976 Act by a person not herself discriminated against. The plaintiff 
was a bamaid who was dismissed for refusing to obey her employer's 
order not to serve coloured customers. 
iv) Property Transactions 
The provisions of the 1968 Act are largely intact in S21,22 of the new 
Act but the fomat of the provisions have been changed to bring them 
into line with those under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. This has 
been done to avoid possible future differences of judicial interpret-
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ation. Discrimination is actionable where practised in relation to 
disposal, terms of disposal, management of property and waiting lists. 
The 1968 Act referred to "the disposal of housing accommodation, 
business premises, or other land." The new Act refers only to 
premises which is defined as including land of any description, 
unless the context otherwise requires (S78(2)). Hence the sale of 
house plots as well as houses is included. Two provisions established 
under the 1968 Act apply - viz that the housing accommodation need 
not be immediately available and an incomplete house is still classi-
fied as housing accommodation (RRB v Geo. H. Haigh & Co)~0 Terms of 
disposal which include more onerous conditions of sale are dealt with 
by S21(1). Discrimination with regard to waiting lists is actionable 
under the main provisions of the act, including the reversal of the 
Ealing case. Under S71 local authorities have a general duty to 
eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and to promote equality of 
opportunity and good relations. Discrimination is also illegal in 
the management of property - eg. refusal of access to any benefits 
or facilities, eviction or other detriment. 
There is a limited exception for owner-occupiers in disposal, provided 
that they do not use an estate agent, advertisement or notice. There 
is also an exception covering discrimination in the provision of 
accommodation in premises for landlords of small premises. This is 
operative if the landlord or near relative resides and intends to 
contirueto reside there and he shares accommodation other than storage 
space or means of access with other people in the house who are not 
members of his or her household and the premises are small as defined 
by the act. 
v) Miscellaneous Liability 
The Act makes discriminatory advertisements unlawful (S29). Bo~1 their 
author and their publisher are liable. This is subject to the excep-
tions of advertisements for a job where discrimination is permitted 
because of a genuine occupational qualification (closely defined as we 
have seen), to advertisements for employment outside Britain and 
advertisements in regard to ethnic clubs. In the case under the 1968 
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Act of Commission for Racial Equality v Associated Newspapers Group 
[1978] I.W.L.R. 905 an advertisement recruiting nurses for South 
Africa made the comment 'all white patients only~. It was published 
in the 'Daily Mail' and the 'Irish Independent'. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the finding that publication in the 'Irish Independent' was 
not covered by the Act. The crucial test was where the newspaper was 
published and offered for sale, not where it passes into the hands of 
its readers. It also upheld the decision that in any event the wording 
in itself did not convey any intention to discriminate under S6(1) of 
the 1968 Act. However, although landlords of small premises can still 
discriminate when they take on tenants, advertisements indicating this 
are unlawful. Although the publisher has a liability for advertise-
ments he publishes it is a defence for him to claim that he relied 
on a statement by the person placing the advertisement that it was 
outside the scope of the act and that it was reasonable for him so to 
do. 
Potential discrimination is unlawful where direct or indirect prov-
isions exist but have not become operable. Likewise instructions to 
discriminate are unlawful even if not carried out. Pressure to dis-
criminate and unlawfully aiding discrimination are also covered. 
With regard to discriminatory terms in contract under the 1968 Act the 
Race Relations Board could apply to the Court to have them revised. 
Under the new act they are unenforceable per se, although the courts 
still maintain provision for their revision. Exemptions from liability 
apply to charitable instruments with the proviso that future provisions 
are void if discriminatory. Exempt also are acts done under statutory 
authority or to safeguard national security. 
Another category of liability in the act is incitement to racial hatred. 
This originated from S6 of the Race Relations Act 1965 when a party 
was guilty if he circulated written matter or used words in public 
intended to be a) threatening, abusive or insulting and b) likely to 
stir up racial hatred. This is replaced by S69 of the new act. The 
main difference is that now this section is made as an amendment to the 
Public Order Act 1936 (the insertion of a new S5A to that act) and is 
therefore taken out of race relations legislation. In addition it will 
no longer be necessary for the prosecution to prove any deliberate 
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intention to stir up hatred. As before no prosecution is possible 
without the consent of the Attorney-General. There are exemptions 
for parliamentary proceedings and fair and accurate reports of court 
proceedings. Nevertheless doubts have been expressed whether the 21 
provisions will be any more successful than those of the 1968 Act. 
c) Institutional Provisions, Enforcements and Remedies 
Institutionally the Commission for Racial Equality (C.R.E.) replaces 
the Commission for Community Relations and Race Relations Board 22 
established by the 1968 Act. Its duties are specified as working 
towards the elimination of discrimination, promoting equality of 
opportunity and good race relations as well as keeping the working 
of the ~ct under review and proposing amendments. It is able to give 
grants to organisations or to finance research and education. We 
will see that in many ways it has far more power than the old Race 
Relations Board but its role has changed in a fundamental respect. 
It no longer has the responsibility of investigating and acting on 
each individual case. The old Race Relations Board in its final 
Report strongly objected to this merger. It claimed that to do so 
was to confuse the function of each and to threaten the impartiality 
of the new Commission in its quasi-judicial function on the one hand, 
and to threaten the previous independence enjoyed by the Community 
Relations Commission on the other hand. 
Individual enforcement and remedies 
Individuals can enforce remedies, where permitted by the Act, in 
either Industrial Tribunals or County Courts - depending on the 
subject matter of their complaint. The burden of proof is always on 
the person alleging the discrimination except under Sl(l)(b) when the 
respondent will have the burden of showing that the practice is 
justifiable on non-racial grounds. 
Employment cases are only actionable before Industrial Tribunals. 
All the Race Relations procedures have stressed the importance of 
avoiding litigation wherever possible. Hence in the new Act all 
complaints go first to~ an ACAS conciliation officer. He attempts to 
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settle but can only act if the parties agree or if he considers there 
to be a reasonable prospect of success. If the case is judged by the 
tribunal the remedies available are:-
i) an order declaring the parties rights in respect of the act 
complained of 
ii) compensation, including compensation for injured feelings up to 
a maximtnn of .£5,200 
iii) a recommendation that action be taken by __ the discriminator 
within a specified period to right the wrong done to the 
complainant. 
An appeal is possible against judgement on a point of law. This goes 
to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which consists of a High Court Judge 
and two lay members. 
All non-employment cases are actionable in certain designated County 
Courts. These are presided over by a single Judge with two assessors, 
"'-'4t 0.\.\&~~. 
unless the parties consent to trial without ~. Actions are treated 
as if they are claims in tort. Remedies possible are a declaration, 
damages (including damages for injured feelings) and an injunction. 
23 
The final repor~ of the Race Relations Board criticized this new 
emphasis on in~viduals looking after themselves. They preferred a 
strengthening of the procedure under the 1968 Act:-
"On this issue our view remains that the balance of advantage for 
individuals seeking redress rests strongly with the retention and 
strengthening of the present conciliation system, combined with the 
right of complainants to have access to the Courts when they are 
dissatisfied with the Board's handling of their case." 24 
The Board took this view because of the difficulties the complainant 
might meet in formulating his case, in representation and in the 
difficulties of proof. In addition they commented:-
"Our strongest reservation, however, relates to the use of County Courts. 
We know from experience how reluctant complainants are to face pub-
licity, how reluctant Judges are to make a finding of discrimination." 
25 
It remains to be seen whether this pessimistic view or the optimistic 
view of the White Paper will be proved to be the correct one. The CRE 
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is not totally unconcerned with individual actions - it may give 
practical assistance where a question of principle exists, where 
there are special difficulties for the employee or other exceptional 
circumstances. It may advise, seek conciliation, arrange for legal 
advice or take other appropriate measures of assistance including 
representation. S65 enables a standard question procedure for the 
eliciting of information. Evasion leads to an inference of discrimin-
ation (cf Virdee v E.C.C. Quarries [1978] I.R.L.R. 296). 
Enforcement by the CRE and Remedies 
The CRE is the sole body able to bring proceedings in respect of the 
following circumstances indirect discriminatory practices in which 
there is no actual victim of discrimination, discriminatory advert-
isement cases where a person gives instructions to someone under their 
authority to discriminate and cases where pressure is applied directly 
or indirectly to discriminate. 
Normally a necessary preliminary before proceedings is a formal 
investigation. The CRE can act as of right to instigate a formal 
investigation in cases where this is confined to specific allegations 
both in respect of its unique enforcement areas and any other discrim-
ination within the ambit of the act. This is part of its strategic 
role of identifying and dealing with discriminatory practices at large. 
In order to assist its investigations the CRE has subpoena powers for 
written information, documents and '~itnesses. After an investigation 
the CRE has the power to issue a non-discrimination notice and to take 
legal proceedingsto enforce it where such investigation has disc~osed 
an unlawful act of discrimination, a potentially discriminatory 
practice, an unlawful advertisement or instructions or pressure to 
discriminate. The non-discrimination notice requires the recipient to 
cease doing such acts and to comply with the law. It may be appealed 
against within six weeks, after which time it becomes final. 
When a notice has become final the CRE can require recipients to inform 
it of those necessary changes they have made as well as providing 
additional information and material for up to five years. If within 
five years of a non-discrimination notice or a judgement it appears 
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that the person is likely again to act unlawfully the CRE is able to 
apply to the County Court for an injunction restraining him (S62). 
There are, however, separate enforcement procedures for discriminatory 
advertisements, instructions to discriminate and pressure to discrimin-
ate. 
These areas can be dealt with by formal investigation and non-discrim-
inatory notice. However, under the special arrangements of S62 the 
CRE can first apply for an injunction to stop the discrimination without 
the necessity for a formal investigation. No damages or compensation 
are obtained and these are the only provisions when the CRE is able to 
seek an injunction without a non-discriminatory notice or judgement. 
An injunction is only available when there is a clear likelihood that 
the respondent will commit a second or further contravention of one of 
the three sections. In addition to an injuxtion, provision is made for 
the CRE to obtain a ruling from the Industrial Tribunal or Court that 
there has been a contravention of the Act. It is hoped this will deter 
future breaches and facilitate decisions on difficult matters. 
The powers of the CRE are therefore considerable. It is to be hoped 
that they will be used effectively and serve not only as a deterrent 
but also as a guideline of what is acceptable practice and what is not. 
In employment cases the CRE have been charged directly with drawing up 
such a Code of Practice. The Government have high hopes that this Act 
will be far more effective than its predecessors. 
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In its first annual report (that for June - December 1977) the Gommission 
for Racial Equality comment realistically about the progress that still 
has to be made. Thus:-
"Equal opportunity in employment is obviously of crucial importance, 
and there is ample evidence, particularly from the research carried 
out by Political and Economic Planning that discrimination in this 
field is still widespread. Our work in employment will be one of our 
main priori ties." 2 7 
"In the fields of both public and private housing research evidence 
has shown that the condition of racial minorities is one of persistent 
disadvantage." 
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No doubt, partly as a response to the criticisms made by the old 
Race Relations Board, the Commis.sion for Racial Equality devote space 
to stress their willingness to help individual complainants:-
"The Commission is aware of the fact that the majority of complainants 
alleging racial discrimination would not be in a position to take 
advantage of their rights under the Act without expert guidance. 
Our policy is to encourage other organisations to share in the 
responsibility of providing a comprehensive advisory service which 
is essential if the 1976 Act's provisions are to offer any real 
benefit to individual complainants. We accept that until these 
organisations are ready to offer such assistance, the main source 
of help to individuals would be the Commission's complaint~L staff." 
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However, on the whole the Commission seems well satisfied with its 
early beginnings:-
"We have nrn-t established a sound basis for more rapid progress. We 
shall continue to use the law against discrimination with courage 
and fairness. During the coming year we hope to be starting at least 
ten strategic investigations as well as undertaking similar invest-
igations where information about the possible occurrence of racial 
discrimination is brought to our notice. The individual commplainants 
will also continue to receive maximum attention from us and assistance 
will be given wherever the merits of the case and the circumstances 
make it reasonable to do so." 29 
In Part III of this study theological justifications for intervention 
in the field of race relations will be examined. Attention will be 
paid to the philosophical notion of equality employed. It will be 
argued that, from the theological positions examined, endorsement can 
be given to the arithmetical notion of equality employed in the Act, 
as well as justification for the element of positive discrimination in 
favour of disadvantaged groups in certain. defined circumstances. 
Comments will also be made on the effectiveness of the 1976 Act and 
the need to go beyond the strict letter of the Act to wider Christian 
principles and practice. 
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GIAPTER 6 - NOTES 
The Law on Racial Discrimination 
1. Roy Jenkins, Essays and Speeches (1967) pg.267. 
2. For a comprehensive survey of attempts to legislate against 
racial discrimination cf. Lester & Bindmann, Race and Law 
(1972) Cp.3. pg.l07f. 
3. 'Report on Racial Discrimination', Political and Economic 
Planning (P.E.P.) H.M.S.O. (1967). 
4. cf. 'Racial Disadvantage in Employment' P.E.P. (1974); 
'The Extent of Racial Discrimination' P.E.P. (1974); 
'Racial Minorities and Public Housing' P.E.P. (1975). 
5. 'Racial Discrimination' H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 6234. 
6. D.J. Smith, 'The facts of Racial Disadvantage' P.E.P. (1976). 
7. Sex Discrimination Act 1975 S.l(l)(b). 
8. 'Report of the Race Relations Board for 1975' H.M.S.O. 
Appendix VII para.l5. 
9. I.A. MacDonald, Race Relations Act 1976 (1977) Cp.2. 
10. cf. 'Report of the Race Relations Board for 1970-71' H.M.S.O. 
para.l9. 
11. cf. MacDonald (supra) for examples. 
12. 'Report of the Race Relations Board 1967-68' H.M.S.O. para.22. 
13. Interestingly the case of MacDonald v Applied Art Glass Co. Ltd. 
1976 I.R.L.R. 130 brought under the Sex Discrimination, permitted 
a complaint from a woman deterred from applying by discriminatory 
tenns. 
14. Reported in the 'Report of the Race Relations Board for 1973' 
H.M.S.O. pg.38. 
15. For a discussion on the liability of Shop Stewards as agents 
cf. MacDonald (supra) paras. 215-217 (pg.58f). 
16. However, under this Act the employee must have completed at least 
26 weeks service and work for at least 16 hours per week. 
17. S.8(2) of the Race Relations Act 1968. 
18. For a criticism of this cf. MacDonald (supra) para 250 (pg.7lf). 
In addition the Education Minister has confirmed that the 
Government is to continue discriminatory rates of fees for 
overseas students relying on S.41 which enables arrangements 
approved by Ministers to be exempted from the Act. 
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18. Such action considerably weakens the Government's moral 
credibility- cf. Daily Telegraph, Friday August 19th 1977. 
cf. also the criticism of the immigration debate contained in 
the Commission for Racial Equality First Report (1977) 
H.M.S.O. pg.35f. 
19. ~4acDonald hints that previous judicial attitudes on the exemption 
of clubs from the 1968 Act may have been partly influenced by 
membership of some of their number in clubs of an ethnic or 
national character now covered by the exemption to the Act 
(MacDonald, para.286 pg.83). 
20. Leeds County Court reported in The Times, 11 Sept.1969. cf. also 
Lester & Bindrnann (supra) pg.234ff. 
21. MacDonald pg.l39, para 481, especially his comment:- "Since the 
underlying assumptions of most racialists are firmly expressed 
in the Immigration Act 1971, all kinds of racist propaganda can 
be dressed up as proposals for amendment of that Act or for 
further restrictions to be made under it." 
22. Race Relations Act 1976, Schedule I. 
23. Report of the Race Relations Board for 1975, H.M.S.O. Appendix VII. 
24. Ibid. para.14. 
25. Ibid. para.15. 
26. Commission for Racial Equality - First Annual Report (June-
December 1977). 
27. Ibid. pg.ll. 
28. Ibid. pg.l6. 
29. Ibid. pg.33. 
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CHAPTER7 SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION 
139 
The Background to Modern Legislation on Sexual Equality 
It belongs to the social historian to chart and assess the immense 
changes that have taken place in the role and status of women in 
recent centuries. Any study of present day legislation in this field 
would however, be incomplete without some attempt to illustrate their 
findings. To this end we will trace in outline form some of the 
major factors that have given impetus to this movement. Although 
these are clearly related, as is all social history, for convenience 
they will be dealt with under separate headings. 
1. Philosophical:-
The French Revolution set Europe ablaze with a new and dramatic 
philosophy of liberty, equality and fraternity that echoed throughout 
the succeeding century. In England an early exposition can be seen 
in Tom Paine's 'The Rights of Man'. Those women who were caught up 
with its fervour could scarcely help relating this to the position 
of their sex. Tom Paine's pamphlet inspired one by Mary Wollstencraft 
entitled 'A Vindication of the Rights of Woman'. This argued that 
women were individuals whose own powers and capacities were capable 
of being developed to the full. Although not claiming an identical 
role this argued that women ought at least to possess the franchise 
and to be allowed in industry and medicine. Whereas this pamphlet 
had no immediate effect it heralded increasing attempts to argue the 
case for a more active social role for women. 
Thus in 1833 ~trs. Anna Jameson commented in her 'Characteristics of 
Women' that:-
"The condition of women in society as at present constituted is false 
in itself and injurious to them" 
and in 1843 Mrs. Reid in her 'Plea for Women' wrote:-
"The greater portion of womankind are, at present, so slavish in their 
spirits, as to have no thought, no wish for emancipation. This 
indolence and senility of mind ought not, however, to be considered 
inherent. It is to be attributed solely to the operation of those 
social arrangements of which we complain." 
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Perhaps the major philosophical influence in the 19th. Century to the 
growth of women's rights came from a man - J.S. Mill, and especially 
in his book 'The Subjection of Women'. Mill, a great believer in 
individuality and with a great distrust of any ontological reasoning 
pleaded for the acceptance of dominant as well as passive women. He 
wrote:-
"Some women may be soft and delicate and gentle; let them remain so. 
~. / Others are more robust and vigourous - why should they be compelled not 
to be?" -
He requested that they be judged "no longer upon an artificial standard 
invented by men for the whole sex." He commented that women had never, 
with a few exceptions, had any opportunity of showing themselves equal 
or superior. A large part of Mill's book consisted of an examination 
of the condition of married women. He maintained that this was sub-
stantially the same as at 1700. He argued that complete equality 
between the sexes was the only basis of just treatment in law. The 
great influence of fvlill 's philosophy on 19th. century and 20th. century 
thought and action gave his conclusions concerning the equality of 
women great currency and proved a major impetus towards reform. 
2. Educational:-
A demand for the education of women sufficient to admit them to every 
employment in the State was made as far back as 1739 in a pamphlet 
'Women not Inferior to Men' by Sophia, a Person of Quality. Of more 
significant practical effect was Elizabeth Mbntagu's proposal in 1775 
to found and endow a college for the higher education of women, and 
the founding of the Sunday School movement by Hannah More (perhaps the 
original 'blue-stocking') in 1789. 
The 19th. century saw an increasing interest in popular education, 
although the quality of education for girls improved very slowly in its 
early part. This can be seen by the report of the 1867 Royal Commission 
into Education. The Commissioners suggested two causes for the poor 
nature of girls' schools. First inveterate prejudice that girls are 
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less capable of mental cultivation than boys. Second a belief that 
solid attainments would impair a girl's prospects of marriage. How-
ever, as the century progressed some significant irnproYernentswere 
made. In 1843 Queen's College, Harley Street was founded as a training 
college in connection with the Governesses' Benevolent Institution. 
In 1849 the Ladies' College, Bedford Square was founded and in 1858 
the Ladies' College at Cheltenham. From 1875-85 there was great 
progress in higher education with the foundation of Lady MargaretH~/1 
and Somerville College;' at Oxford and of Newton and Girton at Cambridge. 
However it was not until 1920 that Oxford would admit women to degrees 
and 1922 before Oxford would admit women to professorships, readerships 
and as University teachers. The need to provide opportunities for 
higher as well as basic education for girls was increasingly recognised 
in the first part of the 20th. century. The syllabus in many girls' 
schools did, however, still reflect some of the conventional wisdom 
about the roles of the sexes. 
3. Economic:-
The 19th. century marked the rapid speeding up of the industrial 
revolution. Women became far more vital in the economic life of the 
nation as factory hands were increasingly needed. Gone were the cottage 
industries and the automatic assumption that all women's work was in 
the horne. Sheer economic pressure drove more and more women into 
towns and factories and the evils of forced competition. Low wages, 
physical and moral deterioration and the squalor. of unbridled capital-
ism forced the problem of female and child labour onto the attentions 
of the Government. Although successive Factory Acts curbed the worst 
excesses, factory women throughout the 19th. century were, on the whole, 
pawns of cheap labour. To them must be ascribed much of the vast 
profits which enabled the investment to keep the industrial revolution 
going at such a pace. Working women, as men, began to value some sort 
of organisation. They began to take their place besides men in 
political agitation. 
In the middle classes the effect of the Industrial Revolution was also 
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7 marked. Much domesticia was now transferred to factories - for example 
~ ....... - '- ......______ -- -
baking, brewing, the making of clothes and linen. This led to a 
demand for genteel employment. The opportunities were not at first 
great - the Governess being the commonest - but as the century prog-
ressed more and more professions were deemed suitable for women. The 
first to be opened up was the medical profession. Florence Nightingale 
was able to establish nursing as a profession for women through the 
Crimean War. The acceptance of women doctors took far longer. Through 
the work of women like Elizabeth Blackwell, Elizabeth Garrett-Anderson 
and Sophia Jex-Blake the London School of Medicine for Women was 
founded in 1874. In 1877 the Royal Free Hospital in London offered 
to take women students and was able to extend full medical qualifica~ 
tions to them. By 1894 there were 170 women doctors. Other professions 
followed the lead of the medical profession. With few exceptions 
(the Church being one) women were not barred from practising any 
profession by the end of the first quarter of the 20th. century. 
4. Political:-
The fight for the franchise by women gained increasing momentum from 
the middle of the 19th. century. In 1848 it had an influential 
supporter in Disraeli who commented:-
"I do not see, when she has so much to do with the State and Church, 
on what reasons, if you come to right, she has not a right to vote." 
c.o.""'e 
In 1866 ~ the first petition for votes for women. In 1867 J.S. Mill 
brought in a woman's suffrage amendment to the Reform Bill, but was 
defeated. On the positive side, however, women were allowed to vote 
at municipal elections in 1869, were eligible for membership of school 
boards by the 1870 Education Act, in 1875 sat on Boards of Guardians 
and in 1888 could vote for County Councils. 
The organisation of the woman's suffrage movement became steadily more 
militant. Mrs. Pankhurst founded the Woman's Franchise League in 1889. 
In 1901 the Woman's Social and Political Union was founded. In 1907 
women were admitted to County and Borough Councils but this did nothing 
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to lessen demands for full suffrage. The suffragette movement became 
violent and lawless - a development that seemed counter-productive. 
In 1914 the Women Householder Franchise Bill \vas narrowly defeated 
in the House of Lords. Innnediately after the war, with the impetus 
and recognition of their war service, eight million women over 30 
gained the vote. By the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919 
women could stand for parliament, be J.P.'s, jurists and enter all 
the professiansexcept that of priest of the Church of England. In 
1928 they attained their goal with regard to the franchise for by 
the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act they attained 
full equality of franchise with men. 
5. Legal:-
As J.S. Mill pointed out, the position of the married woman in the 
early part of the 19th. century was substantially the same as at 1700. 
If there was no marriage settlement the wife's property was no longer 
her own. If the marriage failed she had no control over the children 
as against her husband. She was bound to submit to him for "restitution 
of conjugal rights". If he deserted her or was guilty of cruelty she 
could however obtain a legal separation after 1857, but the Divorce 
Act of 1857 allowed him to divorce her for a single act of infidelity. 
The position of married women was improved greatly by the Married 
Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1882. The 1870 Act enacted that a 
married woman's earnings and wages should be regarded as her separate 
property. She was given a power to recover them in her name (S.l & 11). 
The 1882 Act enacted that all property belonging to a woman who married 
after 1882 should remain her separate property, as should any property 
acquired by a wife after that date. She was now able to enter into 
contracts - including contracts in respect of her separate property. 
By the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 the connnon law principle that 
the father had th~~solute right to determine the form of his child-
ren's education andlhis wishes had to be respected even after his 
death, was set aside. The courts could now pay more attention to the 
welfare of the child. Maintenance for a married woman in the case of 
desertion was provided for by the Married Women (Maintenance in case 
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of Desertion) Act, 1886. These powers were made far wider by the 
Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 and have been extended 
in a series of Acts which became collectively known as the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Acts 1895 to 1949. 1 
Legislation in the 20th. century reflects the fruition of many of 
the 19th. century movements towards equality. Thus the 1923 ~mtri­
monial Causes Act equated the rights of spouses to a divorce - a 
principle followed in subsequent Acts concerned with divorce. The 
1925 Guardianship of Infants Act gave equal rights to Husband and Wife 
over children. The wife was given complete powers to contract by 
the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 and the Married 
Women (Restraint on Anticipation) Act 1949. The Law Reform (Husband 
and Wife) Act of 1962 abolished the prohibition of tort actions between 
spouses. Property rights were established on a basis of equality by 
the concept of the 'common purse' enumerated in Rimmer v Rimmer [1952] 
2 All E.R. 863 and the Married Woman's Property Act 1964. Equality 
with regard to maintenance means that in some circumstances the wife 
may be under an obligation to maintain her husband (cf. Matrimonial 
Proceedings and Property Act 1970). Whereas the common law with regard 
to the married state frequently assumed a unitary doctrine of person-
ality, much of recent legislation has stressed the separate, though 
equa~, ersonhood of the spouses. Thus for the purposes of the Theft 
' b Act a husband and wife are ~o be regarded as separate persons and 
"~ t'A~""on\"\ ~ro(..ect"-'11\.~S 
under the Domicile~Act of 1973 a mArried woman can have a separate 
domicile from her husband. 
The last major area to receive the concerted attention of the Legisla-
ture in respect of sexual equality was that of equal pay and opport-
unities. It is to a consideration of this which we now turn, in 
particular the Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
These can be seen as the culmination of well over a century of legis-
lation about sexual equality. The specific philosophy behind these 
Acts will also be drawn out, bearing in mind the background painted 
in this section. 
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Recent Legislation in the field of Equal Pay and Opportunities 
The demand for equal pay for men and women is no new one - the T.U.C. 
demanded this as long ago as 1888. The contribution of women towards 
the 1914-18 war resulted in the Atkin Committee examining the subject 
in 1919. Their contribution towards the Second World War resulted in 
a Royal Commission on Equal Pay from 1944-46. The entry of women 
into the professions that resulted from the Sex Disqualification 
(Removal) Act of 1919 made a substantial level of equality possible 
within them. However major inequalities continued in manual and semi-
skilled jobs. The 1944 Royal Commission highlighted the inequality 
but was unable to agree as to its cause. In 1955 the Government 
implemented equal pay for non-manual civil servants. Amid continuing 
pressure from the T.U.C. and from the international community an 
Equal Pay Act was introduced in 1970. 
International resolutions on equal pay date from the aftermath of the 
First World War. An I.L.O. resolution in 1919 called for 'equal pay 
for work of equal value.' Equal treatment has subsequently been pro-
claimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Act. 23(2), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 
119 of the Treaty of Rome and the European Social Charter Article 4(3). 
The European Social Charter was ratified by the U.K. in July 1962. 
Qll"\ ~u ~r- ~r\""' Our membership of the Common :Market now gives us~obligation 'JRd.er 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. The Equal Pay Act 1970 must there-
fore be seen in relation to this pressure both from at home and abroad. 
EQUAL PAY ACT 
The Equal Pay Act, although becoming law in 1970, was not intended to 
be fully operative until December 1975. However, the Secretary of 
State was empowered to make an order for its partial implementation 
from December 31st. 1973 to December 1975. 
Under Section 1 it provides for equality of treatment regarding terms 
and conditions of employment between men and women employed on like 
work or on work rated as equivalent as a result of a job evaluation 
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exercise. 2 A requirement of equal treatment is to be implied in indivi-
dual contracts (S.(2) & (3)). The report on Equal Pay by the Royal 
Commission (1944-46) doubted whether "utterly disparate" occupations 
could be ~ompared. This the Act seeks to do by reliance on Job Eval-
uation (S.l(S)) - a scientific examination into the skills necessary 
for each different type of job. The case of Green v Broxtowe District 
Council [1977] 1 All E.R. 694 determined that an evaluation study can 
only be challenged if there is a fundamental error on the face of the 
record. Its conclusions cannot be rejected because the tribunal 
disagrees with them, and it is certainly not proper for the tribunal 
to embark on an evaluation study of its own. 
The 'like work' clause is elaborated by S.l(4) as being the same or 
identical work or work "of a broadly similar nature." Frequently 
cases hinge on arguments about this point. The first appeal under the 
1970 Act determining the correct approach was the case of Capper Pass 
Ltd. v Lawton [1977] 2 All E.R. 11. Here a female cook sought equality 
with two male assistant chefs although there were some differences in 
their duties and hours of work. The Court sought to determine two 
questions - viz. 'When is work of a broadly similar nature and what 
significance should be given to the difference between the man's work 
and the woman's work at this stage?' and 'If their work is broadly 
similar is it inevitably 'like work' or can the differences, though 
insufficient to prevent their work being broadly similar, nevertheless 
prevent their being employed on 'like work' because the differences are 
'of practical importance in relation to the terms and conditions of 
employment?' The Court determined that in answer to the first question 
a 'broad judgement' should prevail. Not a minute examination but a 
consideration of the work involved. In answer to the second question 
one should disregard trivial differences. Hence "the only differences 
l.ffiich will prevent work which is of a broadly similar nature from being 
'like work' are differences which in practice will be reflected in the 
terms and conditions of employment." (per Phillips L.J.). 
This liberal interpretation was quickly followed in Dugdale v Kraft 
Foods Ltd. [1977] 1 All E.R. 454. Here, in comparing day with night 
work, the E.A.T. determined that the mere time at which the work was 
performed should be disregarded when considering the differences 
147 
between 'the things they do'. If the work is broadly similar the Act 
cannot be avoided by the use of night work which is illegal for women. 
Nor can it be avoided by promoting men, titularly at least, in the 
hope of removing a 'like work' comparison- cf. Sorbie v Trust House 
Forte [1977] 2 All E.R. 113. The two questions determined in the 
Capper Pass case were applied directly in Waddington v Leicester 
Council for Voluntary Services [1977] 1 W.L.R. 544. Here a female 
community worker in charge of an adventure playground was paid accord-
ing to a different national scale from that of the male playleader for 
whom she was responsible. He was paid more than she was. The 
Industrial Tribunal found that there were differences in their respect-
ive work and hence she could not claim under S.l(4) of the Act. On 
Appeal it was held that the tribunal ought to have considered first 
whether they were both employed on work of a broadly similar nature 
and then, if so, whether the differences between them were of practical 
importance in relation to the terms and conditions of employment. The 
tribunal had failed to distinguish sufficiently between the nature of 
the work and the work actually done. 
The interpretation given to S.l(4) has given the Act considerable 
cutting edge. (cf. Redland Roof Tiles Ltd. v Harper [1977] l.C.R. 
349; Electrolux Ltd. v Hutchinson [1977] I.C.R. 252; National Coal 
Board v Sherwin & Spruce [1978] I.R.L.R. 122. In Shields v E. Coomes 
(Holdings) [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1408 the differences in contractual obliga-
tions were irrevelant unless. these led to actual (and notinfrequent) 
differences in practice. The employee is entitled to compare her work 
with her immediate predecessor if the time lapse is a short one (cf. 
MCCarthys v Smith [1978] 1 W.L.R. 849). The differences between men 
and women must arise from personal factors and not economic factors 
or bargaining power (cf. Fletcher v Clay Cross (Quarry Services) [1978] 
3 C.M.L.R. 1). In Eaton Ltd. v Nutall [1977] I.C.R. 272 the Waddington 
case was applied to justify a higher salary where the added reponsibil-
ity was significant (cf. also Boyle v Tennent Caledonian Breweries 
[ 1978] I.R.L.R. 321). 
However, even if S.l(4) of the Act is satisfied a remedy may still be 
barred by S.l(3). This applies to minor variations in terms and 
conditions applying equally to both sexes in different parts of the 
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country. S.l(3) was considered in the case of NAAFI v Varley [1977] 
1 W.L.R. 149. Here it was held that where men· and women are employed 
on like work, and the variation is in the rate of remuneration, and 
the remuneration is fixed in accordance with nationally, or widely, 
negotiated wage scales, "it would seem to us that there will usually 
be a strong case for saying that the case falls within S.l(3). The 
variation very likely is genuinely due to a material difference other 
than a difference of sex." This point was also made in the Waddington 
case appeal. The point was referred back for determination to the 
industrial tribunal, although the hope was expressed that the differ-
ent wage rates would be harmonised without this being necessary. 
A difficult area is that concerned with 'red circling'. This is the 
practice of transferring workers to a lesser paid job while protecting 
their previous rates of pay. The employer can justify this if done 
for causes neither directly nor indirectly due to a difference of sex 
(cf. Charles Early v Smith [1977] 3 W.L.R. 189). He cannot, however, 
use this as an indirect means of discrimination (cf. Snoxell & Davies 
v Vauxhall Motors Ltd., The Times, March 23, 1977; United Biscuits 
v Young [ 1978] I.R.L.R. 15. The burden of proof is strongly on the 
employer whenever discrimination is evident. In the important case of 
National Vulcan Engineering Insurance Group Ltd. v Wade [ 1978] I.R.L.R. 
225 the original finding of the Industrial Tribunal was reversed. The 
Tribunal determined that lvhen a woman had established that she was being 
paid less than a man engaged on 'like work' in the same employment it 
was presumed that the variation between her contract and his was due to 
a difference in sex. On Appeal it was held that this imposed too heavy 
a burden on employers. They only had to prove their case on a balance 
of probabilities. In this case the fact that there were both men and 
women in the highest and lowest grades indicated that the differences 
were not due to sex. 
There is, however, nothing in the Ac!~to prevent an employer from not 
~e~~~ 
employing women or men. In this &Qk~e it is not comparable to the Race 
Relations Act (1968) S.l & 3. Neither does it seek to prevent discrim-
ination in non-contractual matters. However, in contractual matters, 
by laying stress on the job, it does prevent the employer from justi-
fying unequal treatment through real or imagined differences between 
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the overall value of the work of each sex based on such grounds as 
lower output, higher absenteeism, maternity leave and the refusal of 
overtime. 
Section 2 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon industrial tribunals 
to determine claims arising out of the Act. The tribunal may award 
arrears of remuneration or damages in respect of a failure to comply 
with "an equal pay clause" (S.2(1)) The Secretary of State has the 
right to refer a breach of an equal pay clause to the Tribunal 
(S.2(2)). According to S.2(6) it is envisaged that it would be for 
the claimant to establish that he or she is entitled to equal treat-
ment under S.l (1)(4) & (5) but that the onus of proving a "material 
difference" would lie on the claimant's employer. 
Section 3 provides for the elimination of discrimination on the grounds 
of sex in collective agreements and in employer's pay structures, both 
of which may be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for amendment. 
Subsection 2 provides that whatever the position concerning the enforc-
ability of a collective bargain by the parties the terms of such a 
bargain may be incorporated expressly or implicitly into individual 
contracts of employment. Sections 4 & 5 contain similar provisions 
to Section 3 to enable wage regulation orders and agricultural wage 
orders to be revised to comply with the new requirements. 
Section 6 rejects the argument that the retention of protective laws 
or special treatment for women in employment would produce inequality 
for males and enacts that such laws or treatment are to be ignored in 
applying the Act. Examples of such protective laws can be seen in the 
Factory Act 1961 and differing retirement ages (60 for women, 65 for 
men). Section 7 makes provision for equal pay and conditions between 
men and women in the services. Section 8 provides for equal treatment 
in certain matters within the Police Force, Section 9 & 10 provide for 
the commencement of the Act and allows a collective agreement, pay 
structure or order to be referred to the Industrial Court for advice 
on the amendments needed. 
'" A 'iQ~rsasH:sive -Report on the workings of the Equal Pay Act was prod- · 
3 
uced in 1972 by the Office of Manpower Economics. While by the end 
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of March 1972 in only one fifth of the agreements and orders examined 
had discrimination in rates of pay been removed or been planned to be 
removed, a majority of agreements and orders had given larger or at 
least equal increases to women in comparison to men. Women were still 
largely concentrated in the service sector. The Report found that 
there was little knowledge of the terms of the Equal Pay Act amongst 
small companies. However, few firms tried to evade the Act by aggreg-
ating male and female jobs although many were seriously worried by 
the cost considerations and by the implications of a complete over-
haul of their wages structure. With the passage of time the provisions 
of the Act have become widely known and many companies have volunt-
arily revised their wages structure. The Act gains from a clearly 
defined and limited aim. Although, as we have seen, the procedures 
of job-evalliation are not without their difficulties tl1ere now exists 
a considerable wealth of experience and body of case law. 4 
THE SEX DISCRIMITNATION ACT 1975 
a) Underlying Philosophy 
The Equal Pay Act 1970 was sponsored by the then Conservative Govern-
ment and was concerned with sex-discrimination in contractual cond-
itions of employment. The Labour Government in 1974 was concerned to 
extend the notion of equality to non-contractual areas and areas other 
5 
than that of employment. In the White Paper 'Equality for Women' it 
commented that the Equal Pay Act was inadequate in scope and enforce-
6 
ment. The government aimed at harmonising the legislation on sex and 
race discrimination. It wished for a Bill to apply to employment, 
training, education, housing and the provisions of goods, facilities 
7 
and services and wished to combine the right of the individual access 
to legal redress with the strategic function of a new public body -
the Equal Opportunities Commission - to enforce the law in the public 
interest. 8 Before examining the detailed provisions of the Sex Discrim-
ination Act, it is helpful to examine the white paper 'Equality for 
Women' for it contains the underlying philosophy of the legislators. 
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The White Paper recognises the major social trend that today nearly 
half of all married women are in paid employment. Work for women is 
no longer merely an interlude between school and motherhood. This is 
not all gain for women:-
"Paradoxically, the very improvements in the pos1t1on of women have, 
in some ways, made their lives harder than before. To the physical 
and emotional strain of bearing children and caring for them in their 
early infancy have been added the demands of work in shops, offices 
and factories. 11 9 
Most women do low-grade jobs in a narrow range of services and indust-
ries for lower rates of pay than unskilled men. They have not the 
same chances for skilled work or promotion. They lag behind on fringe 
benefits like pensions. Women are sparsely represented in the pro-
fessions - there has been little improvement since the removal of sex 
disqualifications in 1919. Less than one seventh of doctors are women. 
They are in the majority in teaching but in primary schools although 
three quarters of all teachers are women only two fifths of the head 
teachers are women. 10 
The White Paper examines discrimination in education-facilities and 
services. In education it comments:-
"Many children are brought up from their earliest years in the belief 
that the social and economic roles of men and women are radically 
different." 11 
The philosophy of the legislation is plainly opposed to this and hence 
we can assume that a basic assumption behind the Sex Discrimination 
Bill is that the social and economic roles of women ought to be the 
same, or at any rate not radically different. The White Paper comments 
that girls tend to have a different curriculum, they tend to leave 
school earlier and fewer in proportion to boys enter higher education. 
The same number as men qualify in languages and the arts but in science 
and the social sciences men outnumber women by five to one. Concerning 
the provision of facilities and services the White Paper claims that 
women may be denied banking, insurance, mortgages, grants, loans, 
credit and tenancies. 
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In discussing discrimination and prejudice the l~ite Paper comments:-
"The unequal status of women has not been perpetuated as the result 
of the deliberate determination by one half of the population ••• 
Its causes are complex and rooted deeply in tradition, custom and 
prejudice. Beyond the basic physiological differences between men 
and women lies a whole range of differences between individual men 
and women in all aspects of human ability. The difference within 
each sex far outweighs the difference between the sexes ••. Women are 
often treated unequally because they are alleged to be inferior to 
men in certain respects and the consequences of their unequal treat-
ment are then seen as evidence of their inferiority. Their unequal 
status is caused less by conscious discrimination against women than 
by the stereotyped attitudes of both sexes about their respective 
roles." 12 
Such is an important statement of the underlying philosophy of the 
Bill. As such it will have to be examined carefully in Part three 
of this study. The \~ite Paper continues in Para.l7 by expressing 
a direct economic motivation:-
"The unequal status of woman is wasteful of the potential talents of 
half of our population in a society which, more than ever before, 
needs to mobilise the skill and ability of all of its citizens." 13 
The rest of the White Paper is a detailed examination of the scope of 
the legislation. These have now become an actuality in the Sex Discrim-
ination Act 1975. 
b) Detailed provisions 
Part I of the Act is concerned with defining the discrimination to 
which the Bill applies. The key formula is found in S.l(l)(a) for 
direct discrimination. This occurs if a person in any circumstances 
relevant to the Act:-
"on the ground of her sex treats her less favourably than in those 
circumstances, or circumstances as nearly as may be resembling those 
circumstances, he treats or would treat a man." 
This definition is extended to cover indirect discrimination by 
S.l(l)(b). Here discrimination occurs when:-
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"he applies to her a requirement or condition which applies or would 
apply equally to a man but -
i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with 
it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can 
comply with it, and 
ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex 
of the person to whom it is applied, and 
iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it. 
S.2(1) ensures that the legislation applies equally for discrimination 
against men. 
The White Paper commenting on the definition of discrimination pointed 
out that it is not the object of legislation to require a change in 
activities which arise out of common sense and not out of prejudice -
for example an employer whose business involves heavy manual labour 
is not obliged to provide less physical work, nor men's shops to 
provide women's wear. It points out that there is an important 
difference of principle between sex and racial discrimination. Racial 
separation is inherently degrading, even where both groups are treated 
equally - but separate provisions for men and women are not always 
unjustifiable (paras 34-37). 
A comparison of S.l(l)(a) and S.l(l)(b) reveals that there is a defence 
of justification possible for indirect but not direct discrimination. 
Discrimination is illegal 'whicl1 he cannot show to be justifiable 
irrespective of the sex of the person to whom it is applied." The 
scope of this defence will depend on the interpretation by the courts 
14 
of what is justifiable and what is not. Beloff and Watson point out 
that 'justifiable' is not the same as 'justified'. Justifiable means 
that the action can be justified after the event. There are consid-
erable obstacles to proving indirect discrimination. There is no 
guideline in the Act as to the size of the groups from which the prop-
ortion of men and women are to be drawn for the purpose of comparison. 
This may depend on the particular case or it may refer to the situation 
at large. They also point out that the test is whether the woman 
'cannot' comply with a condition, not whether they cannot reasonably 
be expected to comply with it. Thus it was not discriminatory against 
men to allow free entry to a club to 'persons wearing skirts' since 
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men could, if they wished, wear skirts - indeed certain Scotsmen did 
(cf. 'Daily Telegraph' 19th Jan. 1976). 
Judith Reid has pointed out that many conditions may be more difficult 
15 
for women than men - eg. availability for travel, training courses 
and the like. Whereas logically it could not be said that women 
'cannot' comply with such conditions it may be very difficult in 
practice. However the subsequent judicial interpretation on this 
point has been a liberal one. The important case of Price v Civil 
Service Commission [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1417 held that an imposition of an 
age. limit of 28 to job applicants may be discrimination against women, 
a large proportion of whom are occupied with children at that age. 
It was commented that the word 'can' )n S.l(l) (b) (i) is not to be 
construed too strictly. Because a woman can in theory comply does not 
mean that she can in practice. This goes a long way towards meeting 
Reid's point. Similarly a seniority condition that many women could 
not meet because they had not previously been allowed to be categor-
ised as permanent full-time status was covered by S.l(l)(b)(iii) -
cf. Steel v The Union of Post Office Workers and the G.P.O. [1977] 
I.R.L.R. 288. Earlier case history also suggested a liberal approach 
- thus rigid seniority rules which militate against the woman who 
leaves work for family reasons for a time might be covered (Lading 
v Headway Shopfitting Ltd. I.T. 2096/76 and Thorn v Meggit Engineering 
Ltd. I.T. 5032/76). Nevertheless Reid, in her article, commented 
"It is greatly to be regretted that the Government was not able to 
implement its original intention of placing the burden of proof 
on the alleged discriminator." 
S.3 of the Act extends the definition of discrimination to cover 
direct or indirect 
of their marriage. 
unmarried people. 
discrimination against married people on the grounds 
Illogically there is no similar protection for 
Under S.3 the '=:'to discriminate can be inferred 
from all relevant circumstances (cf. McLean v Paris Travel Services Ltd 
I.T. 4767/76/E). The victim must be married, not about to be married 
(cf. Bick v Royal West of England School for the Deaf I.T. 11664/76). 
Similar difficulties arise in the case of indirect discrimination 
against married persons as those outlined above. The proportions 
compared must be between married and unmarried people of the same sex 
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(s.l(2)). Another section dealing with comparisons in discrimination 
cases is S.5(3). Under this the relevant circumstances of a woman 
who complains that she has been discriminated against must be the same 
as, or not materially different from, those of the man with whose 
treatment she is comparing her own. Thus dismissal due to pregnancy 
could not be sex discrimination since, as a man could not become 
pregnant, there could be no comparison with men in the same relevant 
circumstances (Reaney v Kanda Jean Products [ 1978] I.R.L.R. 427 .) 
S.4 of the Act protects those who assert rights under the Act or the 
Equal Pay Act. A late amendment to the Act covers discriminatory 
practices that are so effective that discriminatory acts never in 
fact occur. 17 
Part II of the Act deals with discrimination in employment. As such 
it complements the Equal Pay Act by dealing also with the non-contract-
ual aspects ·of employment. The Act contains within it a new version 
of tl1e Equal Pay Act 1970. The relationship between the two is at 
times complex - not least because the concept of the Equal Pay Act is 
1 equality 1 rather than 1 discrimination 1 ." Problems occur in overlap 
areas between the two acts. As Judith Reid comments:-
"It is difficult to see ••. how the woman is going to find her way out 
of this jungle." 18 
The Sex Discrimination Act is far clearer on employment questions when 
the matter clearly relates to a non-contractual aspect. Thus S.6 
makes it unlawful for an employer who has more than five employees to 
discriminate either between applicants for jobs or between employees 
for promotion, transfer or training. Applicants for employment bear 
the burden of proof of discrimination (cf. Oxford v Department of 
Health & Social Security [ 1977] I.C.R. 884). The important case of 
Amies v I.L.E.A. [ 1977] 2 All E.R. 100 determined that where the 
appointment of a man to a post involves discrimination on the grounds 
of sex it is the appointment itself which is within the mischief of 
the Act and not the continuing state of affairs. In this case a man 
was appointed the head of an art department two months before the Act 
came into force in preference to a woman applicant. She claimed that 
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the fact that he still occupied the post after the 1975 Act constituted 
a continuing discrimination against her. This argument was rejected, 
the tribunal having no jurisdiction for the reasons stated above. 
Neither could she seek a remedy under A.ll9 of the E.E.C. Treaty, for 
this created no enfor~ble community right in respect of discrimination 
based on sex within the Equal Pay Act other than in relation to equal 
pay. In addition rights conferred directly by E.E.C. Treaty could 
only be enforced in the High Court. However, the recruitment prov-
isions have been widely interpreted in so far as a complaint can be 
made by a person deterred from applying for a job as well as by an 
applicant (cf. McDonald v Applied Art Glass C~Ltd. [1976] I.R.L.R. 130.) 
S.6(2)(a) also requires equality of treatment with regard to 'Benefits, 
facilities, or services'. An early case determined that opportunity 
to earn overtime is a benefit (cf. Baxter v Glostal A.A. Ltd. I.T •. 
1168/76) unless provision of these benefits is regulated by the person's 
contract of employment. Similarly, reducing overtime is accounted a 
detriment (cf. Morris etc. v Scott & Knowles I.T. 7673/76.) 
An important recent case determining the scope of the interpretation 
of a 'benefit' is that of Peake v Automotive Products Ltd. [1977] 
3 W.L.R. 853. Here the complainant was a male shop floor worker who 
claimed he was being discriminated against because the female employees 
were allowed to leave the factory five minutes earlier than the men on 
safety grounds. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal. The E.A.T. had held that under S.l(l)(a) 
the fact that the act was less favourable treatment on the grounds of 
sex was decisive and the motive of the discriminatory act was irrelevant 
Mbre significantly it held that 'Benefits, facilities or services' in 
S.6(2)(a) ought not to be given a restrictive interpretation. Both 
these findings were overturned in these particular circumstances. The 
Court of Appeal determined that a working rule which differentiated 
between men and women in the interests of safety and in accordance with 
established standards of right conduct between the sexes was not 
discriminatory within S.l(l)(a). Lord Denning commented:-
"Although the Act applies equally to men as to women, I must say that 
it would be very wrong to my mind if this statute were thought to 
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obliterate the differences between men and women or to do away with 
the chivalry and courtesy which we expect mankind to give womankind." 
In these circwnstances there was no 'benefit' under S.6(2)(a) to the 
women, nor 'detriment' under S.6(2)(b) to the men. Even if the Act 
was to be construed literally the discrimination in issue was one to 
which the rule 'de minimis non curat lex' should be applied. The 
Court applied a 'common sense' approach:-
"in _applying statutoryprovisions which touch hwnan conduct and 
relationships it is vitally important to cling to common sense. 
Some acts of discrimination are not adverse to either sex and are 
not designed to be." (per Shaw L. J. ) 
Interestingly this approach has not been welcomed by the Equal 
Opportunities Commission. In their 1977 Report they express their 
concern at the Court of Appeal's argument that reasonable discrimin-
ation could not be sex discrimination. 
The recent case of Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [ 1978] I. R.L.R. 402 
was another case in which a man claimed equality with a woman under 
S.6. Here the women were not required to do certain 'dirty' work in 
the lead-rate shops. The E.A.T. upheld the finding of the industrial 
tribunal that tl1ere had been discrimination by subjecting the man to 
a detriment under S.6(2)(b). However, in relation to the definition 
of a benefit under S.6(2)(a) it was commented obiter:-
'~e are disposed to think that the Ministry of Defence may be correct 
in their submission that a benefit must be something which is positively 
conferred as opposed to the relief from a particular part of the work 
which has been done and that what is relied upon here does not 
constitute a benefit for the purpose of S.6(2)(a); but this is a 
matter of very wide import and in view of our decision that there has 
been a detriment under S.6(2)(b) we do not express any concluded 
view.'' 
Clearly the interpretation of S.6(2)(a) and (b) will exercise the 
courts in the future. Interpretation is still in a fluid state and 
future pronouncements from the Court of Appeal will be awaited with 
interest. 
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A recent case where a detriment was not proved was that of Schmidt v 
Austicks Bookshops [1978] I.C.R. 85. Here the stipulation of an 
employer that the female assistants should wear an overall and not be 
allowed to wear trousers was not serious enough to be a detriment. 
An employer is entitled to a large measure of discretion in controlling 
the image of his establishment. 
S.6 is limited both by the general exceptions of the Act and those 
exceptions relating to employment in particular. It is to these that 
we now turn. 
General exceptions to the Act are charities (S.43), sport where the 
physical strength, stamina and physique of the average woman would put 
her to a disadvantage (S.44), insurance based on statistical data 
(S.45), communal accommodation (S.46), provisions of existing statutes 
including safety legislation (S.51), pregnancy and childbirth (S.2(2)) 
where men cannot claim equal treatment, and provision of training 
facilities (S.47) and where positive discrimination is permitted in 
favour of women (or men) who have been excluded from the kind of work 
to which the training relates, or have been involved for some time in 
domestic duties. 
Specific employment exceptions include private households and small 
employers employing five or fewer employees (an action claiming 
victimisation under S.6(3) is not, however, ruled out by this exception). 
Provisions about death or retirement are excluded by S.6(4). However 
benefits continuing after retirement are not in themselves "in relation 
to retirement" and so are not exempt from the Act - cf. Garland v 
British Rail Engineering [1978] I.C.R. 495. Alsp9excluded from the 
Act are special categories of employees (S.l9-21) and recruitment 
based on 'genuine occupational qualifications' which a man or woman 
alone possesses. These include physiology (excluding physical strength 
and stamina), authenticity in drama and entertainments and matters of 
decency and privacy. Single sex institutions and services for the 
promotion of the welfare or education of its clients are also excluded 
where the work can most effectively be done by a man or a woman. 
Finally there are some geographical exceptions for work wholly or 
mainly outside Great Britain. (S.lO). 
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In commenting on these exceptions Beloff and Watson point out that 
the word 'physiology' is inapt. Either physiognomy or physique 
would be better. They submit that it in fact would not be unlawful 
to discriminate on grounds of physical strength or stamina as such -
for example fire-persons can have a standard imposed - if a woman can 
satisfy it, she is eligible. What, however, the fire authorities 
cannot do is refuse to consider any women on the grounds that the job 
automatically calls for a man. The case of Cartwright v John Collier 
:1976 ~(Daily Express, 1st April, 1976) has shown that as long as some 
of the employees' duties fall within the category of "genuine 
occupational qualifications" which a man or woman alone possess, the 
employer is entitled to rely on it •. However, the employer cannot so 
rely where he already has employees of the appropriate sex who are 
capable of carrying out the necessary duties - cf. lyYlier v Dee & Co 
(Menswear) [ 1978] I.R.L.R. 103. 
Part III of the Sex Discrimination Act deals with discrimination in 
other fields. This can be divided into two sub-sections - education 
and the provision of goods, facilities or services. Sections 22 - 29 
deal with education. It is unlawful to discriminate concerning 
admission and treatment of p~)ils. Facilities must be provided on a 
non-discriminatory basis. However there is an exception for single-
sex schools which are not thereby required to go coeducational. The 
White Paper hoped for the gradual introduction of coeducation. The 
Act seeks to facilitate .this by also providing for exceptions during 20 
the transitional period when an establishment is turning coeducational. 
Also excepted are~hysical training courses in the field of further 
education. Hewitt 1suggested that the provision of books in which women 
are supposedly put at a disadvantage (eg. by showing them only in their 
domestic roles) may amount to sex discrimination. Beloff however poin~ 
out that this is not the case provided such books are provided on an 
equal basis to both sexes ?- 2 The Act covers both the public and the 
private sector. There is also a general duty in the public sector not 
to discriminate. 
Sections 29 - 36 deal with discrimination in the provision of goods, 
facilities, services and premises. It is unlawful for any person 
concerned with provision of goods, facilities or services, whether for 
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payment or free of charge, to discriminate to the public or a section 
of the public. This is so in discrimination by refusing or deliberateq 
omitting to provide them, or by varying the quality or terms of 
provision. The case of Race Relations Board v Charter [ 1972] 1 Q.B. 
545 at 555 held that the opportunity to be considered for membership 
of a club is not included among the "facilities" provided by the club. 
Likewise a members' club is not within the scope of the Act if it has 
rules which provide for a genuine selection of persons to be members 
on the grounds of their acceptability and the existing rules (cf. 
Dockers Labour Club v R.R.B. [ 1974] 3 All E.R. 592). Although the 
effect of these cases has been negatived in the Race Relations Act 
1976 this is only in respect of racial discrimination. They still 
stand in respect of the Sex Discrimination Act. Otherwise excepted 
from this part of the Act are persons who require special care or 
supervision, and places used for religious purposes, or the necessities 
of decency and privacy. It is likewise unlawful with defined excep-
tions to discriminate in the disposal or management of premises. The 
general exception is in the case of residential accommodation shared 
by the landlord provided the premises are "small premises" as defined 
by the Act. There are specific exceptions for political parties, 
voluntary bodies, hospitals, reception centres, prisons and religious 
bodies. 23 
Part IV of the Act deals with other unlawful acts. It will be unlawful 
to publish an advertisement which might reasonably be understood as 
advocating an unlawful act under the previous sectionsof the Bill. 
According to S.38 the use of a job description with a sexual connot-
ation (such as 'waiter' ,'salesgirl', 'postman', or stewardess') shall 
be taken as indication of an intention to discriminate unless the 
24 
advertisement contains an indication to the contrary. A publisher will 
not be liable if he reasonably relies on a statement by the advertiser 
that one of the exceptions of the Act applies. The Commission is 
seeking to discourage advertisers from showing the woman at domestic 
tasks - for example when trying to sell household items. The periodicru 
Publishers Association has warned its members that if advertisements 
are submitted showing the woman in old fashioned roles they will ask 
for an assurance that the balance will be redressed in the course of 
25 
a future series. The Act also contains provisions which make it 
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illegal to instruct to discriminate and to attempt to induce discrim-
ination. Vicarious liability will apply. 
There is provision in the Act (S.74(1)) to assist a person to decide 
whether to institute proceedings and to help in the formulation and 
presentation of the case in the most effective manner. This is done 
by means of a standard question procedure. However, the court has 
proved somewhat chary about ordering the disclosure of confidential 
documents at a preliminary stage. This must be done when the judge 
or chairman decides that the confidence should be overriden in the 
interests of justice (cf. Science Research Council v Nasse The Times, 
March 21, 1978; ~ v Leyland Cars The Times, July 27, 1978; 
University of Reading v MacCormack Busfield v University of Essex 
[1978] I.R.L.R. 491.) 
Enforcement and remedies under the Act are dealt with by Part VII. 
In all employment matters enforcement proceedings are to be in indust-
rial tribunals as per the Equal Pay Act. 
Conciliation offices are to be made available but if these fail remedies 
are threefold - a declaration, a compensation order, and a recommenda-
ation that the discriminator take appropriate rectifying action (S.65 
(1)). Compensation can include damages for injury to feelings and is 
subjected to an upper limit at present of £5,200 or two years pay 
whichever is the less. Complaints concerning the publication or display 
of discriminatory advertisements or notices can only be brought by the 
Equal Opportunities Commission. Industrial Tribunals are not equipped 
to deal with complaints in non-employment cases. These will be dealt 
with by specially designated county courts. Remedies are damages, 
non-discriminatory notices and an injunction. Complaints related to 
the Education provisions of the Act must go first to the Minister. He 
is allowed two months to consider whether or not to bring an action 
himself. This is without prejudice to the individual's right should 
the minister decide to take no action, except for enforcing the gen-
eral duty in the public sector. 26 
The Equal Opportunities Commission has wide responsibilities and powers. 
It can help the individual to formulate a complaint and obtain 
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information as well as helping in getting a settlement. It has also 
a wide range of review, research and education duties and powers. It 
must work towards the elimination of discrimination, promote equality 
and keep under review the working of all the relevant legislation. 
It may conduct formal investigations under terms of reference to be 
drawn up by its members or by the Secretary of State and has wide 
powers to obtain information for this purpose. It may make recommend-
ations based on its investigations and must report on its findings. 
It has powers of enforcement both to aid the individual and where no 
individual has suffered loss. It may issue non-discriminatory notices, 
whether proceedings have been brought or not, and is responsible for 
proceedings against discriminatory advertisements. An even stronger 
level of enforcement can be taken against persistent discrimination. 
Here the Equal Opportunities Commission can apply to a County Court 
for an injunction. In employment cases the Commission does not need 
to go through the non-discriminatory notice procedure, but can simply 
bring the matter before a tribunal which may add a declaration or 
recommendation. 
Such then, in brief, are the main provisions of the Sex Discrimination 
~ c..-\ ... ( CoOl.\ 
Act. In ~~is leg&l analysis, it should be pointed out that although 
the Act brings vast new powers against sexual discrimination it does 
so at the cost of considerable complexity and legal technicalities. 
Beloff comments in his Preface:-
"An Act designed expressly to help John (and in particular Jane) 
Citizen, has emerged in linguistic clothing of such complexity as to 
daunt lawyers, let alone the layman. Firstly, the form of the Act 
was dictated at least in part by its subject matter. Racial differ-
ences (at any rate where races cohabit in one territorial unit) may 
be no more than skin deep; but there are differences of substance 
between men and women. 
The Act has to derogate from its principles by the creation of num-
erous exceptions and then prevent those exceptions gutting the Act 
of force by creating in turn provisions for them. 
The draftsmen by dotting every 'i' and crossing every 't', have 
increased errors and ambiguities." 
Likewise Phillips J. commented obiter in Peake v Automotive Products Ltd 
[1977] 2 W.L.R. 751:-
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"The Act is a very complicated guide, and certainly no layman who 
wished to know his rights and duties in this field would obtain a 
clear answer by reading it." 
Such are indeed startling conclusions for an act that is meant to 
change social policy on such a wide scale in everyday life. The 
question must be asked whether in this complicated form the act can 
significantly further its basic principle of equality of opportunity 
and treatment for men and women. The experience of the Race Relations 
Acts suggests that greater legislative effectiveness is possible by 
legislative revision, but as Beloff points out, the basic issue in 
racial equality is a far simpler one. It may be that some degree of 
complexity cannot be avoided, but unless the complexity is signifi-
cantly lessened the effectiveness of the Act is bound to be impaired. 
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It is not surprising that a commentator critical about the lack of 
effectiveness of the Act has this as one of her major reasons:-
"Legislation: can only function effectively if it is understood and 
used by those it is designed to help. Both the 1970 and 1975 Acts 
are extremely complex pieces of legislation not readily understandable 
without professional advice." 
However, she also advances other reasons. These include the demoral-
isation caused by the high failure rate of cases, the lack of legal 
aid for industrial tribunals, the inactive role played by the Equal 
Opportunities Commission. Interestingly, however, she lists as the 
greatest problem the apathy of women themselves. It would appear 
that many women do not place a high priority on the assertion of their 
rights but rather place a higher priority on many more traditional 
fema:.'e concerns (much to the dismay of the champions of sex discrim-
ination legislation). The possible theological implications of this 
are of great interest to this study and are commented on in Part III. 
28 
In their first annual report, that for 1976, the E.O.C. nowhere 
commented on the complexities of the Act. Rather they were dissatis-
fied because it had been introduced into an atmosphere of unemployment 
and economic stringency:-
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"We would wish to register our belief that stringency has made those 
responsible for the allocation of resources and opportunities less 
responsive to our work than we would have wished, in this, the 
first year of our existence." (pg. 7) 
The E.O.C. clearly saw their role as a pressure group to achieve 
further equality for women. At the conclusion to their 1976 Report 
they comment:-
"The setting up of the Commission is only the beginning of a new 
phase in the century long quest to achieve equality for half of our 
society .•• As the aspirations and expectations of women throughout 
the country rise, more effort and more commitment will be necessary 
from voluntary organisations as well as the Commission. A thriving 
Equal Opportunities Commission can only come about in the setting 
of a thriving movement concerned with equality for women." 
29 
The 1977 Report of the E.O.C. starts with a belief that progress has 
been made in this area:-
'~Ve are_happy to say that as the work of the Commission developed 
during the year, the Commission has found a much greater willingness 
in the country to pay attention to the substaruive issues of discrim-
ination than there was a year earlier." 
This comment does not necessarily contradict the comment of the 
commentator above about the apathy of women themselves. Elsewhere in 
the report dissatisfaction is expressed with the progress towards 
equality and the need for the Commission to be more visible and 
accessible to individuals. The 1977 Report, unlike its predecessor, 
does criticise the Acts dealing with discrimination:-
"The Commission has devoted considerable attention throughout the year 
to a close scrutiny of the two Acts. By the end of 1978 these two 
Acts will have been in full operation for a period of three years. 
It is absolutely clear to the Commission that it will have to return 
to the Secretary of State at the end of this period substantial comments 
on how the two Acts have been working in practice, and to propose 
amendments to clarify and strengthen them." 
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Other recent legislation bearing on Women's Rights 
As well as the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act two other 
statutes should be commented on briefly in relation to recent attempts 
to secure women's rights. They are the Employment Protection Act 
1975 and the Social Security Pensions Act 1975. 
The Employment Protection Act contains provisions concerning maternity 
rights in relation to employment. Employers now have a duty to provide 
maternity pay and leave (5.35). A woman employee is entitled to this 
if she is absent from work wholly or partly because of pregnancy or 
confinement, if she has been continuously employed for a period of 
two years or more, if she has continued at work until the beginning 
of the eleventh week before the expected week of confinement, if she 
has given three weeks notice and has produced a medical certificate 
if so required. Her maternity pay entitlement runs for six weeks 
and is nine tenths of a week's pay, less flat rate maternity allow-
ance. A maternity pay fund is set up by the statute. .Maternity 
"leave" gives the woman the right to return to work within 29 weeks 
from the actual date of birth. This must be to a job which is the 
same as the employee's original one, and on "terms and conditions not 
less favourable than those which would have been applicable to her if 
she had not been absent." (S. 48) Judith Reid comments:-
" there is not much point in giving mothers the right to return 
to work at the end of this period if the employer has no duty to 
provide day nursery facilities or allow some flexibility in working 
hours, part-time arrangements and holidays for the mothers of school 
age children." 
In addition to the above provisions, the Employment Protection Act 
also classes as unfair a dismissal on grounds of pregnancy, unless 
the employer can show that the woman is incapable of doing the job 
because of her pregnancy, or because it would be unlawful to carry on 
employing her for the same reason. The dismissal. is also unfair in 
these circumstances if the employer has another job available which is 
suitable for her but does not offer it (5.34). If· the employee is so 
unfairly dismissed she is entitled to the above maternity benefits 
even though she is not employed up to the eleventh week before 
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confinement and even though without these intervening weeks she would 
not have the requisite two years continuous service. 
The Social Security Pensions Act 1975 regulates discrimination both 
in all private and occupational pension schemes and in those of them 
which are contracted out of the State scheme. Equal access must be 
afforded to "both men and women on terms which are the same as to 
the age andle~h of service needed for becoming a member and as to 
whether membership is voluntary or not." (S.52(3) SSPA). In relation 
to social security itself S.3 of the Act deals with the contribution 
side. The married woman employee's right to opt out of full contrib-
utions is to be phased out - thus facilitating women's claims to 
equal social security rights. S.l9(3) helps the non-working woman 
by crediting her with contributions for some purposes while she is 
kept out of work by responsibilities at home. In benefits, the lower 
rate for sickness and unemployment benefit to a married woman who has 
not opted out but is living with or supported by her husband has been 
abolished. Here therefore the notion of dependence has been abandoned. 
Judith Reid points out that the position is different in the provisions 
30 
for the new pension scheme under SSPA. Perhaps the most glaring 
inequality not dealt with by U1e Act is the fact that women still reach 
retiring age five years earlier than men - this no~ithstanding the 
average longer life-span of a woman compared with a man. 31 
In Part III of this study, the Acts dealing with sex discrimination and 
equal treatment will be subjected to a theological critique. In 
particular the fundamental philosophical basis of the Sex Discrimination 
Act, 1975 will be so examined, together with a consideration of whether 
its complexities and ambiguities arise from this. Alternative, theol-
ogical foundations for sex equality will be examined and suggestions 
made for future legislative amendment. Far from just proposing, like 
the Equal Opportunities Commission, "amendments to clarify and strengt~ 
en" present legislation, this more radical analysis may suggest that 
if the foundations are wrong no amount of tampering with the brick-
work above ground will be satisfactory. 
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CHAP1ER 7 - NOTES 
Recent Legislation on Sexual Equality 
1. These were Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895; 
Licensing Act, 1902, S.5; Married Women (Maintenance) Act, 
1925; Married Women (Maintenance) Act, 1949. 
2. For an examination of how this section has been interpreted in 
practice cf. J.~1. Thomson 'Sex Discrimination and Employment' 
8 Fam. Law.26; J.A. Wall 'Sex Discrimination and Employment' 
128 New L.J. 968; G Woodroffe 'Equal Pay for Women - dream or 
reality?' 74 L.S. Gaz. 1027. 
3. 'Equal Pay - First Report on the workings of the Equal Pay Act 
1970' Office of Manpower Economics. There have been no 
subsequent annual Reports. 
4. In their 1976 Annual Report, ~1e Equal Opportunities Commission 
comment on the high rate of failure of equal pay claims. 
5. Published Sept. 1974. 
6. Para. 23. 
7. Paras. 24 and 25. 
8. Para. 29. 
9. Para. 7. 
10. Paras. 8-11. 
11. Para. 12. 
12. Para. 16. 
13. Para. 17. 
14. Beloff & Watson, Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
15. Judith Reid 'Women in Employment : The New Legislation' 
39 M.L.R. 432-51. 
16. For a discussion on the cases of Price v Civil Service Commission 
1977 1 W.L.R. 1417 and Steel v The Union o£·Post·o£fice Workers 
& the G.P.O. 1977 I.R.L.R. 288. cf. S. Cooke 'Sex Discrimination 
: two recent cases' 75 L.S. Gaz 341. 
17. S.37. 
18. Both Reid and Beloff & Watson give examples of the relationship 
between the two Acts. 
19. This includes organised religions (see note 23). Hence it is not 
illegal for the Church of England to refuse to ordain women. 
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20. For the differing interpretations of what such a transitional 
period involves cf. Times Educational Supplement 28 Oct. 1977. 
21. P. Hewitt, Rights for Women (1975) pg.26. 
22. I.L.E.A. sent a booklet to 13,000 heads, principals, managers 
and governors stating that "myths and taboos" in 'sexist' reading 
books which impress on small children the dominant role of boys 
must be attacked. cf. The Times 30 Dec. 1975. 
23. Organised religion is nowhere defined in S.D.A. However 
Scientology is not a religion (cf. ~ v Registrar General ex p. 
Segerdel 1970 2 Q.B. 697.) 
24. For a criticism of the impact these provision will have on the 
English language cf. Howard 'One area in which sexism is welcome', 
The Times 31 Jan. 1976. 
25. However, the Institute of Practitioners in advertising have 
emphasised that the Commission can recommend but not enforce 
such practice. 
26. Relations between the education section of the E.O.C. and the 
D.E.S. have been somewhat stormy over their relative powers in 
monitoring the Act - cf. Times Educational Supplement Nov. 4th 19n 
Jan 20th 1978. A report by Ruth Miller on 'Women and Equal 
Opportunities' in The Daily Telegraph Feb. 6th 1978 produces 
statistical evidence to suggest the E.O.C. has had little effect 
in the Education field. 
27. Jane Fortin 'Sex Discrimination Laws - Success or Failure?' 
128 New L.J. 700. 
28. Equal Opportunities Commission 'First Annual Report, 1976' 
H.M.S.O. 
29. Equal Opportunities Commission 'Second Annual Report, 1977' 
H.M.S.O. 
30. cf. Reid (supra note 15):- "The woman whose entitlement to 
pension rights rests on her husband's contribution record 
(category B pension) must still wait until her husband reaches 
pensionable age before she can collect it and is paid at a lower 
rate so long as he is alive. One of the more absurd applications 
of the dependence assumption also arises from the S.S.P.A.; S.20 
allows a wife (or a husband) to carry her husband's contribution 
record with her through a divorce. This means that even though 
a person is expressly prohibited from collecting on the 
contribution record of more than one ex-spouse, there is nothing 
to prevent more than one ex-spouse from claiming on the single 
contribution record of a much-divorced contributor." 
31. The E.O.C. seems to attach only a low priority to equality of 
pensions. In their 1976 Report they comment:- "It did not seem 
one of the more pressing issues" (pg.ll). In order of priorities 
they accorded it No.l4. 
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CHAPTERS ABORTION 
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ABORTION - LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
Discussion and contro.versy about the legal consequences and justi-
fication of the act of abortion had a long pedigree. In Victorian 
England the codifying statute the ~Offences against the Person Act, 
1861, S'.S8 made it an indictable offence a) if a pregnant woman herself 
administers unlawfully a poison or uses any instrument 9r other means 
with intent to procure her own miscarriage, or b) if any other person 
with the intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman unlawfully 
administers a poison or uses any instrument or other means. 
Thisstatute was given an extensive interpretation in order to minimise 
the offence in the case of~ v Bourne [1939] lK.B. 687. The law being 
unclea~on the direction of the Judge to the Jury it appeared as if 
abortion was lawful where performed by a doctor with the express purp-
ose of preserving the life of the mother. Included in this was not 
merely the mother's physical health but also her mental health. The 
danger must be clear and definite - the mother must be in danger of 
becoming a physical or mental wreck. Nevertheless pressure increased 
to reform the law on abortion by statute: For some time this,was 
c!q"'e S.o""~ pb' ~, 'w-AwWL~,. 
WReeP"t:alten to bring more certainty to the law. For etftel'~ tlie reasons 
were more social - to reduce the amount of 'back-street' abortions, 
to reduce the pressure on deprived or feckless families or more radic-
ally to enable the woman to choose whether she had the child or not. 
For other~~~re were additional medical grounds to those specified 
" f\'\~~rs. in ~ v Bourne - notably these who have reason to fear their child will 
be born deformed. 
Whlle tl1e Roman Catholic Church remained implacably opposed to abortion 
the reforming movement was given considerable philosophical and moral 
Q\~~::e by the report entitled "Abortion, An Ethical Discussion" 1965 2 
set up by the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility and 
under the chairmanship of the late Bishop Ian Ramsey and including 
several laymen. Whereas the premiss that human life was sacred was 
accepted it was not accepted that the foetus was in this category 
from conception. Rather the conunission would describe it as "an 
embryo having within itself the potentiality of a full flowering of 
human personality." In certain early stages of its development it 
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could therefore be argued that termination of pregnancy does not 
involve taking human life. In addition any decision must also involve 
the mother and family who may have counter-balancing rights to those 
of the foetus. However, the Committee concluded that there would only 
be two possible occasions in which according to Christian ethics it 
could be right to end the life of the foetus - viz. 1) where the 
mother's own life is in danger as a result of the pregnancy 2) '~e 
would extend this justification of necessity to cover a real threat 
to the physical or mental health of the mother, that is, to her psycho-
physical well-being." 3There must be a 'grave' risk of 'serious' 
injury to health or physical or mental well-being taking account of 
the patient's total environment, actual or reasonably forseeable. 
ABORTION ACT 196 7 
The culmination of this reformist zeal can be seen in the 1967 Abortion 
Act. The Act, however, proved far more radical than many of its 
supporters (including its sponsor) intended. Sponsored by Mr. David 
Steel it originally followed the recommendation of the Ramsey Committee 
and specified that the continuance of the pregnancy must involve 
'serious' risk to the life or 'grave' injury to the health, whether 
physical or mental, of the pregnant woman. The adjectives 'serious' 
and 'grave' were, however, deleted in committee, as unquantifiable and 
meaningless. By this simple stroke the Act was capable of being inter-
preted as providing abortion on demand. Some doctors have pointed out 
that since any unwanted pregnancy creates some risk to the mental 
health of a pregnant woman, a demand for abortion can never be refused. 
\::.\c. 
The linguis~ absurdity of the Act in its present permissive form has 
been pointed out by J.M.B. Crawford in an article~ He concludes:-
"When a piece of legislation, which aims at controlling and licensing 
abortions, can be shown to permit any abortion under it, then its 
licensing and control is trivial because it is ineffective. As it 
stands the Abortion Act 1967 both permits and encourages abortion on 
demand, a state of affairs which parliament did not intend when it 
had passed the Act." 
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Hence when the final Act is examined Section. 1 (1) reads in defining 
the exceptional circwnstances when abortion is to be lawful:-
"when a pregnancy is tenninated by a registered medical practitioner 
if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, fanned 
in good faith -
a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the 
life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children 
of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; 
or 
b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it 
would suffer from such physical or mental abnonnalities as to 
be seriously handicapped" 
According to Section 1(2) 
"In detennining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve 
such risk of injury to health •.• account may be taken of the woman's 
actual or reasonably forseeable environment." 
It is the woman who is entitled to apply for an abortion and her 
welfare and that of the existing children are the only factors to be 
taken into account. A recent judgement in Paton v Trustees of B.P.A.S. 
and others [1978] 2 All E.R. 957 has detennined that under the Abortion 
Act 1967 the husband has no legal rights over the life and death of his 
unborn child. Mr. William Paton applied to the Court for an injunction 
to restrain his wife from having an abortion. Sir George Baker, 
president of the Family Division, said in his judgement:-
"The Abortion Act 1967 gave no right to a father to be consulted. The 
husband therefore has no legal right whatever and certainly no right 
enforceable in law or in equity, to stop his wife having this operation 
or to stop doctors carrying it out." 
In addition he commented:-
"Not only would it be a bold and brave judge ••• who would seek to 
interfere with the discretion of doctors acting under the 1967 Act, 
but I think he would be a foolish judge who would try to do any such 
thing, unless possibly, there is clear bad faith and an obvious attempt 
to perpetrate a criminal offence." 
A case where the Court did detennine clear bad faith was that of 
R v Smith (John) [1974] 1 All E.R. 376. The question of good faith is 
173 
+\.-. ... ~ 
to be detennined ..-. the totality of the evidence by the jury. This 
plainly did not arise in Paton's case. An article considering any 
possible legal action by the husband in the case of an abortion or 
threatened abortion without his approval has been written by D.C. 
Bradley.5 In particular this examines the legal consequences in tenns 
of a divorce petition and the possibility of proceedings for the 
custody of an unborn child. 
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GOVERNHENT SCRUTINY OF 1HE 1967 ABORTION ACT 
The operation of the i967 Abortion Act confirmed some of the worst 
fears of its critics. The number of abortions performed lawfully 
increased dramatically year after year. In the last year before the 
Act 6,380 lawful abortions were notified. In the first year of the 
Act this figure jumped to 54,819. By the early 1970's this figure 
increased to over 100,000 and then to well over 150,000. By 1976 
a total of 1,000,000 foet~fhad been abortej1~~~e the passing of the 
Act. Since that time the annual number of abortions has decreased 
slightly - although expressed as a percentage of live births the 
6 trend until 1978 was still upward. In recent years between 70 
and 80% of abortions were performed on'mental health grounds and rather 
more on unmarried women than married women. 
Government scrutiny became essential when public disquiet was voiced 
over many abuses of the Act. Private nursing homes and pregnancy 
advice agencies extorted large amounts of money for providing a service 
of abortion on demand and attracted some doctors by the lure of easy 
money. Abortion within the health service was dealt with more resp-
onsibly but many gynaecologists complained at the amatmt of bed space 
used and those medical staff who refused to co-operate on conscientious 
grounds complained that their careers were disadvantaged. Large 
numbers of foreign girls took advantage of this country's liberal 
abortion facilities. Foetuses and foetal material were used for 
unscrupulous research. These and other practical abuses can be seen as 
the motivation for three influential government reports - the Report 
of the Advisory Group 7on the use of Foetuses and Foetal Material for 
Research (The Peel Report), 1972, the Report of the Committee on the 
8 
Working of the Abortion Act (the Lane Report) 1974 and the Report from 
9 
the Select Committee on Abortion (the Parliamentary Committee examining 
Mr. James White's Abortion (Amendment) Bill 1975. This latter report 
contains a summary of the proposals of the other reports. Before 
examining the reports in more detail it should be stated that the 
government has achieved some measure of success in tightening up on 
the operation of the Act without statutory reform. This is particularly 
stressed in the Lane report and by the Department of Health which now 
believes the situation is under control and the Act does not need any 
rna j or revision. 
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The Lane .Report admitted that a small number of doctors had used the 
Act to make money and that some women had used the ~ct and the fact 
that they could afford private treatment to get an abortion on 
comparatively trivial grounds of inconvenience or embarrassment to 
themselves. It admitted that in some parts of the commercial private 
sector the provisions of the Act had been flouted and abortion on 
request had been the rule. However in its 'Summary of Conclusions' 
it held that the vast majority of abortions were fully justified 
under the act:-
"We are unanimous in supporting the Act and its prov1s1ons. We have 
no doubt that the gains facilitated by the Act have much outweighed 
the disadvantages for which it has been criticised. The problems 
which have been identified in its working and they are admittedly 
considerable, are problems for which solutions should be sought by 
administrative and professional action, and by better education of 
the public. They are not, we believe, indications that the grounds 
set out in the Act should be amended in a restrictive way. To do so 
when the number of unwanted pregnancies is increasing and before 
comprehensive services are available to all who need them would be 
to increase the sum of human suffering and ill-health, and probably 
drive more women to seek the squalid and dangerous help of the back-
street abortionist." 10 
The Report claimed to be aware of the moral nature of the decision:-
"As a committee we can only aclmowledge its significance for the moral 
life of the individual and of society and seek to ensure in our 
recommendation that such decisions are made with deliberation, care 
and earnestness." 11 
With regard to medical staff disadvantaged in appointments by 
conscientious objection the report comments:-
,,~ N_IICi. ~~~~ \J\Q.\1) \\-t 
k~ometimes the needs of the many must take priority and that inevitably""' S 
some who refuse this work may not obtain a particular appointment; 
but we come to this conclusion with great reluctance and hope that 
the occasions for such a decision will be rare." 12 
In assessing the general conclusions of the Lane Report it is striking 
that the philosophical reasoning is almost exclusively based on util-
itarianism. Individual happiness and individual suffering are 
balanced from a humanist standpoint. The influence of Bentham on 
present day legislation and the evaluation of such legislation can 
~r 
hardly be ~det-estimated. 
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RECENT ATTEMPTS 1D AMEND TI-lE ACf 
There have been several recent attempts to amend the Abortion Act -
The first, Mr. James White's Abortion (Amendment) Bill 1975 although 
gaining a large majority at second reading lapsed through lack of 
Parliamentary time. However it is of interest because of the exhaustive 
nature of the Select Committee's report on it and because of their 
considerable~!~~~ith the Lane report - both on detailed evaluation 
and on matters of philosophy. We see in the S)1ect Committee far more 
emphasis on the sanctity of life as an over-ri1ing consideration. 
However, it should perhaps be remembered that the committee had a 
rather one-sided composition - the pro abortion members refusing to 
serve shortly after its constitution. 
~fumy examples of the Committee's more restrictive attitude to abortion 
can be seen in their comments on provisions of Mr White's Bill. Perhaps 
the most radical change Mr. White proposed was to restore the words 
'grave' and 'serious' back into the criteria f0r an abortion - so no 
abortion would be lawful unless there were grave risk : to the life of 
the pregnant woman or risk of serious injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family. 
While the Lane Committee disapproved strongly of such a change the 
Select Committee refused to be committed but rather listed three points 
in favour and three against. Hence in favour were the points that 
doctors would be prevented from using the statistical argument to 
justify abortion on request, the re~ation of those criteria in the 
original Abortion Bill before it was amended in the I.;orc:S and the fact 
that more stringent criteria would give expression to the concern that 
due weight should be given to the right of life of the foetus - so 
upholding the value of human life. Points against were that it dis-
regarded the Lane Report, it made the work of the certifying doctors 
more difficult by bringing greater uncertainty and the fact that it 
would greatly increase the private sector against the National Health 
Service - as well as leading to more back-street abortions. Hence we 
can see considerable hesitation in seeing the matter in as clear cut 
a way as the Lane Report. 
Many of the restrictive provisions of Mr. White's Bill were also agreed 
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to by the Select Committee - often in contradiction 0f the Lane Report. 
Examples are restrictive provisions in relation to the certifying 
medical practitioners (Clause l(a)(i)), the new criteria proposed for 
the approval and regulation of premises (Clause 6), the upper time 
limit for an abortion (Clause 7) and strengthened powers of enforce-
ment (Clause 11,12). The Committee did, however, agree with the Lane 
Report that no legislation should be introduced to reduce the number 
of abortions on foreign women as proposed under Clause 2. While 
numbers had jumped from 4,604 in 1969 to 49,414 in 1972 new regulations 
to reduce the grosser scandals resulted in a considerable improvement 
in 1975 to 31,329. Licensing and control of premises and advisory 
and referral bureaux would substantially further reduce the number. 
The licensing of referral and advisory bureaux was covered by Clause 5 
of Mr. White's Bill and was also common ground between the Lane 
Committee and Select Committee. 
~rr. White's Bill was followed by an Abortion (Amendment) Bill sponsored 
by Mr. Benyon in 1977. If Mr. Benyon's Bill had been successful it 
would only have permitted abortions if the pregnancy was under 20 
weeks, or under 24 weeks with a substantial risk that the child would 
suffer from physical or mental abnormalities, or if treatment was 
necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent grave 
permanent injury to her physical or mental health (Clause 1). The 
Bill further provided that one of the two medical practitioners whose 
consent was required must be of not less than five years standing and 
had safeguards to ensure he was independent from the other doctor 
(Clause 2). Stricter licensing provisions were proposed for pregnancy 
advisory services, together with the severance of all financial links 
between them and abortion clinics (Clause 6). Mr. Benyon's Bill, 
although obtaining a majority at its second reading, suffered the same 
fate as Mr. White's Bill and was not allowed sufficient time by the 
Government. 
The latest attempt at legislation to reform the 1967 Act has been 
Mr. Braine's Abortion (Amendment) Bill (1978). Clause (1) concerned 
the time limit for abortions and contained similar provisions to the 
1977 Bill, although allowing a little more flexibility. Cl~use 2 
made further provisions for conscientious objectors to the Act and 
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Clause 3 laid do\vn similar provisions for licensing pregnancy advisory 
agencies as Clause 6 of the 1977 Bill. Mr Braine's Bill, although 
being milder than Mr. White's Bill, again failed through lack of 
time being made available to it. Thus, although Parliament has 
clearly expressed its wish to amend the Abortion Act 1967 on three 
occasions, attempts so to do have been thwarted by the deliberate 
policy of the Executive. 
THE RECENT CONTRIBUI'ION OF THE CHURrnES 
We noted earlier the influential nature of the Church of England 
report "Abortion : An Ethical Enquiry" on the 1967 Act. Mr. White's 
Abortion (Amendment) Bill provided an opportunity for the Church of 
England and other Churches to further elaborate their standpoint to 
the Select Committee. These contributions are reported in the 
Committee's 'Minutes of Evidence' - an assessment of them shows a 
significant variation between the Churches and also a significant 
change in the official stance of the Church of England. 
The Church of England evidence had none of the coherence seen in 
"Abortion : An Ethical Enquiry" chaired by Bishop Ian Ramsey. One 
member Mrs. Jones, appeared to be entirely happy with the 1967 Act or 
at any rate not to wish for legal changes. The main contribution was 
made by Professor Dunstan - he was influential in elaborating the 
continunn theory of the foetus' growth in the earlier report. In 
reaffirming this he commented:-
"Scientifically speaking, here we have one unbroken physiological 
continuum and my task as a moralist is . to try and match this continuity 
with the appropriate moral language, and then to see how this can be 
reflected in an effective and workable and just law." 13 
He then goes further:-
'~e do not assert that human life is absolutely inviolable -we say, we 
place a very high value on it." 
"The foetus may be the aggressor (although innocent) against the 
mother." 
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However in practical terms his concept of justifiable foeticide is 
still restrictive. So the restrictive adjective 'grave' is welcomed 
and the provision which extends the consideration to a threat of 
serious injury to any existing children of the family is regretted 
("I can conceive of no threat that can't be met by less drastic means") 
So far the practical conclusion is broadly similar to the previous 
report. However there was a major change in attitude from the earlier 
report in the case of a prognosis of severe congenital handicap:-
"My own thinking on this has developed since the earlier report of 
the Board, because of the development of accuracy and precision in 
pre-natal testing and assay." 
Because of such greater precision the Professor stated:-
"It would seem, therefore, to me, logical not to insist, on moral 
grounds, to continue a pregnancy which would result in the birth of a 
child which everyone concerned would hope would die." 
This is a major change in Church of England standpoint. While Dunstan 
was unable when asked to define gross handicap he sought to clarify 
his statement by elaborating:-
"If there were a prognosis of a child for whom nothing medical can be 
done to serve that child's interest, that would be a description which 
I would take as a ground for termination in utero." 14 
'oo.~;~ W\ a."~~~ 
He was criticised by Leo Abse and Kevin McNamara for~e~ased on ~f 
expediency of current medical and social attitudes, rather than on 
principle. 
The most liberal Protestant standpoint can be seen in thP. evidence 
15 
of the Methodist Church Division of Social Responsibility:-
"We have not pressed for a repeal of the Act nor for greatly increased 
restrictions on its implementation. We would view with great concern 
steps which might lead to an appreciable increase in the numbers of 
back-street abortions and unwanted children. We therefore welcome 
several clauses of the Abortion (Amendment) Bill but regard with unease 
the total effect of its provisions . " 16 
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In particular the Methodist Church doubted the wisdom of reinstating 
'grave' and 'serious' as proposed by Clause 1. Theologically the 
Church acknowledges that all human life is reverenced. The foetus 
is l.Uldoubtedly part of the continmun of human existence, but the 
Christian will wish to study the further extent to which the foetus 
is a person. The foetus has significance but lacks full personhood. 
When there is a conflict of interest with the_mother the decision must 
not be taken lightly - but either answer is permissible. The Church 
allows the possibility that large families might provide a justification 
for abortion. 
The most stalwart Christian opposition to abortion comes, as might be 
expected, from the Roman Catholic Church. Paul VI's 'HlDilanae Vitae' 
in August 1968 stated bll.Ultly that abortion was a crime against God 
and against nature. A directly willed abortion was condemned even for 
therapeutic reasons. The foetus was inviolable in the womb. It 
appeared doubtful whether killing the foetus was justified even to save 
the life of the mother. In their evidence to the Select Committee1fhe 
Roman Catholic Church reiterated that God is the ultimate authority of 
life and that the protection of htm1an life is a fl.Uldamental principle. 
The Church would be opposed to any law which contradicted this principle. 
Hence:-
"a direct attack on the life of the human foetus is excluded by our 
moral principles." 18 
However the view was expressed by the Rt. Rev. Augustine Harris that 
in the situation where the foetus was a direct threat to the life of 
the mother "a medical practitioner would, we hope, try to save a life 
19 
rather than lose a life." However the shift from life and death 
justifications for abortion to justifications on social, economic or 
psychological grol.Ulds was deplored. The present Act was l.Ulworthy in 
weighing a human life against the emotional, social and economic 
situation of the mother. Local authorities should provide alternatives 
to abortion. The Catholic Church remained opposed to the basic 
principles of the 1967 Act. 
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CHAPTER 8 - NOTES 
Abortion - Legislative Background 
1. Bills were proposed by Joseph Reeves in 1952, Kenneth Robinson 
in 1961, Mrs Short in 1965 and Lewis Silkin in 1965. For a 
general survey of the movement towards liberalising the law on 
abortion cf. Hindell and Simms, Abortion Law Reformed (1971). 
2. 'Abortion, An Ethical Discussion'. Church Information Office 
(1965). 
3. Ibid at pg.34 of 3rd reprint (1973). 
4. J.M.B. Crawford, 'Abortion: A Logical Oddity' 126 New L.J. 252. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
D.C. Bradley, 'A Woman's Right to Choose' July 1978 M.L.R. 
365f. cf. also O'Neill & Watson 'The Father and the Unborn Child' 
38 M.L.R. 174, 184. There is a vast literature on abortion in 
America, especially in A.Jo. J/P.e.g. R.T. Gerber, 'Abortion, 
Two Opposing Legal Philosophies' A.Jo.J/P. 1970 pp.l-24. 
The following figures are taken from the Office of Population 
Census & Surveys:-
ABORTIONS 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
--
Total 169 163 141 128 133 141 
UK residents 111 109 106 101 102 112 
LIVE BIRTHS 1966 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
850 640 603 584 569 596 
DEATHS 585 585 583 599 575 586 
All figures represent l,OOO's. 
In the U.S.A. in 1976 for the first time there were more legal 
abortions than live births. 
For the existence of a new tort in the U.S.A., that of liability 
for wrongfully causing one to be born, cf. 83 A.L.R. 3d. pg.l5. 
'Report of the Advisory Group on the use of Fetus and Fetal 
Material for Research'. Department of Health & Social Security. 
H.M.S.O. (1972). 
'Report of the Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act' 
H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 5579. (1974). 
'First Report from the Select Committee on Abortion.' Vol.l. 
Report. H.M.S.O. H.C. 573-I (1975-76). 
~. J*I:I a. 605. '\<.qot"\ o£. -\-\...~ Co~\\~€. eN'..~ ~'4 a\ "\'-€_ A.~ 
~'t- , \-\ .'t\ .~.0 . ~. ~.,~ c_,~-,"-) ~~. bcli . 
Ibid. para. 606. 
Ibid. para. 607. 
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13. 'First Report from the Select.Corronittee on Abortion' Val .• 2. 
'Minutes of evidence.'H.M.S.O. H.C. 573-II (1975-76) Para 184. 
Pg. 93f. 
14. Ibid. para. 192. 
15. Ibid. pg.l67f. 
16. Memorandum submitted by the Methodist Church Division of Social 
Responsibility and attached to the Connnittee's 'Hinutes of 
evidence' (supra) pg.l65. para. 1. 
17. 'First Report from the Select Corronittee on Abortion. Vo1.2. 
'~fLnutes of evidence'.(supra. note 13) para.223f. pg.l18. 
18. Ibid. para. 223 pg.119. 
19. Ibid. para. 256. pg.l29. 
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VOLUNTARY EUTI-IANASIA - SOME LEGAL, MEDICAL AND THEOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
VOLUNTARY EUfHANASIA 
1. The present legal position 
The sanctity of human life has long been an underlying principle of 
English law - and indeed the law of all civilised nations. The crime 
of murder, defined as the unlawful killing of a reasonable creature, 
in being and under the Queen's peace, with malice aforethought, express 
or implied, the death following within a year and a day, was viewed 
with such seriousness that until comparatively recently the person 
found guilty was required to forfeit his own life. The lesser offence 
of manslaughter covers all unlawful homicides which are not murder. 
Manslaughter occurs when there is no malice aforethought, express or 
implied, but in special circumstances it may also occur even when 
malice aforethought is present. At common law this was the case 
where the killing was done under provocation. By statute (the Homicide 
Act 1957) two further categories must be added - namely where there 
exists diminished responsibility or a suicide pact. It is no defence 
to a charge of murder or manslaughter to prove that the victim gave 
his consent to the killing. Hence voluntary euthanasia - defined as 
the deliberate inducement of a painless death at the request of the 
patient is at present quite plainly a crime. 
In one respect the law relating to the sanctity of life was signifi-
cantly changed in 1961. Originally suicide was also a crime. The 
Suicide Act of 1961 made it no longer a crime. The law is, however, 
still operative in relation to possible factors surrounding a suicide. 
Thus, by the combined effect of the Homicide Act 1957, and the Suicide 
Act 1961, the survivor of a suicide pact, who by common law was guilty 
of murder, is now guilty only of manslaughter. Anyone other than the 
survivor of a suicide pact who has aided, abetted, counselled or 
procured the suicide of another is guilty of a new offence carrying a 
possible penalty of fourteen years. Hence it is also plainly a crime 
to help someone to kill himself. \~~tver the liberalisation of the 
law means that there is no longer ahauty to try and restrain a would-be 
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suicide. A question of more complexity is whether a person would be 
guilty of an assault if he did, in fact, restrain a would-be suicide. 
The general legal consensus seems to be that 
"probably there is no more than a mere liberty to commit suicide and 
not a right, there may just possibly be no offence or tort in 
restraining a would-be suicide." 1 
\~ereas a doctor cannot deliberately end the patient's life at his 
request he can, however, use such treatment as is necessary to 
alleviate his pain. This is probably the position although it may 
incidentally shorten life. It has been pointed out that evidence 
that in any given case that the effect was inimical to life is hard 
to obtain. In Catholic theology this double causation is known as 
the principle of double effect. The illness is presumed as the 
direct cause, the drugs or cessation of extraordinary treatment only 
the indirect. It would usually be the illness that killed, not the 
drug. If the drug could be proved to be the immediate cause of 
death, it would be difficult in law to find a defence:-
"The best that could be done would be to argue that a combination of 
necessity (to relieve pain) and the de minimis rule (the hastening 
of death by a few hours) should prevail; but the validity of such 
an argument is doubtful." 2 
It is pointed out that the doctor who administers such a dose is 
unlikely to be detected or prosecuted. If convicted and death was 
already imminent he would probably be granted immunity via the Home 
"~"""\--. .. ~ Otfiee from the strict letter of the law. It must be admitted that 
standard medical practice in such cases does, in fact strain the 
strict letter of the law, while of course falling far short of 
administering voluntary euthanasia as defined above. The legal effects 
of decisions to withdraw life-saving apparatus is similarly somewhat 
vague. In~ recent directives on 'brain death' the medical -profession 
~-~ . assumed that death accord1ng to some definition must have occurred 
before such apparatus is removed. 3 
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2. Present medical practices 
This brings us to the root of much of the present dilemma. The 
problem is such a live issue in the twentieth century because of the 
enormous advances in medical resources and technology. On the one 
hand respirators and other life-saving equipment can keep a person 
alive according to physical criteria. On the other hand the vast 
range of modern drugs can provide extensions of life for seemingly 
hopeless cases and at the same time are more effective than ever 
before at combatting and alleviating pain, albeit at the risk of 
marginally shortening life. We will see much discussion on these 
points in the debates on the attempts at legislation. From the medical 
point of view much evidence as to enlightened medical practice in the 
treatment of terminal cases can be seen in the report 'On Dying Well'. 
This concentrates in particular on the work of the Hospice movement 
which concentrates on care for the dying. Few would quibble with the 
inspired care and concern apparent in such institutions or with the 
need to encourage more of them. Few would argue that life should pe 
~~ preserved at any cost. There does, however, remain a grey area~ tffe 
doctor's dilemma. How far should active surgical treatment be pursued 
with elderly and terminal patients, assuming this is their wish? 
How active should be the attempts to deal with the cardiac arrest of 
a man over 65, or 70 or what you will? These are everyday dilemmas 
for some doctors. Inevitably the individual case will be of great 
importance but so will be the attitude of the individual doctor and 
of society. Should utilitarian arguments such as those recently 
suggested by the Archbishop of Canterbury be entertained? When does 
the law count a doctor's non-intervention as negligent? Such are the 
grave medical, legal and ethical problems posed by the complexity of 
modern medicine. We must bear them in mind throughout the ensuing 
discussion. 
3. Attempts at Legislation 
The first attempt at legislation can be seen in the voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill of 1936. Sponsored by Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede 
following the death of its author Lord Moynihan it was restricted to 
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patients suffering from a disease which was 'incurable, fatal and 
painful.' In such circumstances the patient could request the 
administration of euthanasia. Although some of the language of 
its sponsor points in that direction there was no right to demand 
euthanasia granted in the Bill but merely a liberty to request it, 
thus setting the proposed enquiry into motion. Lord Moynihan is 
quoted ~ saying that the general principle of the Bill is 
"to obtain legal recognition for the principle that in cases of 
advanced and inevitably fatal disease, attended by agony which 
reaches or oversteps the boundaries of human endurance, the sufferer, 
after legal enquiry and after due observance of all safeguards, 
shall have the right to demand and be entitled to receive release. 
You will observe at once that most anxious scrutiny of all such 
cases must be made and many questions must be asked." 4 
The restriction of the Bill to the terminal stages of illness led 
to much of the medical debate in the House concentrating on standard 
medical practice and whether the prescribing of increased doses of 
pain killing drugs was in fact conceding euthanasia. Lord Dawson 
of Penn stressed that 
"The medical profession is primarily concerned with the causes, 
diagnosis and treatment of disease, and to the best of our minds, 
our undeviating purpose is to cure and assuage suffering." 
Where the disease is incurable 
"our duty and our privilege is to do what we can to make that passage 
between a painful illness and the inevitable end as gentle as we 
can .•• our first thoughts should be to the assuagement of pain even 
if it does involve the shortening of life." 5 
The principle of the Bill was also opposed on moral and religious 
grounds. According to Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent 
"it is not opposed only on Christian and moral grounds, it is opposed 
because it is contrary to the law of nature." 6 
To usurp the right to life is in "the nature of an impertinence." 7 
8 
The Archbishop of Canterbury stressed the clear moral principle that no 
man is entitled to take his own life. Although on rare occasions 
there may be exceptions to this they should not be given the backing of 
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legislation because of the many practical problems involved. Those 
commented on in the debate included the responsibility put on the 
relatives, the difficulty of sound moral judgements when under the 
influence of drugs, the unforesoon effects on the public in giving 
~o~\\:.~ definite legal e~~1rag~sat and the danger of losing the bond of 
trust between doctor and patient. 
9 
The subject next came before the House of Lords in 1950. They did 
not debate a Bill but merely a motion in favour of the principle of 
voluntary euthanasia. This was withdrawn without a division. Lord 
Chorley commented that 
"the object of such legislation is to provide a person who is suffer-
ing from an illness involving severe pain, the illness being incurable 
and of a fatal character, with a merciful release from his suffering." 
11 
The Archbishop of York warned of the dangerous nature 
~-~ c:o .......... "*'"'C\ principle a~ pgiJltsa set that the duty of prolonging 
the same as prolonging dying. 
of such a 
life is not 
10 
The next definite attempt at legislation did not come until 19 years 
12 later with Lord Raglan's 'Voluntary Euthanasia Bill' 1969. This 
contained significant extensions to the previous legislative attempt. 
A . . . ""'*"~ 'q~l . . . d pat1ent or prospect1ve pat1ent ~ ab e to s1gn 1n a vance a 
declaration requesting the administration of euthanasia to himself if 
he was believed to be suffering from 'a serious physical illness or 
impairment reasonably thought in the patient's case to be incurable 
and expected to cause him severe distress or render him incapable of 
rational existence.' Hence the condition no longer needed to be fatal 
- merely incurable, and 'incapacity for rational existence' was added 
to 'expected to cause severe distress.' This would cover a distressing 
chronic condition and would also cover senile dementia. This Bill 
comes closer to advocating a right to die in the sense that it is for 
the patient, other things being equal, to specify the conditions under 
which that right is to be exercised. The doctor could only exercise 
his professional judgement to the extent of certifying that the 
circumstances are those that the law specified as justifying euthanasia. 
Such a position can be distinguished from a liberty to request 
euthanasia (as proposed under the 1936 Bill) where the onus of decision 
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is upon the doctors, and from a position of immunity from prosecution 
for the doctors for doing what would otherwise be a criminal act. 
The extensive nature of the Bill and its provision of only vague 
safeguards (the witnesses to the declaration, for example, would only 
have to testify that no pressure had been put on the person requesting 
euthanasia 'so far as we are aware.') were strongly criticised from 
a legal and administrative point of view (cf. the speech of the Earl 
of Cork and Orrery). The medical contribution to the debate widely 
rejected any legislative interference with what was seen as a medical 
prerogative. The argument about the effectiveness of drugs was again 
c.o~..,~t\ Cl\b ou.t 
presented together with~ widespread lack of demand for euthanasia 
from terminal patients. Lord Amulree commented that such demand 
usually comes from the relatives. He also reiterated the trust 
necessary between doctor and patient and interestingly also commented 
on the utilitarian argument about shortage of accommodation:-
"If the patient is a burden we should encourage more accommodation. 
I know I will be told that we can't afford it -but even less can 
we afford to drop our moral standards by encouraging the belief 
that these people should be killed." 13 
Lord Brock made the point that no patient can be a proper judge of 
the desirability or inevitability of his death. Neither are doctors' 
diagnoses always infallible. 
The religious contribution included a comprehensive speech by the Bishop 
of DurhaJ.4(Bishop Ian Ramsey) • After stressing the Christian principle 
of the value of life he distinguished between four contexts for which 
euthanasia could be argued - pain, keeping alive by highly artificial 
means, severe mental distress and social desirability. He believed 
pain was no longer an argument because of the effectiveness of modern 
drugs. However he believed that something like euthanasia may in 
principle be justified in not keeping alive people by extraordinary 
means. Under certain conditions there is a moral justification in 
removing the machine. With regard to mental distress he commented that 
we do not know enough about the subject and with regard to the fourth 
situation 
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"euthanasia is likely to be particularly hazardous in the case of 
alleged social or (dare I say?) political desirability." 
He stressed far more the need for more education and better terminal 
care. Other religious contributions included that from the Earl of 
15 
Longford:-
·~e are the custodians of life - that is all we are - and the life of 
each person belongs to God." 
16 
and Lord Soper. Lord Soper declared that he was in favour of 
euthanasia although he couldn't support this Bill. He did not 
believe that the whole question of treatment should be left to the 
doctors and stressed the Christian view that death is the gateway 
to eternal life. 
The latest attempt at legislation can be seen in the Incurable Patients 17 
Bill of Baroness Wootton (1976). In her introduction she specifically 
denied that this was a Bill to legalise euthanasia. Rather 'this is 
a Bill to relieve the sufferings of incurable patients and not to 
kill them.' It was however held by the bulk of the House that this 
unquestionably was a euthanasia Bill. Baroness Wootton listed two 
objects of the Bill. First declaring the right of incurable patients 
to receive the drugs necessary to give them full relief from pain, 
even if this should cause unconsciousness. This would impose a duty 
on the doctors so to do. Second that we should have a right, while 
of sound mind, to make a binding declaration that should we become 
totally incapacitated we do not wish to be kept alive. Only a doctor 
could make the decision when the point of incurability had arrived. 
The patient's declaration would reject any contrived prolongation or 
renewal of 'what has .:ceased to be life in any meaningful sense. ' 
Hence according to clause l(l) the patient has a right to refuse life 
sustaining treatment, but nevertheless to be given drugs even to the 
point that may produce unconsciousness. According to clause 1(2) 
the patient is judged to be incurable "if he is judged by his attendant 
physician to be suffering without any reasonable prospect of cure 
from a distressing physical illness or disability that he finds 
intolerable." Here again we may note that the illness need not be 
terminal. Clause 2 interestingly tried to create the legal fiction 
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that a successful suicide. would be reckoned as death by misadventure 
and clause 2(2) attempted to clarify the law on suicide by stating 
that 'a person must not interfere with action taken by a patient 
likely to cause his own death and any such action would be unlawful.' 
This would apply only to patients suffering from incurable diseases 
under the Bill. Clause 3 dealt with the formalities of the 
declaration. 
18 
In mo~ing its rejection the Earl of Cork and Orrery commented on the 
grave practical and legal inadequacies of the Bill. Clause 1 was , '-'e.~'~, 
irrevelant because in effect this was the position at present. Clause 
2(1) was absurd in claiming that deliberate suicide was an a~cident. 
M '-'f1Cv\\t.cl ~t 
Clause 2(2) was potentially very dangerous. Here1not only was a 
doctor empowered but actually required by Statute to end a patient's 
life. Clause 3(1) was similarly dangerous. A patient who many years 
before signed a declaration is now to be regarded as refusing life-
sustaining treatment. This not merely allows but requires a patient 
to die. Lord Wells-Pestell further pointed out the difficulties of 
interpreting 'intolerable' and 'distressing'. Advisory measures such 
as those of the Royal Colleges on 'brain death' would be more approp-
riate and more helpful than legislation. 
The medical contribution again stresse! their distrust of law:-
"After all, there are times when a doctor does not officiously strive 
to keep alive, but it is better not to put into legislation what 
they are." (per Baroness Young). 19 
"Teaching, training and experience are better than law and, for 
goodness sake let us keep the law out of the relationship between 
doctor and patient." (per Lord Anrulree). 20 
Similarly the effe.cti veness of present care in incurable diseases was 
affirmed. Lord Raglan in supporting the Bill made the point about 
present medical practice that:-
"If one accepts that good medical practice sometimes entails removing 
life-sustaining equipment one inevitably accepts that good medical 
practice sometimes entails killing." 21 
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The Christian contribution in the debate included the points by 
Lord Hunt of Pawl~ that "no Christian teaching urges us to prolong 
life at all cost~"" yet on the other hand in relation to the 
elderly:-
·~ery few doctors, nurses or relatives want to assume or usurp the 
role of the Almighty and be personally responsible for the death of 
these old folk, however incurable, difficult, tiresome, crippled, 
incmtinent, mentally confused, blind or deaf they become... At 
the end of their life they are dependent on others as they were 
at the beginning. I feel it is our duty to look after them and 
keep them as happy and comfortable as possible." 23 
I~d in the debate as a whole many contributions were claimed to 
beLon specifically Christian grounds. For example:-
"As a Christian and a Roman Catholic I oppose this Bill" 
(Lady Kinloss), 24 
"As a Christian, I cannot agree with the principle that it is within 25 
our prerogative to decide when to die" (Baroness Macleod of Borne), 
"As a Christian I finnly hold that life is God given." 26 
(Lord MOwbray and Stourton). 
Lord Soper however, supported the Bill:-
"Christian death has to be seen sub specie aetemitatis. It is not 
the end but the beginning. It has always struck me as peculiar how 
those who believe ardently in the next world take the utmost 
precautions to stay in this one. '27 "I believe that those of sound 
mind and judgement can, in advance, declare their intention of no 
longer causing suffering to those who are round about them, the 
intention being that they should relieve the doctor of the require-
ment to go on prescribing the kind of drugs which will just keep 
going the mechanism from which life in any real sense has long since 
departed." 28 
These comments drew the response from Lord MOwbray that:-
"I do not, I must confess, subscribe to the philosophy expressed by 
the noble Lord, Lord Soper, that because Heaven is round the corner 
we are entitled to take short cuts to get there." 29 
All three attempts at legislation were decisively rejected by the 
House of Lords. 
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4. . Recent Theological Conunent 
An Anglican contribution to the debate on euthanasia can be seen in 
the pamphlet 'On Dying Well.' The chapter on 'Theological Consider-
ations' shows much of the recent Anglican thought on the subject. 
It first examines the traditional approach of appealing to a body 
of moral teaching derived from Scriptures or Natural Law. It 
defines natural law as that aspect of divine eternal law which 
concerns human beings and which is capable of rational discovery. 
It points out that even on such a traditional basis such moral 
teaching has to be interpreted and clarified, and then applied to 
new problems and situations as they arise. There has been a reaction, 
it claims, away from such moral rules towards looking more at general 
principles of Christianity. Thus man's life can be seen as a gift 
and a calling from God. He holds it in trust and should respond to 
the demanding love of God. He has a divinely offered future and 
destiny. 
The contribution continues this line of thought by examining the 
doctrine of God as creator. It then attempts to balance underlying 
assumptions of the doctrine with the call to exercise responsibly 
the freedom· which the doctrine implies. Hence on the one hand there 
is the assumption that it is not for us to determine the bounds of 
our mortal life, yet this may be balanced by, say, responsible 
parenthood, or the use of drugs to control pain even at the risk of 
shortening life. How can such moral issues be determined? The authors 
f . d . Vc\tWt~ f h "1" . appear to 1n an answer 1n a ¥&I1CLJ o t e ut1 1tar1an argument. 
It is not one which I find consistent or theologically sound. Their 
argument goes like this. A respect for God's creation will seek to 
minimise destruction. However in an imperfect world some destruction 
is inevitable:-
"Destruction will be morally justifiable only if the good sought 
outweighs the evil done and only if that good cannot be secured 
in any other less destructive way." 30 
Hence although animal life may be taken it is seldom justified to take 
human life: -
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·~ere there are other means available of exercising care and 
compassion towards a person in his dying and of relieving his 
ultimate distress, respect for God's creation and for the 
consequent value of human life in general would tell against 
the practice of euthanasia, or direct killing." 31 
The authors themselves admit the extreme relative nature of the 
argument. More radical utilitarians could argue that such a 
doctrine of creation was too static, that man has freedom to create 
new values or that a greater good occurs if a miserable life is ended 
rather than allowed to linger on. 
There is a useful examination of the theology of death -
"the Christian •••• accepts death as that signal occasion when he is 
finally to prove the love and power of God in Christ. He sees 
death as the last and crucial occasion for that testing of his 
faith when victory is to be won in Christ and his redemption is 
fulfilled." 32 
However the dialectical approach continues:-
"It might be replied that the reality of our ultimate dependence 
upon God is not impugned by the responsible exercise of our freedom 
of choice, even when it comes to our dying •.• If my disintegration 
as a human being occurs before death, is there still any sense in 
speaking of my dying as either action or passion, self-determination 
or waiting on God?" 33 
Against this it is pointed out that human life is more than just 
pleasure and pain, that suffering is part of being human and dying 
may be integrated into life, and also that euthanasia is incompatible 
with the caring and trust of human relationships. 
As a final approach in the chapter the authors examine the basis of 
Jesus' moral teaching in the statement 
"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, 
do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." 
and in the commandment to love your neighbour as yourself. The 
conclusion is not surprisingly reached that 
195 
"It is difficult in the face of these corrnnandments to maintain 
either the moral position that euthanasia is always and absolutely 
forbidden, or the moral position that it is always permissible." 34 
The chapter ends by admitting there may be extreme and unusual cases 
in which euthanasia is morally legitimate but there is no case for 
abandoning the simple moral principle that innocent human life is 
sacred and no case for altering the law. 
"It is often expedient to forbid by law acts which are thought morally 
blameless. Such acts might include some cases of euthanasia, if, 
although they were held to be morally permissible, the making of 
them legal were likely to result in practice in the legalising of 
other acts as well which the law should be seeking to prevent." 35 
The mixture of expediency, utilitarianism and relativism with the 
doctrines of creation and redemption provide a rather dazzling array 
of arguments. At the beginning of the chapter the natural right 
approach was criticised because of 'the variety of conclusions which 
may be drawn from such data'. The author's arguments have hardly 
improved on such a situation - although their findings in the end are 
of a similar nature. The variety of conclusions possible from many 
of their arguments does not inspire confidence as to a sound theol-
ogical base. Interestingly their final base - that of 'a good and 
simple moral principle that innocent life is sacred' has returned 
full circle to the principle of natural law as revealed. Unless 
there is such a sound and overriding principle the case against 
euthanasia may go by default. However even under a utilitarian 
premiss the criteria employed should not be confined to those 
immediately affected. The possible wider effects on society should 
also be assessed - including loss of confidence in the medical 
profession and possible 'knock on' effects of a diminishing value to 
human life. 
Arising from this a further cause for concern in the Anglican theo-
logical discussion can be seen in the recent speech of the Archbishop 
of Canterbury to the Royal Society of Medicine and widely reported in 
the press on December 14th 1976. While stressing the generally 
accepted principles that it is wrong to prolong a life at any cost 
and recommending a healthier attitude to dying and more specialised 
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facilities, Dr. Coggan, while stopping short of advocating euthanasia, 
came close to doing so by his use of the utilitarian argument:-
"The resources of the national exchequer are not limitless, and the 
prolongation of the life of one aged patient may in fact entail the 
deprivation of aid to others and even the shortening of their lives. 
Nor are beds in hospitals limitless, and the extension of the life 
of a terminal patient may necessarily involve the suffering or even 
death of those who, if speedily admitted to hospital treatment, may 
have many years of useful life ahead of them." 
Dr. Coggan asserted that 
"the doctor has a responsibility to his immediate patient, to other 
patients, to the Government and his fellow taxpayers who provided 
the resources to keep the health service going." 36 
By adopting such crude utilitarian arguments Dr. Coggan is not only 
balancing a life against a life but is also balancing a life again5t 
social and political considerations. Bishop Ramsey's comment 
quoted above· is pertinent:-
"euthanasia is likely to be particularly hazardous in the case of 
alleged social or (dare I say?) political desirability.'·' 
Even balancing a life against a life can hardly be sound theological 
reasoning for lowering the standards of treatment. Great dangers can 
be seen to flow from this argument in the case of respirator depend-
ent non-responsive patients whose organs would be usefUl for transplant, 
let alone the impression given to elderly sick patients that they are 
better rid of so the money used in treating them could be used on 
younger, more viable patients. Dr. Coggan also laid great stress on 
leaving patients to doctors' skill and wisdom, and keeping the law 
out of this area. If doctors did take cognisance of social and 
political factors and did not thereby treat patients they would, in 
. Q(.'t\o- . . fact, run a strong r1sk of Pf!e~eel:!t:ten for negligence. The B.M.A. 
have rightly rejected any social or political criteria:-
"Doctors, in their treatment of patients - whether they are in the 
terminal phase of disease or otherwise, should be guided by knowledge 
and conscience. They should not be expected to add to their judgement 
the words "How much does it cost?" 37 
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The Times in a leader commented:-
"Both medical ethics and clinical practice concerning the dying 
must be rooted in consideration of how best to care for the patient, 
to effect his recovery or prolong his useful life if that is possible; 
to ease his dying if it is not. That consideration should never 
become overlaid by judgements about the social utility, return on 
capital resources employed, or cost/benefit, of the alternative courses 
open to the patient's doctor. The resources at his disposal may be 
a matter of administrative policy. His use of them is not." 
The Roman Catholic theological contribution dates from the allocution 
of Pius XII to a congress of anaesthetists on the 24th November 1957. 
This distinguished between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' medical or 
surgical procedures. Here immediately we are involved in casuistry. 
'Ordinary' in this context does not mean what a medical man would 
regard as 'normal' treatment- it means whatever a patient can obtain 
and undergo without thereby imposing an excessive burden on himself 
or others. 'Extraordinary' treatment has been defined as 
"whatever here and now is very costly or very unusual or very painful, 
or very difficult or very dangerous, or if the good effects that can 
be expected from its use are not proportionate to the difficulty and 
inconverti.€mce that are entailed." 
A man, according to this argument has a moral obligation to submit 
to 'ordinary' means of preserving life and health but is not bound 
to accept 'extraordinary' means unless he has some special obligation 
to stay alive. Such reasons have been described elsewhere as first 
that the patient is not spiritually prepared for death or that the 
patient's existence is of vital importance for the common good. 
The above argument seems to be deficient on several counts. It clearly 
involves casuistry in distinguishing between 'ordinary' and 'extra-
ordinary' treatments. The casuistry is based on moral not medical 
grounds - the doctor seems unreasonably excluded from the delibera-
tions. Much of the reasoning is based on yet another variety of 
the utilitarian argument weighing the good effects against the 
difficulty and inconvenience entailed. However although the latter 
•Y.•~\ 
can be fairly accurately measured, the former carmot. Who can ~
good effects in the future? Finally the papal allocution lays too 
much emphasis on the family of the patient. It does not say, in 
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the case of artificial respiration that it may be withdrawn if a 
doctor comes to the conclusion that permanent resuscitation is 
impossible. Rather it makes all turn on whether or not the continued 
use of the apparatus would impose an excessive burden on the family 
of the patient. Thus medical opinion on either option could be 
overruled. If the death of the patient is seen as a necessary 
means of relief to the family this quite plainly seems to be a form 
of euthanasia. So it can be concluded:-
"On the whole the distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' 
treatment and treatment that is excessively burdensone does not 
seem to be the most helpful approach to the problem under consider-
ation. It is more in keeping with the realities of the situation 
to regard artificial respiration, not as a distinct means of 
'preserving life', but simply as the basis for a complex attempt 
at resuscitation. Then if the position is reached where the patient 
remains incurably unconscious and incapable of respiration and 
circulation without artificial aid, it may be said that the attempt 
at resuscitation has decisively failed, with the implication that 
the apparatus involved in the attempt may licitly be laid aside." 39 
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5. The role of the law in the debate on voltmtary euthanasia 
~ ... ,~~.. 
In manyways persistent attempts at legislation to 8Rabl8 voltmtary 
euthanasia have seriously weakened the standing and role of the law 
in the area of medical ethics. The Hippocratic Oath clearly maintains 
a duty upon the doctor to preserve life. Faced with attempts at 
permissive and potentially dangerous legislation the medical 
profession and others have strongly reacted against the law having 
any part whatsoever. The comment (supra) of Lord Amulree - a 
distinguished geriatrician - is typical of many throughout the 
debate:-
"Teaching, training and experience are better than law and, for 
goodness sake let us keep the law out of the relationship between 
doctor and patient!" 
In part this is entirely understandable and any lawyer would agree 
with the conclusion of the working party that produced 'On Dying 
Well' that the law is a rather bltmt instrument to be operating in 
this area. However that report does see a positive role for the law 
as it now stands. 
The comment of Lord Amulree and those with similar views cannot be 
taken at their face value. The law can no more be kept out of the 
relationship between doctor and patient than it can out of any other 
contractual or statutory relationship. Doctors have no divine right 
to be above the law any more than any other profession, or the trade 
unions. A comparison with the position of the trades unions vis a vis 
the law is perhaps instructive. Whilst the trades unions operate 
within a framework of the law they have considerable freedom to 
negotiate within this framewor~ Attempts at strict legal regulation 
\ "1\ 
in the Industrial Relations Act failed. There are some areas of life 
where strict legal regulation is either unhelpful or inappropriate. 
There must be a large area of discretion within the botmdaries of a 
legal framework. The bargaining activities of the trade unions may 
be one such area, the professional duties of the medical profession 
another. In the case of the medical profession there must obviously 
be a wide discretion as to the most appropriate treatment for a 
particular patient. The relationship between doctor and patient is 
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founded on mutual trust. Increasing the opportunities of litigation 
would do much to undermine such trust. 
However a framework of law there must be. This is not only to guard 
against criminal or negligent treatment by doctors or the encourage-
ment of suicide by relatives, it is also in recognition of the 
important legal consequences that result from a death. Death clearly 
~•c'"'~~ 
nullifies some contracts and esaets others. The moment or cause of 
c.. ...... ,"'~ 
death may be of relevance to ~ crimesl (as for example in the 40 ~ 
Wilkinson case). Death is in many ways as important a legal event 
as it is a medical one. It is unfortunate if harmful attempts at 
legislation result in the law being seen as the villain of the piece 
and in a reaction towards the other direction of 'leaving it all to 
the doctors.' 
The crucial area is, of course, what form this framework of law 
-"'~~ o.."""'o"·'~ 
should take. It has been argued with g~sat ~e?s~B~fl that the 
existing framework of law is about right. It errs on the side of 
caution - we have seen that the strict letter of the law is modified 
in current practice to enable the administration of pain killing 
drugs which may shorten life, providing this is not the purpose of 
their administration. It clearly upholds the sanctity of life and 
the doctor's duty to attempt a cure or relieving treatment. It gives 
no right or liberty to the patient or his relatives to demand or 
request voluntary euthanasia either at the time of the distress or 
prospectively for the future should certain criteria exist. Rather 
the responsibility is clearly on the doctor to act in the patient's 
best interests. The common law has always maintained that this does 
not include deliberately ending the patient's life, while supporting 
the doctor in decisions in the patient's best interests which may 
incidentally shorten his life. In relation to the vast majority of 
situations in which the question of euthanasia might arise it is 
submitted that the existing common law is sufficient, developing if 
necessary by case law according to the principles mentioned above. 
This basic framework of law should be supported and defended both 
against those who would introduce permissive legislation and those 
who would abandon legal constraints altogether and leave the vital 
area of treatment of the dying devoid of legal consequences. An 
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unholy similarity between the practical effects of both extremes 
should not be allowed to alter the present legal framework or a 
reasoned extension of it through precedent. The contributions of 
the major theologians examined in this study will be seen to support 
such a position. 41 
However, as has already been indicated in this chapter, there are 
particular difficulties which arise when the issue of euthanasia is 
\.. 'o... ~"· related to advanced medical technology. StatHteyY ~egislationlto 
govern some of this technology has proved essential (eg. Human Tissue 
Act 1961). Old common law assumptions about the moment death occurs 
have been called into question. Thus the very existence of life in 
the patient may be in doubt - for example when crucial brain stem 
functions have ceased. Because of the complexity of the legal and 
moral problems in this area a separate chapter has been devoted to it. 
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LIFE AND DEATII - SOME LEGAL PROBLEMS CONNECI'ED Willi ADVANCED 
MEDICAL 1ECHNOLOGY 
The advances in medical technology over the last twenty years are so 
C.O.\A~~ 
considerable that they ~ problems far beyond the domestic sphere 
of the medical profession. Some of the issues raised necessitate 
comments or clarification from the lawyer, the theologian and the 
ethical humanist. Academically these issues are exciting because of 
their inter-disciplinary nature but they are also of supreme practical 
relevance dealing as they do with man's greatest gift and his greatest 
surrender. 
Because of the complexity of the issues and of their inter-disciplinary 
nature there is a constant need for clear and careful definitions. 
I wish therefore to attempt to distinguish medically between different 
categories of cases and then to spell out the legal responsibilities 
~ .... ct.s QW4ag to each. At one end of the scale there is the doctor's clear 
duty to his patient. The patient is entitled to rely on the doctor's 
professional competence for treatment in his best interests. If the 
doctor intentionally or negligently falls short of this standard ~ 
criminal, civil and disciplinary action may be brought against him. 
The doctor is criminally liable if he hastens the death of the patient 
following the patient's own wishes. Voluntary euthanasia is still 
illegal despite attempts of some humanists to the contrary. The doctor 
is, however, quite entitled to administer drugs to a patient to reduce 
pain, although those drugs may incidentally shorten his .life. The 
purpose of the drugs is in the patient's interest in reducing pain -
they are not intended to shorten life, although this may be their 
effect. 
So far the relationship between doctor and patient is quite clear. 
It has assumed that the patient, although sick, is quite clearly alive 
and possesses the qualities of a human life - thought, feeling, 
expression etc. There is quite clearly a new situation where the 
patient cannot automatically be considered as a human person. Let us 
take a hypothetical example:-
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"A man aged about fifty lies in a coma. He has been in this condition 
for about six months, without sight, hearing, understanding or capacity 
for voluntary movement or response - without apparent awareness of 
being at all. The vital functions of the heart, of breathing and of 
digestion continue. So far as is known, he will never regain 
consciousness, never recover: there is no known medical remedy for 
his condition. He is kept as he is by constant and skilled nursing 
care: he is fed artificially, kept warm and clean, and is moved as 
often as is necessary for his well-being. Withdrawal of this essential 
care would result in his death, as surely as if he were given a lethal 
dose of poison. 11 1 
Such a man is quite clearly alive and independent of any medical 
technology. His life cannot be said to be human in the nonnally 
accepted sense - but it is an obvious life. This being so there is 
a clear legal duty for everyday care and attention - however demanding 
this may be. Again doctors and nurses are liable criminally and 
civilly for intentional or negligent omissions. However, the situation 
is changed if anything more than nursing care is required. Suppose 
our example is attacked by pneumonia. This may well end his life. 
The doctor has a possible remedy in antibiotics. The law has left 
this decision to the doctor's medical judgement. It is most unlikely 
that he would be liable in negligence for not administering the 
antibiotic. Not to administer is undoubtedly the standard medical 
practice in such cases. The law while recognising the value of life 
does not impose upon.the doctor in such a situation the duty to strive 
~" \'•"''-\ 
officiously to keep~alive. tae ~~t~eftt. The patient is entitled to 
ordinary nursing care and no more. 
We now come to the most complex area of doctor/patient relationship. 
There are patients who in addition to being deeply unaonscious are· 
also dependent upon a respirator for breathing. We must at once 
distinguish these cases from the case, say, of a polio patient who is 
dependent upon a respirator but otherwise is a fully conscious and 
functioning human being. The case in question is both deeply uncon- : 
scious and also incapable of functioning without elaborate machinery 
and constant skilled vigilance. There seem to be three reasons why 
a person might be attached to a respirator when in an apparently 
irreversible position of unconsciousness. The first is when it is 
known that the position is reversible. The second is when the doctor 
wishes to give himself time to find out whether the position is 
reversible or not. The third is when the possibility of organ trans-
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plantation is involved. The organ of the donor must naturally still 
be capable of functioning if the recipient is to benefit from it. 
The whole area of organ transplantation is of vital significance 
and we will see that many moral and legal problems are raised by 
it. However it is plain both in medical ethics and in law (The 
Human Tissue Act 1961) that the donor must be pronounced dead before 
an organ can be removed for transplantation. The difficulty arises 
over the criteria for death. Naturally this is of vital importance 
not· only in possible transplant situations but also where there is no 
question of a transplant. Again medical ethics demand that the machine 
is not switched off until the patient is pronounced dead. There is 
no legal obligation to keep the patient in a state of suspended death 
for years, possibly decades - nor are there many humanists or theol-
ogians who would support such a travesty. The difficulty in both 
cases is in what constitutes death. Not only are the above medical 
consequences at stake. Legal consequences may also be at stake. The 
case of Potter (The Times, 26 July 1963) illustrates this. 
A useful summary of this case is given in 'Decisions about Life and 
Death':-
''Mr. Potter was admitted to hospital after he had received four 
fractures of the skull and extensive brain damage from a fall in a 
street fight. On June 16, 1963, fourteen hours after admission he 
stopped breathing. 'Artificial respiration was then begun by machine 
so that one of his kidneys could later be taken for transplanting 
in another man. After twenty hours of artificial respiration a 
kidney was taken from the body on June 17. The respirator was then 
turned off and there was no spontaneous breathing or circulation.' 
At what moment did he die? When the hopeless position was reached 
on June 16, or when the respiritor was switched off on June 17? 
At inquest til July, a doctor attached to the hospital gave his opinion 
that the man had virtually died when he stopped breathing on June 16, 
though from a legal point of view he might have died when circulation 
ceased and the heart stopped beating on the 17th - ie. when the 
respirator was switched off. A pathologist testified that death was 
due to head injuries, and that the removal of the kidney played no 
part in it. The consultant neurologist who obtained the wife's 
consent to the removal of the kidney said that he was told the patient 
was technically dead. The coroner, who had also given his consent in 
accordance with the Human Tissue Act 1961, Sl(S), had supposed when 
he did so that the kidney would be taken after the man's death; 
though he is reported also to have said that he thought the patient 
was alive when the kidney was removed, although there was no hope for 
him, but he did not regard the doctors as having committed any offence. 
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The jury on the evidence, returned a verdict of manslaughter against 
the man said to have been involved with the patient in the fight; 
and in the Magistrates Court this man was afterwards convicted on 
a reduced charge of connnon assault." 2 
This case illustrates well the state of confusion'. in the early 60's. 
It also illustrates the legal complexities that may arise unless the 
moment of death is clearly determined. Similar legal questions that 
~~,(~\.A~ 
could arise are mentioned in an articlekshortly after this case -
for example 'Did P. a legatee survive a testator?' 'Did P. a joint 
tenant survive his co-tenant?' Did P. a beneficiary with a contingent 
interest survive until he attained a vested interest?' 3 
Much work has been done since this time on a new definition of death 
- the old one based on heart and circulation is plainly inadequate. 
The new concept employed is that of 'brain death'. The first comp-
rehensive attempt at defining this came from America and is known 
as the Harvard Criteria. In Britain a statement was issued on the 
11th October 1976 by the Conference of the Medical Royal Colleges 
and Faculties on the diagnosis of brain death. This stated:-
"It is agreed that permanent functional death of the brain stem 
constitutes brain death and that once this has occurred further 
artificial support is fruitless and should be withdrawn." 4 
It then lays down stringent medical criteria to establish that there 
is irremediable structural brain damage. These include a series of 
clinical tests, particularly of brain stem function - eg. the pupils 
are fixed in diameter and do not respond to sharp changes in intensity 
of incident light, no corneal reflex, no motor responses etc., no 
respiration when the patient is disconnected from the mechanical 
ventilator for a sufficient length of time. Experienced clinicians 
are to make these tests - only when the diagnosis is in doubt is it 
necessary to consult a neurologist or neurosurgeon. Before artificial 
support is withdrawn there must be the consent either of a consultant 
who is in charge of the case and one other doctor or in the absence of 
a consultant his deputy, who should have been registerej~five years 
or more and who should have had adequate experience in the cure of 
such cases plus one other doctor. 
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Reaction to these clear criteria have been varied. The British 
Medical Journal is strong in their support:-
"It sets out clear guidelines for the diagnosis of death, including 
a recommendation that the decision to withdraw artificial support 
should be taken by two doctors. There is a consensus of opinion 
throughout the western world on the diagnosis of brain death. Perhaps 
we may now see an end to uninformed comment on this topic." 5 
However The Lancet is more equivocal. While recognising the need for 
criteria it is not happy about some of the safeguards. Because of the 
importance of the individual doctor's opinion it comments:-
"Doubts will still be raised about the wisdom of nominating as the 
deputy for an absent consultant a doctor who may have been registered 
for no more than five years, even with the proviso that he shall have 
had 'adequate experience."' 
In an important passage it also raises the question of organ 
transplantation:-
"As the law of Britain stands a person is dead when a doctor states 
that he is dead - there is no indication of how a doctor should reach 
that conclusion. We are now moving towards a diagnosis of death in 
patients whose hearts are still beating. In contrast to the old 
criteria of death - persistent absence of respiration and circulation, 
with fragmentation of blood in retinal veins - the new criteria 
depend heavily on the opinion of the doctor in charge of the patient 
with his knowledge of all the circumstances. 
Among transplant surgeons the beating-heart donor will be greatly in 
demand; and at times those who care for brain-damaged patients may 
find themselves under pressure to diagnose brain death. But, if 
public confidence is to be sustained the existence, say, of a well 
matched organ recipient, in the same hospital and in dire need, is 
not one of the circumstances that should be taken into account. In 
the diagnosis of brain death the doctor's loyalties must be undivided 
- and conspicuously so." 6 
Supporters of the 'brain death' criteria would, however, no doubt 
claim that the definition is as objective as possible in the circum-
stances. In a borderline case where there is some slight reaction to 
the stimuli, the patient cannot be pronounced brain dead if the guide-
lines are followed and the patient's life cannot be valued against that 
of a potential recipient of one of his organs. He is entitled to be 
kept on the respirator and given ordinary nursing care until such time 
as brain death occurs. 
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A more radical challenge to the guidelines can be seen in an article 
by Adrienne Van Till-d'Aulnis de Bourouill entitled 'How Dead Can You 
be?' 7 Although this was written in 1975 before the Royal Colleges' 
guidelines it criticises strongly the Harvard approach which heavily 
influenced the British guidelines in methodology and content. The 
author's thesis is that juridicial acceptance ·of the doctor's dilemma 
makes cessation of artificial respiration lawful, provided that the 
patient had validly refused this treatment or is irreversibly coma-
tose and also respirator-dependent. This, however, makes it 
unnecessary to redefine death in terms of coma in order to solve 
legal and practical problems. Such a redefinition is against current 
usage and is the first step on a slippery road. The author cites 
the case reported in The Times on 16th March 1974 of a Birmi.ri.gham 
64 year old pedestrian who was fatally injured. After he had been 
declared dead artificial respiration was continued in order to 
preserve his organs for transplantation. While his kidneys were 
being removed he made movements. The anaesthetist turned off the 
respirator, the patient coughed, swallowed and began to breathe. He 
was returned to intensive care and died 15 hours later. His kidneys 
were then removed. The author believes that someone who is nearly 
dead is morally, legally and medically still considered to be alive. 
For brain death all brain function, that is to say all function of 
all neurones in the whole brain, must have ceased completely and 
irreversibly:-
"To accept an irreversible but less than total loss of brain function 
as a criterion for death is to accept an arbitrary interpretable 
criterion for death which can vary with personal opinion and with 
present day practical requirements. The fact that such a variable 
criterion provides an easy and inexpensive solution for many practical 
problems does not make it ethically or j uridicially acceptable." 
The author believes the empirical method of testing, such as used in 
the Harvard criteria (and now in the Royal Colleges) is not conclusive:-
"No response does not prove unawareness of the stimulus. As long as 
intact neurones with synapses exist in the brain, the receipt, passage 
and reaction of stimuli is not with certainty impossible, even where 
no response is outwardly detectable." 
The author prefers the Austro-German diagnosis of brain death based 
Zll 
on an absence of intracranial blood circulation. In the Royal 
Colleges' report this was held to be not required. Clearly we are 
here in the realms of technical medicine. A layman is not entitled 
to pass judgement. If, however, there are more stringent criteria 
such as the author seems to suggest, he is entitled to ask for further 
comment. The author, interestingly, proposes both a rigid definition 
of death as well as legal immunity for withdrawal of artificial 
support in clearly specified cases:-
"To accept a differentiation in ethics is a better solution than to 
allow doctors to redefine death in terms of coma." 
This would give legal status to irreversibly comatose individuals 
who would still be alive under the author's definition until the 
-
respir)tor was turned off. It would also stop the risk of being 
pronounced dead and used as an organ donor while possibly still having 
some awareness. The Harvard criteria would be sufficient justification 
for stopping the respirator lawfully. But only then, when all brain 
neurones had lost their structure could transplantation take place. 
Despite this debate it is now clear that the Royal Colleges' guidelines 
on 'brain death' are recognised as valid in law. This was established 
by the verdict of a Bradford inquest on Feburary 22nd. 1978 in the 
case of Carol Wilkinson. Carol Wilkinson was the victim of a savage 
sexual assault and found with severe head injuries. Shortly after 
her arrival in hospital she was put on a ventilator to assist her 
breathing. The Royal Colleges' guidelines on brain death were applied 
by consultant physicians. They pronounced her as brain dead and 
withdrew the ventilator. The inquest had to decide whether Carol's 
death was directly attributable to her attacker, or whether it was 
caused by the removal of the ventilator. The jury decided that she 
was unlawfully killed by a person or persons unknown and died from 
bruising of the brain and a fracture of the skull. They thereby 
agreed with the doctors that she was already dead when the ventilator 
was removed. It seems unlikely that such a ruling would be overturned 
at a later date by a higher court. 
The whole question of the relationship to the law of murder of 
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witholding or withdrawing life-support measures has been dealt with 
8 in a recent article by P.D.G. Skegg. With regard to witholding such 
measures he comments:-
"There is now general agreement that a doctor need not provide, or 
continue to provide, artificial ventilation for a patient whose 9. 
brain is damaged to an extent which prevents a return to consciousness." 
It is unlikely that any statutory duty would apply and:-
"As the doctor will not be in breach of his duty of care under the 
tort of negligence in omitting to provide artificial ventilation 
where a patient is irreversibly comatose, there should not be any 
question of his being in breach of any duty imposed by the law of 
homicide." 10 
The situation with regard to the withdrawal of artificial ventilation 
is somewhat more complicated according to Skegg. He discusses whether 
such a withdrawal constitutes an 'act' or an 'omission' - a distinction 
of fundamental importance within the law of homicide. 
However, he makes the point that even if such a withdrawal is regarded 
as an 'act' within the law of homicide, this does not necessarily mean 
that liability for murder would descend upon the doctor. It is possible 
to adopt and develop Lord Devlin's view that "proper medical treatment 
consequent upon illness and injury play no part in legal causation." 
It is possible to utilise the doctrine of necessity. However, a more 
likely course is that indicated in the Wilkinson case discussed above 
- namely that the patient is already dead when the machine is switched 
off. Such an approach seems far preferable to another possibility 
discussed by Skegg - that of fitting a device to life support machines 
to ensure that the termination of the support would be an 'omission' 
in law rather than an 'act' • 
Interestingly in America, far from considering the criteria for 'brain 
death' as an accepted norm the case of Re Quinlan 79 A.L.R. 3d 205 
in effect dismissed them as too stringent. Here Karen Quinlan, although 
comatose and described as never able to be restored to cognitive or 
sapient life, quite clearly did not fulfil the criteria for 'brain 
death' having shown some clinical response to stimuli. Hence the 
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doctors refused to remove her from the ventilator. Her father re-
quested that because of her condition he be appointed as guardian 
and receive authorisation for the termination of the extraordinary 
medical means used in sustaining her life. In granting such a right 
to the father it was held that if the attending physicians concluded 
there was no reasonable possibility of her ever emerging from her 
comatose condition the life support apparatus should be discontinued 
after necessary consultations. No civil or criminal liability 
would ensue., During his judgement Hughes C.J. did not accept that 
the 'brain death' criteria were standard practice in determining the 
removal of life support systems. He commented:-
"Humane decisions against resuscitative or maintenance therapy are 
frequently a recognised de facto response in the medical world to 
the irreversible, terminal, pain-ridden patient, especially with 
familial consent. And these cases, of course, fall far short of 
'brain death." 
His decision was supported by the Roman Catholic Church according 
to the principle of double effect. In this sense it was distinguished 
from euthanasia. 
It .is submitted that Re Quinlan goes far beyond the present position 
in the United Kingdom, the brain-death principles having been accepted 
in the Wilkinson inquest case. Despite the dramatic judicial order 
to override medical judgement in Re Quinlan Karen Quinlan is still 
alive. When her ventilator was removed she began breathing of her 
own accord. 
In the Wilkinson case there was no question oftransplants being 
involved. We have already commented that this is vitally connected 
with the question of brain death and have emnnerated it as one of 
the possible reasons for being placed on a ventilator. We will now 
consider in more detail the law as it relates to transplants. 
The key statute is the Human Tissue Act 1961. This made it legally 
possible for the first time for doctors to use every part of the 
deceased person's body for therapeutic purposes as long as the speci-
fied criteria have been met. The most straightforward situation is 
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where the deceased made a formal request that organs be used from his 
body. By S.l(l) this must be a request in writing or orally in the 
presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness. Such 
consent can subsequently be withdrawn. Relatives have no legal right 
to veto such a request unless they are in the position of a person 
lawfully in possession of the body (this will normally be the hospital 
if the patient dies in hospital). If there has been no such request 
the provisions of S.l(2) operate. These entitle the person lawfully 
in possession of the body to transplant material providing a) there 
is no reason to believe that the deceased expressed an objection and 
b) the surviving spouse or any surviving relatives have given their 
consent. The ~ct specifies a positive duty to make reasonable inquiry. 
The consent of the coroner is only required where there is reason to 
believe that an inquest may be required. Inquests are required when 
there has been a violent or unnatural death or a sudden death of 
unknown cause (Coroners Act 1887 S.3/l). A post mortem may be ordered 
(Coroners Amendment Act 1926 S.21). Hence in many motoring accidents 
the coroner's consent would be required. There is some evidence that 
11 
attitudes of individual coroners vary. 
The Human Tissue Act has been strongly criticised from various quarters. 
Section 1(2) dealing with objections has been described as vague. It 
is not always clear who is in lawful possession, nor what reasonable 
enquiry is, nor how far' any surviving relative' extends. It has been 
held by the ~mclennon Committee (1969) and by the British Transplant-
ation Society (1975) that the provisions for contracting-in prejudice 
the living but sick in favour of the dead. In particular the British 
Transplantation Society propose an amendment with the words 'in the 
time available' which would make any real enquiry as to the deceased's 
wishes and the wishes of the relatives impossible. However criticism 
from the opposite standpoint is as vocal:-
"There is still a substantial body of public op1n1on, particularly 
among those who hold particular religous beliefs, that the law should 
be written so as to give proper opportunity for the objections of those 
opposed to the removal of organs for transplant to be sought out and 
respected. This being so it is all the more important to determine 
whether the existing law not only provides this opportunity but also 
provides appropriate legal redress if it is denied." 12 
215 
The latter point about lack of legal redress has been made in several 
13 14 
articles. It was first made by the New Zealand barrister P.D.G. Skegg. 
~~d ... 
He questions 9ft ·;;hat legal basis liability would arise if cadaveric 
transplant material was not removed in accordance with the Human Tissue 
Act 1961. After careful analysis he claims that there are no recog-
nised torts which would normally be applicable. Neither does the Act 
specifically invoke any criminal sanctions. It does not expressly 
create an offence. The possibility of the common law offence of 
disobeying a statute seems to be ruled. out by S.l (8) which provides 
that nothing in the section shall be construed as rendering unlawful 
any dealing with a body which is lawful apart from the Act. Mr. Skegg iwhf'"'~ --~'·'~ after analysis cannot ~taRe any other crime to cover this situation. 
On the contrary a possible justification for removal of material might 
be founded on the doctrine of necessity:-
"The safety of human lives belongs to a different scale of values than 
the safety of property ••.. the necessity for saving life has at all 
times been considered a proper ground for inflicting such damage as 
may be necessary upon another's property." Southport Corp v Esso 
Petroleum [1956] AC 218, 228, per Devlin J. 
15 
In a further article Mr. Skegg discusses in more detail S.l of the 
Human Tissue Act. He points out that a hospital is lawfully in 
possession of a corpse which lies in a hospital until such time as 
the corpse is claimed by the person with the right to immediate 
possession of it. He again claims that even in the absence of a donor 
card it is sometimes lawful for parts of a co)%se to be removed 
without the spouse or relatives being consulted. That the hospital is 
in lawful possession of a body lying within it was made clear in a 
memorandum on the Act issued by the Ministry of Health. Although in 
the late 60's the Medical Defence Union took a contrary view the govern-
ment has reasserted its position in a recent circular. This is in 
accord with the vast majority of legal opinion. Mr. Skegg also 
examines how far the definition of 'relatives' should extend. The 
original memorandum suggested this in its widest sense whereas the 
recent government circular is more equivocal. He suggests that if 
resources of time and manpower are scarce no enquiry might be reason-
able and practical and hence in accord with the Act. 
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While acknowledging the significant loopholes Mr. Skegg has exposed 
in the Human Tissue Act he is taken issue with by another barrister 
- Ian McColl Kennedy~ 7 Mr. Kennedy suggests a possible tort for 
unauthorised removal of material in the tor~,of negligently causing 
~~'0''1 
nervous shock. If the doctor could have~forseen such shock he may 
well be liable. The doctor would owe a duty to the plaintiff where 
he knew there were relatives but did not contattthem- it would 
probably be otherwise if the person complaining was not known or 
could not easily have become known (Bourhill v Young [1943] AC92). 
The damage suffered must not be too remote. No action would lie for 
mere grief and sorrow. There must be some 'recognisable psychiatric 
illness.' (Hinz v Berry [1970] lA.E.R. 1074)- although of course 
anxiety and depression can be psychiatric. He suggests another 
possible tort in the tort of breach of statutory duty. Here the duty 
is imposed in S.l(2). The person to whom the duty is owed may bring 
an action. The ham suffered must be of the kind the statute was 
intended to prevent - it could be held that S.l(2) was designed to 
prevent nervous shock. If the breach of duty caused the injury an 
action may well succeed. In respect of criminal liability Mr. Kennedy 
believes Mr. Skegg has passed over the common law offence of disobeying 
a statute too lightly. He cites the case of~ v Lennox-Wright [1973] 
C.L.R. 529. Here D. who had failed medical exams abroad gained 
admission to an opthalmic department by forged documents. He removed 
eyes from a cadaver for further use in another hospital. He was 
charged under S.l(4) of the Human Tissue Act 1961 with not being a 
registered medical practitioner. It was argued that the Act was 
regulatory and created no offence. The Court held a) that all acts 
or omissions against statute are misdemeanours at common law punishable 
on indictment b) The common law offence of disobeying a statute here 
applied. Kennedy admits that this case may be criticised on the basis 
of R v Hall (1891) lQ.B. On balance, however, Kennedy thinks that 
the Lennox-Wright case applies also to breaches of S.l(2). However 
the most telling point that Kennedy makes is as follows:-
'~at has emerged, it is hoped, is how extraordinarily difficult it 
may be actually to guarantee that the fundamental provisions of the 
Human Tissue Act are observed in practice. Such a conclusion should 
not any longer be allowed to pass unnoticed by those charged with 
making and changing the law.'' 
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Similar conclusions were reached in a White Paper on the Human 
18 
Tissue Act. In stressing the need for public confidence it commented:-
"It is axiomatic that the public should be able to feel every 
confidence that the traditional ethical standards enjoining the 
medical and nursing professio~ to treat their patients to the 
best of their abilities are ma1ntained. The trust required by 
the doctor-patient relationship must remain a stable element in 
the situation of change brought about by the development of 
transplantation." 19 
It recognised the uncertainties of the present legal position and 
recommended clear and definite safeguards - eg. that death should 
be certified independently of the transplant team. The majority 
proposed a limited amendment of the Human Tissue Act to clarify 
that the 'person lawfully in possession' is the hospital authority 
during the time between death and when the next of kin or executors 
claim the body, to define the persons who ought to be consulted and 
to define the minimum procedure of enquiry. Of a more contentious 
nature was the majority proposal for the system of 'contracting out' 
whereby surgeons should be able to remove organs unless there were 
definite indications that the deceased had objected. 
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Conclusions 
The complexities of advanced medical teChnology are matched by the 
moral and legal complexities to which they give rise. Here the 
legal complexities have been discussed - these are frequently a 
reflection of the ethical difficulties. 
The definition of death still provokes disagreement, although there 
is now a great degree of uniformity amongst the medical profession 
in this country. It is inextricably bound up with the care owing to 
the patient, his legal status, and the possibility of organ trans-
plantation. The Human Tissue Act 1961 is plainly inadequate as 
anything other than regulatory. It is both ambiguous and lacks 
effective sanctions. If doctor/patient confidence is to be main-
tained in areas of advanced medical technology there is a need for the 
law to provide a clear framework within which the doctor is free to 
exercise his professional skill and judgement. This must reflect a 
deeply moral view of the value of both life and death. The second 
part of this study will reveal the great wealth of insight the Christ-
ian contribution can make. 
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1HE APPLICATION OF 1HE FOREGOING 1HEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS m PRESENT 
DAY ENGLISH LAW 
Implied throughout the earlier part of this study has_been the 
assumption that theologising on the concept of Justice bears some 
relevance to the practicalities of English Law, especially where it 
legislates on ethical or social issues of great rna ment to our 
society. Whereas such an implication would be viewed ·as normal in 
the Middle Ages, in our present pluralistic society with its apparent 
dramatic decline in religious belief and certainly its decline in 
religious observance, such an implication cannot be allowed today 
without a justification. Certainly most practical lawyers and prob-
ably most students of Jurisprudence view theology as a specialist 
domain for the theologian. It is for the benefit of those who believe 
in God - an esoteric discipline far removed from their practical 
concerns. 
This is, indeed, one of the major points at issue in the famous debate 
between Hart and Devlin over the enforcement of morals, many of which 
have been derived from the precepts of the Christian religion. That 
debate has been summarized and evaluated by Mitchell in 'Law, Morality 
and Religion in a Secular Society'. Mitchell is unable to agree with 
Devlin's premiss that the whole of a country's morality is dependent 
upon the Christian religion. However, while agreeing with Hart that 
there are certain moral principles and virtues which have been univer-
sally accepted and do not depend for their validity upon religious 
belief, Mitchell asks the question 'What part ought religion to play 
in the formation of a critical morality?. Unlike those who relegate 
religion into the private sphere, Mitchell maintains that a religious 
interpretation may illuminate the moral platitudes that are accepted,\~~ 
to a deeper understanding of human nature. The Christian religion may 
go beyond the morality of platitudes by providing insights into human 
nature not available to the 'natural man' and so give rise to moral 
insights which are not available to him either. 
If this conclusion is valid it would, therefore, not be surprising if 
within this study reformist attempts not based on a Christian concept 
of Justice were likely to be seen as deficient in some respect from a 
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Christian standpoint. However, before we can attempt any critical 
conclusions it is necessary first to point out in what way there is 
a discernible Christian theology of Justice worked out in twentieth 
century tenns by the theologians examined within this study. Only 
then can we illustrate its practical application to law. 
It is for this reason that the theologians studied in the first part 
of this study have deliberately been drawn from widely differing 
strands of the Christian community. If significant corrunon elements 
can be found from different confessional standpoints, then it is fair 
to talk about a Christian concept of Justice in a modern setting and 
it is reasonable to try to apply conclusions derived from such a 
basis. 
The three-fold nature of the theological exercise must, however, be 
kept in mind. The first and primary level is that of abstract theol-
ogising on the nature of Justice. This itself may well demonstrate 
significant theological developments. The second level concerns 
itself with precepts for man's guidance in practical living and is 
derived from the first level. The third level undertaken in this 
study seeks to apply these precepts to particular legal problems 
faced by a particular legal system at a defined point in time. Such 
an attempt would clearly be discredited should a disparity of con-
clusions be reached in the theology examined. What factors then, can 
we discern in corrunon? 
The first common factor relates to the primary level on the nature of 
Justice itself. All the theologians studied see Justice as emanating 
from God and hence ultimately an absolute value which is inseparable 
1 from the Deity. For BARTH this is seen in terms of the Word of God. 
This has been revealed in Christ, is revealed in holy writ, and is 
being revealed through his Holy Spirit. Justice therefore comes from 
the very nature, or personality of God and must be discerned in concrete 
2 
terms. For TILLICH this is seen in terms of the Divine 'Ground of our 
Being'. Justice is ontological- part of the creative possibilities of 
\'; "\~ 
meaningful life. ~ ontological it cannot be separated from other 
ontological characteristics of the 'Ground of our Being' or God -
namely love and power. All three ontologies illuminate each other. 
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For MARITAIN the highest form of Justice is that which descends from 
the Divine reason. This corresponds to the eternal Divine law in the 
Thomist position. In its purity it cannot be fully understood in 
human terminology, but all human Justice is a striving towards this 
4 ideal. MOL11~ takes his standpoint not so much from ontology as 
from eschatology - the end of all things. Justice is the eschatolo-
gical revelation of God by expressing his eternal purposes for man-
kind. It is both ultimate aim as well as the ground of existence. 
The second common factor relates to our strivings for an expression 
of this Divine Justice in our human affairs. Justice is seen as a 
dynamic concept to whicl1 our strivings, though inadequate, are vital. 
For BARTH Justice in human terms cannot be reached through traditional 
formulations of natural right because of the corrupt nature of human 
reason through sinfulness. Yet neither is Divine Justice totally 
separated from Human Justice as seen by his opposition to the 'Two-
World' doctrine. Rather the Word of God can be discerned in a concrete 
situation and if discerned correctly enlightens the whole of the natural 
order and provides a prophetic imperative. This is the task of the 
Christian community (to be "a wholesome disturbing presence'~ however 
difficult it may be. For TILLICH man is partly estranged from his 
actual being. He needs positive law. Just formulations of this can 
minimise his estrangement, but human Justice whether related to law 
or not cannot be without ambiguities. These he lists and examines. 
MARITAIN follows the Thomist position that man can discover the natural 
right by ascertaining God's will through reason as well as possessing 
revealed law. In examining ontological and gnoseological elements he 
develops a progressive theory on the nature of insight and knowledge. 
For Mari tain natural right presumes human rights which it is the 
Christian duty to formulate and refine while recognising Divine Justice 
is transcendent. ~·ULTMANN expresses this paradox between human and 
Divine Justice in terms of the two strands of his theology - that of 
Hope, and the Cross. The life, death and resurrection of Christ are 
as a cosmic parable on the nature of the human predicament and the 
loving purposes of God. Justice can be worked out in concrete terms 
by relating eschatology to the present- ie. in the light of God's 
eternal purposes what is the just position now? Human sin evidenced by 
the Cross is ever likely to cloud this reasoning. 
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From this striving to express Divine Justice in human affairs positive 
guidelines or precepts can be formulated in relation to practical 
ethical and legal issues. All of the theologians studied, to a greater 
or lesser extent, have applied themselves to this process. Another 
indication of a fundamentally common methodology can be seen in the 
extent to which they agree on a specific moral issue. If there is 
clear disagreement on a moral issue this indicates either a fundamental 
difference in methodology or a defective application from a fundament-
ally common methodology. 
Whatever the degree of uniformity on precepts or guidelines we still 
. - 1 have before us the final stage of this process - the application to 
a concrete set of legal problems at a specified point in time. On 
some occasions the practical guidelines worked out by the theologians 
studied may fit very well into the modern situation. On others they 
may not be directly apposite - in which case the fundamental principles 
and methodology must be resorted to. Yet whatever the conclusions 
reached in human terms the theological method of pursuing Jurisprudence 
postulates that we have never reached the state of ultimate Justice 
until we fully know God. Hence our conclusions always allow the 
possibility of a more perfect expression of Justice - subjecting all 
human endeavours to scrutiny and criticism, ie. the theological approach 
is essentially dynamic. 
As a necessary preliminary to applying the theological concepts studied 
to present-day English law, it is of value to ask the questions 'To 
what extent are theological concepts of Justice still influential in 
the formulation of English law?' and 11 I f they are still influential 
are they compatible with the theological concepts here examined?' 
Bearing in mind what has been said about the status of theology in 
present-day thought it might be thought prima facie that any signifi-
cant influence on the formulation of law is unlikely. However, while 
in overt terms this may well be true, neither agnostic nor atheist can 
ignore tl1e historical fact that Christianity and its teaching has had 
a profound effect on English culture, institutions and moral values .. 
It is this Christian heritage that Devlin relies on so heavily in his 
~ ~'. 
defence of the enforcement of those morals that have become historical 
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'noi111S' in our society. He holds them to be part of the very fabric 
of society itself,aR@ without which society is at serious risk of 
disintegration. Such residual Christian concepts are, of course, 
unlikely in tei111S of theology to be a profound or up-to-date analysis 
such as we have been examining in this study from professional theolo-
gians. Nevertheless we should not forget the influence of such basic 
concepts. 
More consciously the Christian voice in the legislative process is 
heard through the institutional Churches - their commissions, boards 
and deliberative bodies, through independent pressure groups which may 
have a strong Christian motivation and through individual legislators 
who may have a passionate desire to apply their faith. In particular 
the Church of England has a 'built-in' presence in the House of Lords 
in the form of both Archbishops and a number of Bishops. The influence 
of professional theologians may be seen through all of these, but 
perhaps particularly through Christian pressure groups. 
The first question above (ie. 'To what extent are theological concepts 
of Justice still influential in the formulation of English law?'~ was 
asked in a study from an English academic lawyer's point of view. In 
this study he showed Christian influence in the sphere of marriage and 
divorce law reform, abortion and race relations. He concluded that 
"Christian values still constitute a force to be reckoned with in the 
formation of laws in modem Britain." 
However, he quickly qualified this statement:-
"It would be misleading to stop at this point and leave the reader with 
the impression that Christian doctrine was the dominant or even one of 
the most prominent forces in the legislative process in this country 
in this decade. It must be stressed that Britain is not a predominantly 
Christian community in this second half of the 20th. century but a 
pluralistic society •.. Perennial elements in legislative opinion are 
the Aristotelian axiom of equal treatment for equals, which underlies 
much of the above; current morality which is fed from fragments of 
the above; and the lawyers' especial concern for certainty." 6 
Dowricks's survey has now been overtaken by the vast legislative changes 
of the 1970's, some of which have been examined in this study. 
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How far are his conclusions still valid? Are Christian values still 
'a force to be reckoned with?' To answer this question we must briefly 
examine the Christian contribution to the legislation examined in the 
two broad areas of the legal part of this survey - the equality legis-
lation and the legislation concerning issues of the right to life. 
1. The Equality Legislation 
a) Race Relations Legislation_:-
We noted in the Chapter dealing with the vast increase in legislation 
7 
to promote racial equality that the predominant spurs to such a 
strengthening of the law were firstly the loopholes in the old law, 
especially those relating to clubs where Judges gave a restricted 
interpretation to the meaning of 'public'; secondly the fear that unless 
racial tensions were remedied there would be vastly increased racial 
violence and thirdly the current philosophy of equality based more on 
Aristotelian and Utilitarian models than on Christian ones. 
Interestingly in operating a restrictive interpretation of the old 
Race Relations Act 1961 Lord Diplock made a clear distinction between 
a citizen's Christian duty and what the law could be expected to 
enforce:-
"If everyone were rational and humane - or, for that matter, Christian 
- no legal sanction would be needed to prevent one man being treated 
by his fellow men less favourably than another simply on the ground 
of his colour, race or ethnic or national origins. But in the field 
of domestic or social intercourse differentiation in the treatment of 
the individual is unavoidable. No-one has room to invite everyone 
to dinner. The law cannot dictate one's choice of friends. The legal 
process is not adequate to analyse the multifarious and inscrutable 
reasons why a Dr. Fell remains unloved." 8 
Hence while recognising the brotherhood of man in God's creation and 
the moral authority this should have on the individual believer, it 
is possible to claim that the law can only enforce this practically to 
a limited extent. This position is also broadly taken by Lord Hailsham. 
Hin~elf a practising Christian he commented in his speech in the House 
of Lords against the 1976 Race Relations Bill:-
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"One of the major fallacies of our time is that once you have identi-
fied a problem which requires infinite care, and possible courtesy 
between individuals in dealing with it, you improve the situation or 
perhaps solve the problem by passing a law about it or, as in this 
case changing the structure of the law about it. • • When you seek to 
press the law further and seek to intrude into private clubs or small 
shops employing a few persons, or estates with five or six tenants or 
a house with a few lodgers, you are setting yourself an impossible 
task. You are creating rights which it is impossible to protect. 
You are interfering with intimate relations which it is not possible 
to regulate." 9 
On the other hand Lord Denning's extensive interpretation of the old 
law in many of the early cases probably arose from his basic Christian 
ideals. The 1976 Race Relations Bill was broadly supported by the 
Bishops in the Lords. The Bishop of Worcester concluded that the new 
legislation would enable the minority community to feel they belonged 
to the British community. He spoke of the problem of fear, the need 
for local leadership and the need to acknowledge other cultural values. 
His speech was largely practical and pastoral rather than containing 
any profound theological analysis. 10 
Undoubtedly the Race Relations Acts were not strengthened through 
any great Christian pressure but rather through the steady and insist-
ent pressure of the Race Relations Board in their annual reports drawirg 
on the current philosophy of equality, the shortcomings of the inter-
pretation of the old Acts and the dangers, also highlighted by the 
Community Relations Commission, of increased racial violence. Indeed 
Mitchell makes the point that it is usually thought that moral conserv-
atives wish to use law to enforce morality, but the legislation about 
race relations sho~that radicals may be in favour of enforcing an 
'enlightened' morality. Hence it is of great importance to determine 
their own philosophical motivation. We have seen that 'enlightened' 
morality tends to be based more on utilitarian models than Christian 
ones, although the conclusions from both may at times coincide. 
b) Sex discrimination legislation:-
From our examination of the movement of women towards equality it is 
apparent that the major spurs to the passing of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 were firstly the current philosophy of equality, meaning 
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identity as far as practically possible, of rights and opportunities; 
secondly the triumph of the cultural movement which has abandoned the 
conventional wisdom that men and women have generally distinctive 
~'f"glgsig& aR8. characteristics which justify fundamentally different 
roles in private and public life, thirr.d .Ql~, desire and requirement 
+o ~ \ \ -,~ «"'-
to conform ~ international standard and fourthly the economic 
motivation of the need for more productive employment and economic 
growth. 
Practical Christian contributions to the legislative process are not 
easy to find. Certainly the Church of England was in a somewhat 
embarrassed position as being one of the exceptions of the Bill - thus 
enabling the continuance of its present sexual discrimination in · 
ordination to the priesthood. In the House of Lords the Bishop of 
ll 
Leicester did, in fact, support the Bill. His speech did, however, 
have a significantly different philosophy from those mentioned above. 
He commented that the Creator did not create a unisex world. Hence 
there are dangers if we ignore basic differences and functions between 
men and women. Yet he acknowledged that women must start by having 
identical rights and opportunities. From there the situation must be 
allowed to be flexible so that many occupations should develop a female 
aspect as well as a male one. This useful speech throws a specifically 
Christian insight on sexual equality. While giving qualified support 
to the Bill it seems to be at variance with the basic philosophy 
behind it. 
2. The Right to Life 
a) Abortion:-
The liberalization of the laws prohibiting abortion in the Abortion Act 
1967 had as its basic philosophy a desire to minimise human misery and 
increase human happiness - ie. utilitarianism~2 Added to this was the 
support of the women's liberation movement (the so-called 'women's 
right to choose') and also the support of a liberal Christian justi-
fication for abortion in carefully limited cases. In the event, as 
has been previously indicated in this study, the Act was extensively 
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interpreted - in some areas allowing abortion on demand. 
Christian reaction to the 1967 Abortion Act has varied widely. On 
the one hand are several vigo~ous Christian groups actively opposed 
to the present law and concerned to offer alternatives. Examples of 
these are the 'Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child', 'Life' 
and the social responsibility section of the 'Order for Christian 
Unity'. The first two of these are predominantly Roman Catholic in 
inspiration ani it is from the Catholic conscience that opposition is 
strongest, and unequivocal 'No' being given to abortion by the Roman 
Catholic Church. Pressure groups such as the above have significant 
support in Parliament and have been responsible for the unsuccessful 
attempts to get the Act amended .. These Bills have failed not from 
lack of support from M.P.'s but from the Government's unwillingness 
to allow the Bills sufficient time to become law. 
13 
Dowrick in an article written in the early years of the Act's operation 
listed three objections common to many who subscribe to the Christian 
ethic of respect for life. The first is the deletion of the adjectives 
'serious' and 'grave' in S.l(l)(a) thus allowing something very close 
to abortion on demand. Second Dowrick objects to the inclusion of 
existing children of the family in S.l(l)(a). He points out that it 
is difficult to imagine cases in which allowing a mother to continue 
to have her baby would injure the health of .the other children -
although it may be economically or domestically disadvantageous. 
Unscrupulous doctors may rely on this clause to justify abortions when 
the real ground for their decision is economic or domestic. However:-
"If doctors only invoke the defence in exceptional cases in good faith 
to protect the health of other children, it remains an unjustified 
extension of the ethical conclusion that the right of the foetus to 
live should only give way to its mother's rights to live and enjoy 
health." 14 
Thelast objection is to the provision within the Act to authorise the 
termination of a pregnancy if the doctors are of the opinion that there 
is a substantial risk the foetus is so abnormal ~ that the child may 
be 'seriously handicapped' . Dorwick comments:-
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"Even in the case of the foetus which has in fact abnormal features, 
physical or mental, the Christian would insist that these features 
do not disentitle it to live. Many handicapped human beings have 
led rich spiritual lives and enrich the lives of their families and 
neighbours." 15 
On the other hand the recent contribution of the Church of England 16 
and Protestant Churches has: been far more equivocal. We noted earlier 
the influential nature of the Church of England report "Abortion: 
An Ethical Enquiry" on the 1967 Act. Mr. White's 'Abortion (Amendment) 
I 
Bill provided an opportunity for the Church of England and other 
Churches to further elaborate their standpoint to the Select Committee. 
These contributions are reported in the Committee's 'Mrrnutes of 
17 18 
Evidence'. The assessment of them in that Chapter shows a significant 
variation between the Churches and also a significant change in the 
official stance of the Church of England. This related to the case of 
a prognosis of severe congenital handicap. Professor Dunstan affirmed:-
"If there was a prognosis of a child for whom nothing medical can be 
done to serve the child's interests, that would be a description 
which I would take as a ground for termination in utero." 
We noted in the earlier Chapter that this attitude was criticised by 
Leo Abse and Kevin McNamara for being based on the expediency of 
current medical and social attitudes, rather than on theological 
principles. 
We also noted that an even more liberal Protestant standpoint was seen 
in the evidence to the Select Committee of the Methodist Church Divi-
sion of Social Responsibility:-
'~e have not pressed for a repeal of the Act nor for greatly increased 
restrictions on its implementation. We would view with great concern 
steps which might lead to an appreciable increase in the numbers of 
backstreet abortions and unwanted children. We therefore welcome 
several clauses of the Abortion (Amendment) Bill but regard with 
unease the total effects of its provisions." 
In particular the Methodist Church doubted the wisdom of reinstating 
'grave' and 'serious' as proposed by Clause l.(l)(a). Theologically 
the Church acknowledges that all human life is reverenced. The foetus 
is undoubtedly part of the continuum of human existence, but the 
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Christian will wish to study the further extent to which the foetus is 
a person. The foetus has significance but lacks full personhood. 
When there is a conflict of interest with the mother the decision must 
not be taken lightly - but either answer is permissible. The Church 
allows the possibility that large families might provide a justifica-
ation for abortion. 
In its diversity some of the Christian stances on the Abortion Act 
are clearly contradictory. Whereas it would be misleading to suggest 
that the most liberal Christian positions have been largely instru-
mental in leaving the Act unamended, this being achieved by the more 
powerful utilitarian and women's rights lobbies, it cannot be denied 
that the drive to have the act substantially amended has come from 
the opposite Christian base, owi~~ its origin largely to Catholic 
inspiration. In a recent survey over half those who voted Labour in 
the last election and are practising Catholics said they would not so 
vote at the next General Election if the Labour Party took a pro-
abortion stance in its election manifesto. Here is Christian opinion 
exercising some force. A further examination of this issue in relation 
to the theologians studies in depth will be made shortly. 
b) Euthanasia:-
All attempts at legislation permitting euthanasia in any shape or form 
have been decisivelx: rejected by the House of Lords. We have seen in 
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the relevant Chapter that the Christian standpoint has been influential 
in this rejection. However, in that Chapter, attention was also drawn 
to the rather curious nature of current Anglican theological reasoning 
as exhibited in the pamphlet 'On Dying Well' (C.I.O. 1975) and the 
rather startling statements of ~1e Archbishop of Canterbury in his 
December 1976 speech to the Royal Society of Medicine. Concern was 
expressed in that Chapter that although Christian opposition to 
euthanasia had been effective in the past some of the modern theolog-
ical casuistry was putting the basic case in jeopardy. It is hoped 
to demonstrate that the theologians examined in this study provide a 
somewhat firmer ground for Christian moral pronouncements in this area. 
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c) Advanced Medical Technology:-
Although issues raised by advanced medical technology may relate to 
the moral problem of euthanasia, they also raise a more fundamental 
problem. The question is not only ''Is this life so fraught with pain 
or difficulties that the patient should be entitled to terminate it?' 
but also 'Is there a life in existence at all in these medical circum-
stances?' 'Is the doctor under an obligation to prolong it indefinite-
ly by means of machines?' The Christian contribution to this debate 
has not so far been impressive. We noted the difficulties in the 
Roman Catholic approach to 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' medical or 
surgical procedures:1 We also noted the possible dangers of an exten-
sion of the Archbishop of Canterbury's utilitarian arguments. Recent 
theological statements lack the clarity of approach of the earlier 
pamphlet 'Decisions about Life and Death' - an alarming factor conside~ 
ing the rapid and continual growth of medical technology and the 
·.increased possibilities and difficulties related to organ transplant-
ation. It is clear that the common Christian stance does: not seek 
officiously to keep alive by use of machines when there is no known 
possibility of recovery. Such a state of suspended animation is 
abhorrent. Yet recent official Church comment does not seem to have 
spotted the moral complexities and dangers, let alone contributed 
markedly in clarifying the issues. 
A somewhat sorry picture has been painted of the influence of present 
day Christian thought on legislation in the 1970's. Whereas in some 
areas the Christian voice is not heeded because it is out of tune with 
the prevailing philosophies, in other areas we have pointed to an 
apparent decline in theological cogency and quality of application. 
This presents a potentially dangerous situation of Christian thought 
largely unheeded, but even when listened to, possibly defective. 
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It is against this background that we now return to the four theolog-
ians examined in depth in this study, in the hope that their conclu-
sions, based on firmer foundations, will illuminate the deficiency 
in recent theological thought and legislation and provide a critical 
tool for legislative reform or criticism - a 'wholesomely disturbing 
presence', as Barth would describe it. 
The contribution to the modern debate of Barth, Maritain, Tillich 
and Mol tmann 
\ve have suggested that some of the recent contributions from the 
Churches in relation to the legislation under review may be ineffect-
ive or defective. The purpose of this section, central to the whole 
study, is to provide a critical analysis of current legislation from 
the insights of the four theologians examined in Part I. From this 
it is hoped to endorse current legislation where it is seen to be in 
accord with the Christian base, as defined by them, and likewise to 
suggest possible reform where this does not appear to be the case. 
We therefore return to ti1e basic classification of Part II of this 
study, namely the Equality legislation and the legislation concerning 
decisions with regard to life and death. 
1. The Equality Legislation:-
It has been suggested throughout this study that the philosophical 
foundation of the equality legislation is a somewhat crude and simple 
notion of equality. This is the notion of equality as sameness -
as two equals two in arithmetic. The simplicity of this concept is 
in some respects an advantage. It is easily understood. Legislation 
deriving from a simple, easily understood principle, is more likely to 
be straightforward and possess that certainty so highly regarded by 
practical lawyers. The Christian insights into equality we have 
examined do, however, present a far more complex picture which requires 
a more profound analysis than the model basic to the legislation. 
That a more profound analysis is necessary anyway in practical terms 
in the provisions present legislation seeks to enact can be seen in 
the Sex Discrimination Act - perhaps the most complex and ambiguous 
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of modern legislation. The question therefore remains in relation to 
that Act 'On what philosophical basis have these complexities been 
determined?' We will return to this later. 
At this stage it is helpful to reiterate basic distinctions as well 
as basic similarities between the Race Relations Acts and the Sex 
Discrimination Act. While distinctions between the races are princi-
pally those of colour, those between men and women are of a far more 
fundamental physiology. Whatever the importance attached to this 
philosophically, the need for practical exceptions and a variety of 
rights relating to physiology is obvious. Prima facie a more complex 
notion of equality appears necessary in relation to sex discrimination 
than in relation to racial discrimination or put more practically, 
while a simple notion of equality can be effective in racial discrim-
ination legislation, it is likely to lead to immense legislative 
difficulties in sex discrimination legislation. It will be argued in 
due course that this has been demonstrated in a comparison between the 
two Acts. 
As a pre-requisite to applying a Christian notion of equality we need 
to review what such a notion is as outlined by our four theologians. 
Fortunately they reveal a considerable unanimity. Perhaps the most 
profound examination of the notion of Christian equality is that under-
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taken by MARITAIN. We see in this analysis that Maritain rejects a 
mathematical base for the concept of equality and he rejects both that 
which he calls the 'Pure nominalist or empiricist notion of Equality' 
(ie. the fact of inequality leading to a deduction of inferiority) 
and what he calls 'Pseudo-Christian Egalitarianism.' (ie. equality 
as sameness). Rather the true 'Christian Equality' is based on the, 
tenet that all men are created in the image of God and are called to 
the same supernatural dignity as adopted sons of God. However this 
does not mean there should be no differences or distinctions between 
them. Differences and diversity of talents are part of the created 
order. However, they should not be used to negate fundamental rights 
which flow from the primary tenet above. In addition some notion of 
distributive justice is necessary to enable the individual to receive 
according to his talents and necessities. 
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M)LTiviANN makes a similar point to that of Mari tain in a Biblical 
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analysis of Gal.3/28:-
"For Christianity the basic principle of liberated humanity can only 
be the principle of the recognition of the other in his otherness, 
the recognition of the person who is different as a person. It 1s 
only this recognition which makes it possible for people who are 
different to live together - one in fellowship - sharing and fulfill-
ing man's common being in hope for the Kingdom." 
Likewise TILLICH, while adhering to the basic principle that 
"Every person is equal to every other, in so far as he is a person" 
nevertheless acknowledges that every concrete application of this 
principle is ambiguous. Differences in society may entail different 
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claims for distributive justice. BARTH likewise recognises a common 
humanity created by God. In the sphere of race relations this requires 
positive legislation to prevent discrimination. However he sees a 
distinction between the nature of racial equality and sexual equality. 
The nature of sexual equality is more complex for men and women are 
both inseparable and distinct. While one is not superior to the other 
the nature of the equality may justify differences in rirts and 
duties in personal as opposed to economic relationships~ 
The Christian view of equality here examined, then, recognises diversity 
- or otherness as Mbltmann puts it. It is not embarrassed by it, or 
~~ to pretend it does not exist. Rather it is able to rejoice in it 
as part of God's created order and part of the necessary means of 
attaining the fulfilment of that created order. It is, however, 
conscious that such diversity can be used to justify the denial of 
basic human rights to a section of humanity. This is tl1e case when 
the Christian position of diversity leading to unity cannot be grasped 
or is seen as a threat. Hence it is necessary as well as stressing 
the positive function of diversity also to stress indivisible rights 
which belbng to each person as a person. Such rights are akin to the 
full arithmetical notion of equality, but are not in themselves a 
full expression of the Christian nature of equality. More complex 
notions of equality are necessary when the diversity cannot be 
disregarded without impairing the basic integrity of the personality 
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of mankind. We will now see how this principle is operative in the 
spheres of racial and sexual discrimination. 
a) The Racial Discrimination Legislation:-
The common conclusion of our four theologians was that as a basic 
Christian tenet all men, of whatever colour, are created in the image 
of God. They are all children of God and loved by him - so Christ 
died for all mankind. From this theological principle it follows 
that all children of God must be treated as persons and given the 
basic rights and privileges belonging to persons. This Christian 
tenet would not seek to deny that there may be distinctions in char-
acteristics between the races but would strenuously resist any attempt 
to use such real characteristics to deny personhood or treat one race 
or class as inherently inferior to another. While acknowledging there 
may be distinctions between races, the Christian cannot see this as 
a fundamentally God-given order of creation. The doctrine of creation 
is a unitary one, giving rise to tinitary rights. Differences between 
races fundamentally arise from geographical and historical circum-
stances that have led to a va.riety of cultural development and insight. 
So BARTH stresses the positive role of distinctions:-
"In every land there are many native features, traditions and customs 
which would benefit greatly from superior foreign influences", 
while commenting that the basic theological precept behind this is 
that there is a common humanity created by God. Likewise MDLTMANN 
looks fonvard to the time when 
"people win through to a liberated, non-agressive identity as people 
- when they cease to identify 'being human' with the membership of 
a particular race. 11 
Given this basic theological concept an arithmetical notion of equality 
can be seen as an appropriate starting point in racial discrimination 
legislation. This concept is not, however, sufficient to cope with 
the particularly disadvantaged circumstances the racial minority may 
find itself in with regard to, say, education and training. It is 
therefore appropriate in addition to introduce an element of positive 
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discrimination in such areas to enable the basic concept to work 
satisfactorily. The Race Discrimination Acts as we have examined 
them earlier in this study can be seen to illustrate both these points. 
Undoubtedly the basic philosophical notion behind them is one of an 
arithmetical equality, which coupled with the social dangers of in-
equality have spurred the government to legislation. So we see in 
the 1976 Act an extensive enforcement of this principle. Both direct 
and indirect discrimination is covered, as is victimisation and 
incitement to racial hatred. Unlawful discrimination may take place 
in extensive areas of life - employment, education, the provision of 
goods, facilities and services, property transactions and advertise-
ments. We have seen that the reluctance to enforce the law in semi-
private areas, such asclubs)has been swept away by· the 1976 Act, 
although purely private relationships are not included. Positive 
discrimination is permitted to give persons of a particular racial 
group access to facilities or services to meet the special needs of 
persons of that group in regard to their education, training or 
welfare, or any ancillary benefit. 
While it is not suggested that Christian influence was extensive in 
the culmination of the race relations legislation in the 1976 Race 
Relations Act, it seems plain that the Christian concept of racial 
equality is akin to the concept employed and therefore~~ similar 
principles. There does, however, remain the separate issue, voiced 
by some Christians, whether what are fundamentally Christian attitudes 
can be enforced by law in the way the 1976 Race Relations Act tries to. 
The opposite danger, however, is to relegate Christian influence to 
private exhortation. Important although this may be all the theologians 
examined in this study view Christianity as vitally concerned with 
politics and legislation. This 'wholesomely disturbing presence' is 
a fundamental means of working towards the Kingdom of Heaven and 
showing the moral cogency of Christianity in practical terms. The 
Christian cannot separate the private moral life from the public duty 
in formulating law and political decisions. There does, however, 
remain a point at which relationships are not sufficiently public to 
justify the heavy hand of legislative intervention. It is, however, 
submitted, that the issue of so called 'private' clubs was not one of 
these. The evidence showed that these were used largely as a loophole 
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. 
'"' ~ the Act and that many belonged more to the public than the private 
sphere. 
However it remains true that a law such as the Race Relations Act 
1976 is far stronger if the moral principles underlying it have gen-
eral acceptance. Legislation by itself is insufficient. This was 
recognised under the 1968 Act with the establishment of both a 
Commission for Community Relations concerned with education and 
practical encouragement, and the Race Relations Board concerned with 
the enforcement of legislation. The Christian may question the wis-
dom in the 1976 Act of abolishing these and merging them in the new 
Commission for Racial Equality. Its duties are specified as working 
towards the elimination of discrimination, promoting equality of 
opportunity and good race relations as well as keeping the working of 
the Act under review and proposing amendments. While the view express-
ed by Lord Hailsham in the House of Lords debate that this is equiva-
lent to merging the Director of Public Prosecutions with the Archbishop 
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of Canterbury is perhaps a little far fetched, nevertheless it seems 
. unlikely that one commission c:'t";u these functions efficiently. 
Likewise the change to a system of largely individual enforcement in 
the ordinary courts may be questioned on the lines of the criticism 
of the old Race Relations Board. Are the races sufficiently equal to 
make individual enforcement a fair and practical proposition? Only 
time will tell. Nevertheless the strengthened provisions of the 1976 
Act are to be welcomed from the premiss of the theologians examined, 
as giving practical legislative effect to the basic Christian principles 
on racial equality. 
b) The Sex Discrimination Legislation:-
It will be argued that, whereas a simple arithmetical notion of 
equality is basically appropriate and justified by theological princi-
ples in the field of racial discrimination legislation, a more complex 
notion of equality is required in any legislation relating to sexual 
discrimination. That is not to say an arithmetical notion has no part 
to play in this area, but that it is not sufficient by itself. 
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Whereas, theologically, the creation of mankind was seen as a unitary 
act in which the subsequent existence of different races was not a 
fundamental order of creation, mankind itself is subdivided - 'male 
and female he created them.' This was no historical accident but 
part of the Divine purpose for the survival and advancement of the 
human race. God did not create a unisex world, except in some of the 
simplest and crudest forms of life, but a bisexual world. In partic-
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ular BARTH examines the consequences of this. \Vhereas on the one hand 
both male and female are human creatures of God and the image of God 
and whereas crude typology is dangerous and possibly insulting, the 
fact nevertheless remains that:-
"Outside their connnon relationship to God there is no point in the 
encounter and fellowship of man and woman at which even as man and 
woman they can also transcend their sexuality and precisely in the 
relationship to God they cannot do this in such a way that they 
become to be male and female or that their sexuality becomes non-
essential." 
tvDLTMANN'S recognition of the other in his otherness points to the 
strong positive function of the distinction of the sexes - although 
this is not Moltmann's own conclusion. Man is attracted to woman 
and woman to man because each make up for what the other lacks. 
The Christian moralist can rejoice in a basic sexual distinction in 
the order of creation, without thereby suggesting that one is superior 
to the other. Here again we return to MARITAIN'S distinctions in 
models of equality. BAR11-I comments that in inner dignity and tight 
one has not the slightest advantage over the other. Man and woman 
are fully equal before God and are equal in regard to the necessity 
of their mutual relationship and orientation. He does, however, 
conclude that in domestic relationships that man has a Divine prece-
dence in order although this should confer no privilege or injustice 
- no duty or right. 
In such analysis BARTH makes us aware of a fundamental distinction 
between domestic relations of men and women, particularly in the 
married state and relationships in the sphere of legal and political 
freedom, rights and responsibilities. Such a distinction can also 
be seen behind the analyses of J1.1ARITAIN and M)LTMANN. I:ri this respect:-
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"The restriction of the political freedom and responsibility •••. 
supremely that of woman, is an arbitrary convention which does not 
deserve to be preserved any longer. If Christians are to be consist-
ent there can only be one possible decision in this matter." 28 
It follows that an Act legislating in respect of identical rights and 
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responsibilities in these areas must have Christian support. 
Hence there is no difficulty for the Christian who agrees with this 
theological analysis to welcome the provisions of the Sex Discrimination 
Act with regard to equal pay, equal opportunity in education and 
employment and equality in the provision of goods, facilities and 
services. However the impossibility of extending such an arithmetical 
notion of equality on a comprehensive scale can be seen by an exam-
ination of the provisions of and execptions to the Sex Discrimination 
Act. Thus there are many general exceptions to the Act (S.43 -51) 
as well as specific employment exceptions including recruitment based 
on "genuine occupational qualifications." It recognises that there 
are occasions when work can be done more effectively by a man rather 
than a woman. All of this involves a necessary discrimination and 
an admission that the basic philosophical notion of the Act cannot be 
applied consistently. Even the basic definition of discrimination in 
S.l(l)(a) and S.l(l)(b) is not without its difficulties as we have 
noted. The attempt to graft on the Equal Pay Act into this philo-
sophical and legal jungle has proved disastrous in terms of the basic 
philosophical concept and the unrealistic attempt to treat sexual 
discrimination in the same way as Race Discrimination has led to a 
muddled, confused and defective piece of legislation. 
The solution would seem to be first to get the philosophy right and 
then to seek to apply the new philosophy consistently. In the earlier 
part of this study we have examined theological models of sexual 
equality. \~ile on the face of it these appear more complex than the 
philosophy underlying the Act, paradoxically this complexity of concept 
leads to far simpler legislative conclusions. \~t are the conclusions 
possible from a Christian concept of sexual equality? ~ile acknow-
ledging that equality is basically complementary this should not lead 
to any state of loss of opportunity nor to any enforced stereotyping. 
However in this view of equality, discrimination is not the prima facie 
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evil it appears to be in the Sex Discrimination Act. It is submitted 
that the extent of the exceptions under the Act point also to the 
fact that discrimination is a fundamentally unsound principle for 
legislation in this area, deriving as it does from·a false concept 
of arithmetical equality. What then is the right approach to 
guarantee the admitted political, social and economic rights to men 
and women? The solution seems to be to stick to that measure of 
equality where an arithmetical notion can be justified in respect of 
basic rights and the clue is found in the name of the Corrnnission 
designed to implement the Act - Equal Opportunities. An Act specific-
ally designed to promote equal opportunities between men and women 
would suffer none of the tortuous legal complexities and absurdities 
of the present Act. Many of the exceptions of the present Act would 
no longer be necessary because the concept would not be discrimination 
but rather denial of equal opportunities. The Equal Pay Act would be 
· _:kept as a separate statute dealing with a separate, though related, 
area of equal pay for equal work . 
2. Legislation concerning decisio~about Life and Death 
-ft~S 
Whereas the impetus ~ legislation like the Abortion Act 1967 and 
............ s 
~ proposedlegislation to legalise euthanasia comes typically from 
the Utilitarian school seeking to minimise the sum of human misery, 
the Christian moralist as demonstrated by the theologians in this 
thesis starts from a completely different premiss - one of theology. 
The fundamental Christian premiss is that aptly described by Barth 
- all human life is an unmerited loan from God. ~fun should treat 
this loan with respect and not seek to usurp the DivinJauthority in 
matters of life and death. The philosophical foundatibn of this in 
ontology is traced by Tillich. Maritain enumerates human rights 
arising out of this, including the right to existence and the right 
to keep one's body whole. Mbltmann treats the Divine gift within the 
context of its acceptance in human terms and its surrender. 
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a) Abortion 
ck. " .. 'l-td 
By far the most ~FsisHftd analysis of this problem examined in this 
30 
study is found in the analysis of Barth. He has no doubt, from his 
starting point of the sacredness of life, that this is both medically 
co .at~ "r-
and theologically the killing of a htnnan life. However, l!Q.~ the 
Roman Catholic view, we noted that he was prepared to admit exceptions 
in which there may be the possibility that God may wish this life to 
be terminated. He expresses one clear case where this is justified 
- where the life of the unborn child directly threatens the life or 
health of the mother. 
By including the health of the mother as a possible justification for 
abortion, Barth has admitted aq exception oflssible immense bTeadth. ~ ... \:~~ '"' He devotes little theologica~justification this exception and 
likewise gives little guidance on the practical difficulties involved 
in assessing such damage to health. Such assessment is made more 
difficult by his willingness to acknowledge that on rare occasions 
socio-medical reasons may suffice. How far should economic or 
environmental conditions enable the basic precept of the sacredness 
" of lifelbe overruled? We are left with little guidance from Barth, 
except that any such calculation s~ arise from scrupulous heart-
\eoc.\£ ~ ~ 
searching before God. This~seerns to be a major weakness in Barth's 
argument. 
The socio-medical provision as a possible justification for an abortion 
in exceptional circtnnstances comes close to the original intention of 
the legislation to permit abortion, although the governing factor of 
the decision in the legislation was to have been more the philosophy 
of Utilitarianism than Barth's 'scrupulous heart-searching before God'. 
TI1e practical difficulties in assessing 'grave injury to health' 
resulted, however, in the all embracing 'injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her 
31 family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated'. It is this 
provision under which the vast majority of abortions have been justifia:l. 
Such 'injury' on many occasions seems to amount to no more than socio-
economic inconvenience. Barth, even at his most liberal, could only 
justify socio-economic reasons in the most extreme circumstances, but 
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his analysis gives us no practical guidance about how a Christian 
can limit this justification in order to remain consistent with the 
basic precept of the sacredness of life. 
Mbltmann in his analysis deals with the problem in a different way. 
In seeking the origin and value of the humanness of life he lays 
stress on the origin of humani~ as coming when it is accepted and 
affirmed·, recognised and loved. This subjective approach might 
provide a justification for abortion but for two factors. The one 
Moltmann mentions is that human non-recognition and refusal of 
nascent life can be revoked, but an abortion is irreversible. The 
one he does not mention is the status of life in the sight of God, 
which may make its revocation a sin. Moltmann, more than Barth, 
recognises gradations of life - from the potential to the actual. 
Here we see a possible influence on the official Church of England 
standpoint as described earlier. Both Barth and Mol tmann envisage 
morally justifiable abortion as a rare event and one which must be 
justified theologically and not merely in human terms. Neither would 
Mol tmann' s concept of personhood justify abortion on the grounds of 
potential handicap per se, if he is consistent in the extension of 
his argument. 
Despite some successful action taken against various obvious abuses, 
the present law on Abortion in England is very liberal and in many 
cases amotmts almost to abortion on demand. Over one million \""'~ ...... ~ 
abortions have taken place since the Act was first passed - a~sigHlfi 
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eBnt factor in the recent significant decline in live births. 
. h . 34h Mite ell commented 1n 1967 t at to relax the law very considerably 
on abortion would weaken the moral restraint even further with the 
result that the number of illegal abortions would continue to rise, 
because many people would regard abortion as a remedy for inconveni-
ence which even the more liberal law did not regard as a sufficient \ -~--· \<e\\~ U~tl ~ ~ ~\o~ 
reason to justify the operation. In the event this has not fiappenedk 
simply because it has been possible to justify the operation tmder 
the Act on the flimsl.est of moral grotmds. However the point about 
the weakening of morals when legal restraint is removed seems evident 
35 from the continued increase in the numbers of legal abortions. There 
is ample evidence to suggest that the Christian concept of the value 
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of life has, in this area, been seriously eroded. 
It is therefore suggested that the atteffiP,tS to amend the Abortion 
36 
Act 1967, analysed earlier in this study, and deriving from a 
fundamentally Christian motivation, are in accord with the theological 
conclusions we have been examining. Any revision of legislation which 
seeks to take more care over the decision, and to weigh with more 
importance the seriousness of the step of denying the flowering of 
h~life, is to be welcomed. In particular attempts should be made 
to restore the words 'serious' and 'grave' to qualify the risks 
envisaged in S.l(l)(a) of the Act, or some other means found to ensure 
that the basic sanctity of unborn life is given more emphasis. 
Significantly attempts to do this and to introduce more controls to 
the Act generally have obtained the majority approval of M.P.'s but 
have been denied time by the government, in deference to their own 
pressure groups. The conclusion of this study is that continued 
Christian representation is vital. 
b) Euthanasia 
Euthanasia has been unequivocally opposed by the theologians concen-
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trated upon in this study. In Maritain's enumeration of rights it 
contradicts 'The right to existence', 'The right to keep one's body 
whole' and 'The right of every human being to be treated as a person 
and not a thing.' The proponents of euthanasia may argue that these 
can be counterbalanced by a right to decide to end one's life. Such 
an argument would not gain favour with Maritain for in his enumeration 
of positive rights he quite clearly accords these an absolute value. 
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BARTH likewise gives an unequivocal 'No' to euthanasia. His principal 
reason comes not from the enumeration of inalienable rights but rather 
from what he sees as a wicked usurpation of God's sovereign right over 
life and death. If we can see no value to a life, or even if the 
person concerned can see no value to his life we must still acknow-
39 
ledge "The value of this kind of life is God's secret." M:>LTMANN 
starts from a similar premiss and analyses the problem in terms of 
the nature of man's personhood as created by God. He comments that 
if being human is identified with being healthy, or useful, then the 
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sight of a handicapped person brings insecurity and demands for 
extinction. However the Christian vocation is to recognise not the 
material but the spiritual reality - to recognise the other in his 
otherness as one in fellowship. Thus we all share and fulfil man's 
common being in hope for the Kingdom. TILLICH while not entering 
into specific ethical applications of his philosophy, in his emphasis 
on the ontology of love, power and justice belonging to God alone, 
\vould no doubt reject with Barth any attempt to steal this ontology 
from God and set up man as an arbiter over the life of his fellow 
man or on his own life on grounds of human disinclination to accept 
life. 
Such an unequivocal stance on the value of life in the sight of God, 
no matter how wretched it may appear in human terms lays a clear 
ethical foundation for the Christian to oppose any legislation 
advocating euthanasia. Added to this are the more practical consider-
ations of the doctor and the lawyer. Modem drugs can, to a large 
extent alleviate pain. This is morally permissible although the by-
product may be an incidental shortening of life, for it is not for 
the incidental reason the drugs are being administered. The function 
of medicine is not to keep humans alive at all cost. The Christian 
theologian does not lay so muc~ stress on the value of life because he 
is frightened of death, for the Chrjs.tian faith does not see death as 
an ultimate end, but merely a stage in the spiritual journey. Hence, 
while not deliberately inducing death, there are occasions when it is 
right not to practise meddlesome medicine but to allow the patient to 
die and to ease this inevitable and universal process. In the words 
of BARTH 
·~e should not make the required assisting of human life a forbidden 
torturing of it. A case is: at least conceivable in which a doctor 
might have to recoil from this prolongation of life no less than from 
its arbitrary shortening." 
c) Problems connected with advancedmedical technology 
The ethical issues and conclusions in this area bear·a close resem-
blance to those already discussed under the heading of Euthanasia. 
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They do, however, mark grey areas of moral complexity caused by 
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incredible advances in medical technology. The earlier Chapter in 
which this area was examined has shown the considerable uncertainty 
on definitions in both the legal and medical field. Th~ ~~~e in 
no small measure from a discussion of 'What is medical life?' and 
'What is medical death?' The medical profession in this country 
has sought to answer this problem in its definition of 'brain death'. 
Although the possibility of such medical technology was not available 
when the majority of our theologians were writing, it is not difficult 
to trace the Christian re~ronse from their principles. Indeed this 
has been done by MOLTMANN. The Christian distinction is that between 
meddlesomely prolonging life and the required assisting of it. 
Moltmann comments that physical death can be determined by the dying 
of vital organs - of which the irreversible death of the brain would 
be one. If this is the case death should be accepted and the patient 
entrusted into God's loving care. This reveals the primary use of 
advanced life-support technology - that of determining whether death 
should be accepted or whether there is any possibility of recovery. 
Hence, depending on the medical conclusions it may have to be employed 
for a considerable length of time in a comatose person, or it may, if 
medically there is no prospect of recovery, be correct to switch U1e 
machine off. That is a medical decision and if undertaken responsibly, 
has full Christian backing. 
However, legal difficulties arise ~such a subjective notion of death. 
The pronosal of Adrienne Van Till-d'Aulnis de Bourouill examined 
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earlier has its attractions. That was to have a rigid definition of 
death as well as legal immunity for withdrawal of artificial support 
in clearly specified cases:-
"To accept a differentiation in ethics is a better solution than to 
allow doctors to redefine death in terms of coma." 
This would give legal status to irreversibly comatose individuals who 
would still be alive under the author's definition until the respirator 
was turned off. Such a definition would seem both more logical and 
more in accord with the Christian value of life than the definition 
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adopted which suggests that the patient is already dead while sustained 
on the machine if certain criteria are fulfilled. It gives spiritual, 
ethical and legal rights to the comatose individual and at such a 
crisis point demands a decision as to whether the individual be allowed 
to die or not. The law should enshrine the ethical nature of the moral 
decision, rather than say the patient was already dead. 
This might appear an academic point but for the complications intro-
duced from that other area of medical technology - that of organ 
transplants. It is undoubtedly true that some irreversibly comatose 
individuals are maintained on a machine with the sole purpose of 
removing some of their organs at a convenient time. If the patient is 
legally and ethically dead the humanist may think this can hardly be 
questioned. However the Christian moralist could not condone such 
w""'"" 
action or see the patient as dead. Rather he would see this ~ the 
category of a forbidden torturing of human life - a sinful denial of 
the finality of death, and the right to a Christian burial. If it is 
wrong in Christian terms artificially to prolong life when only the 
patient is considered it is doubly wrong to deny a person's right to 
death by using him as a spare parts' bank at the doctor's whim, no 
matter how vital such organs may be to others. The definition proposed 
above would enshrine this. Once the decision has been made in the 
patient's interest a short and clearly defined period of time should be 
available if the question of transplants was involved, in order to 
obtain the necessary consents and fulfil the necessary legal requirements. 
We noted in an earlier Chapte~3that the present statute dealing with the 
area (the Human Tissue Act 1961) is both out of date and gravely 
deficient in law. A revised Act is now necessary. It is suggested on 
the lines argued above that the new Act should face the problem of a 
legal definition of death, coupled with immunity for withdrawal of 
artificial support in clearly specificed cases, the artificial support 
in such cases being seen theologically as a temporary cessation of the 
natural course of death in order to see if any possibility of cure 
existed. Its switching off is not therefore a moral hastening of death 
but a moral refusal to.irnpede death. This is therefore in no sense 
legislation permitting euthanasia. The new Act should further remedy 
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the legal defects already pointed out in the practical issues of 
obtaining consent to the removal of organs. 
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CHAPTER 11 - NOTES 
The Aptlication of the foregoing theological concepts to present day 
Englis law 
1. cf. Chapter 3. 
2. cf. Chapter 4. 
3. cf. Chapter 2. 
4. cf. Chapter 5. 
5. F.E. Dowrick, 'Christian Values in the Legislative Process 1n 
Britain in the Sixties.' A.Jo.J/P Vo1.16. pg.156f. 
6. Ibid. pg.182. 
7. cf. pg.118fof this thesis. 
8. Dockers Labour Club v Race Relations Board 1974 3 All E.R. 
at pg.598. 
9. Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords). Hansard. Fifth Series 
Vo1.373. Co1.741. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords). Hansard. Fifth Series. 
Vo1.362. Cols.130-136. 
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F.E. Dowrick, Justice According to the English Common Lawyers 
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13. F.E. Dowrick, •·Christian Values in the Legislative Process in 
Britain in the Sixties'. A.Jo.J/P Vol.16. pg.l56f. 
14. Ibid. pg.l73. 
15. Ibid. pg.l74. 
16. cf. pg.l70 of this thesis. 
17. First Report from the Select Committee on Abortion.' Vol.II 
Minutes of Evidence. H.M.S.O. H.C. 573-II (1975-76). 
18. cf. pgl78f of this thesis. 
19. Taken by the 'Sunday' programme on B.B.C. Radio 4 and announced 
Dec. 11th. 1977. 
20. cf. Chapter 9. 
21. cf. pgJ..97 of this thesis. 
22. cf. pg.24f of this thesis. 
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23. cf •.. pg·., l0_6f of this thesis. However Moltmann is here apply:in.g 
this to distinctions between the healthy and the handicapped. 
It was argued that his conclusions could be logically extended 
to differences in sex, but Mbltmann himself appears to deny 
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24. cf. pg. 79£ of this thesis. 
25. Ibid. pg. 61£. 
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28. Karl Barth, Against the Stream (1954) pg.38. 
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an Act of Parliament that women as a whole attach a high priority 
to the enforcement of such rights (cf. Jane Fortin, 'Sex 
Discrimination Laws- Success of Failure?' 128 New L.J. 700). 
If this is so there may be some justification for laying more of 
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30. cf. pg.S6 of this thesis. 
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41. Ibid. pg. 108. 
42. Ibid. pg. 210£0 
43. Ibid. pg. 214£0 
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Conclusions 
The four theologians examined are engaged upon a continuation of the 
age old quest of Christianity to understand God better, and as a 
result of this understanding to put into practice how we determine 
.~u~~ God wishes us to live and relate to each other. Each age must ~ 
this process afresh, building and adapting on the wisdom of its 
predecessors, to meet modern conditions. and problems. Our specific 
task has been to examine the nature of God's Justice, to derive from 
this precepts for man's guidance in practical living and to apply 
these to particular legal problems in the Britain of the 1970's. 
In this task, although the theologians have been drawn from widely 
differing confessional standpoints we have come across a significant 
degree of unanimity as illustrated by the last Chapter. In particular, 
clear precepts have been derived for man's guidance in practical living. 
It could well be argued that the need for legislation would be drama-
tically lessened should Christian precepts be universally followed. 
This is especially so in regard to many of the areas under consider-
ation in this study, dealing as they do with matters of morality. It 
is certainly part of the Christian task to get people to behave in a 
Christian way and so negative the need for law designed to enforce 
morality. However, should this task of the individual prove ineffect-
ive the Christian has a responsibility to operate through institutions 
and government. This does not mean taking over such institutions in 
the guise of a Christian political party, for Christians can legit-
imately hold a wide variety of political views, nor does it mean 
usurping the skill of the legislator and providing detailed draft 
bills. It does, however, mean offering precepts or guidelines for 
legislators. 
As we have seen in the legislation examined in this study, behind each 
bill is a guiding philosophy as well as mere concrete precepts or 
guidelines. This 'spirit of the law' is of vital importance in its 
interpretation and subsequent development. It determines what sort of 
fruit the legislator will bear - in what sort of way it will change 
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or modify human actions, behaviour and thought. If Christians opt 
out of this vital area they cannot be surprised if new guiding phil-
osophies, some subtly close to Christian ideals, some poles apart 
Q 
emerge. We have seen throughout this study that the prev¢lant legis-
lative philosophy today is Utilitarianism. This may be Social 
Utilitarianism, implying that the Government is the better judge of 
the happiness of the majority and can regulate by laws and admin-
istrative processes, or it may be Individual Utilitarianism. This 
implies that the individual is the better judge of his own happiness 
or misery, and accordingly the law should leave him maximum freedom · 
to make his own decisions without regulations· from above. Neither 
contains, in itself, any transcendental reference. In the nature of 
things subjective judgements and pragmatic expedients are the order 
of the day. There can be no external reference apart from humanity, · 
because the well-being of humanity, as determined by legislators, is 
the only thing that matters. 
In contrast to this the theologians examined stand for an older, and 
it is argued more fruitful belief that there is a transcendent quality, 
traditionally known as Justice and that this may, on occasion override 
pronouncements of positive law. Above all that in theological terms 
this is rooted and grounded in God, and made concrete through his 
revelation to mankind. This does, of course, depend on human under-
standing, experience and reasoning, all of which are potentially 
fallible. Yet precepts so derived can be empirically tested by experi-
ence and by unanimity as well as by more indefinable factors such as 
prayer and conscience. Such precepts may well be referred to as 
'natural' and part of 'natural right'. Undoubtedly they have to be 
extended to fit modern conditions and problems but concrete precepts 
derived from a transcendent Divine Justice can be offered and have been 
offered in some profusion within this study. These act not merely as 
guidelines for legislators but also as a critique of laws. 
This process is no incidental luxury for Christians to indulge in but 
a matter of spiritual life or death. Legislation~ not based on Christ-
ian precepts is ever liable to lead man to set up himself as final 
arbiter instead of Divine Justice. Given the Christian realism about 
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human sin, the Christian argues that this is ever likely to lead 
into tyranny and misery and dehumanisation of one kind or another. 
This has been argued within this study in respect of some of the 
social refonns effected or proposed. Thus to take perhaps the clear-
est example, the ease with which abortions are now performed has led 
to a dehumanisation of the foetus as a source of life. So, where 
the foetus is unwanted, it becomes viewed as a sort of growth endanger-
ing the mother's health, which it is justifiable to remove. When the 
foetus is wanted it is treated with loving care and is referred to 
typically as an unborn bab~ Yet the foetus itself, whether wanted 
· · · lf -_..,.\r-' ~ th f s· ·1 1 · or not, 1s m 1tse rma ogons to ano er oetus. 1m1 ar y 1t 
becomes far easier to justify euthanasia should empirical standards 
of 'quality of life' be used. 'This old person' it could be argued 
'has such a poor quality of life, that it is not a life at all in any 
meaningful sense. Therefore it is morally permiss~le to administer 
euthanasia.' 
The Christian moralist, on the other hand, is concerned with precepts 
which are endemic and emanate from God, rather than those which are 
empirical and emanate from man. This study has attempted to draw out 
their implications at one particular point of:history and in relation 
to one particular, highly developed, legal system. On occasions it 
has found points .·of influence on legislations by Christian precepts, 
of agreement on legislation by Christian precepts and also of critic-
ism or disagreement arising from Christian precepts. It claims to 
shaw that there is still Christian reflection in this vital area 
which exhibits a significant degree of unanimity. Whether this 
reflection will be further put into action remains in the realms of 
speculation. It can offer precepts, or guidelines for legislators, 
it can criticise laws but it has no power to enforce beyond persuasion, 
and, it would argue, the (admittedly imperfect) exhibition of that most 
glittering yet elusive jewel - the truth, which it would say resides 
in God and is seen in His Justice. 
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